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ABSTRACT
The prime objectives of the study are to analyse the effects of tax and tariff policies in
Bangladesh. Toward this end, different variants of computable general equilibrium
models are developed and used to assess the distributional consequence of tax reform
and to examine the resource allocation and income distribution effects of tariff
liberalisation within the paradigm of both 'traditional' and 'new' trade theories.
A computable general equilibrium model of the Bangladesh economy is developed to
assess the distributional consequences of the indirect tax reform which involves the
introduction of a value added tax system. The model captures specific features of a
consumption-type and destination principle-based value added tax system which has
been adopted in Bangladesh. An alternative model of the Bangladesh economy is
also developed to analyse the effects of tariff liberalisation on resource allocation and
income distribution under both competitive and non-competitive assumptions. The
model explicitly incorporates 'market structure' variables such as marginal costs, the
number of domestic firms, the excess profit condition, the market demand elasticities
for domestic firms and increasing returns to scale.
The models are static in nature and are calibrated to a 1988/89 data set compiled
within the framework of a social accounting matrix (SAM). The social accounting
matrix integrates different data sources and the input-output table to depict the major
macroeconomic relations and provides a consistent macroeconomic data set for policy
modelling. Such a framework is particularly useful for a country such as Bangladesh
with sparse and conflicting data sources. The SAM is an attractive framework for
locating inconsistencies and for resolving them in best the possible ways.
11
The incidence effects of the indirect tax system under pre-VAT and VAT systems are
based on two approaches: a simple approach and a computable general equilibrium
approach.
Two sets of policy experiments are carried out. First, excise duties of domestic
production activities and sales taxes on imports are replaced by a revenue-neutral
single rate of value-added tax. In the second experiment, the VAT system is extended
to the service sector with a revenue-neutral VAT rate. The results of policy
experiments indicate that because of exemptions on subsistence agricultural products,
and because of the progressive structure of the tariffs, the overall indirect tax system
would remain progressive even after the introduction of a single rate VAT. However,
the overall indirect tax incidence appears to be less progressive under the VAT system
compared with the pre-VAT system.
The effects of tariff liberalisation on resource allocation and income distribution are
also examined in this study. It is observed that the results of tariff liberalisation are
sensitive to the way the model is specified. It is also observed that in the competitive
and constant returns to scale model variant, resources move from the heavily protected
sector to the less protected sectors as a result of tariff liberalisation. In contrast, the
heavily protected manufacturing sectors turn out to be the main beneficiary of
liberalisation when imperfect competition is introduced. Expansion of manufacturing
output appears to come from the pro-competitive effects of tariff liberalisation. On
the other hand, almost all the manufacturing sectors show much larger output growth
with the incorporation of increasing returns to scale. The larger expansion of output
of manufacturing sectors is due to a reduction in unrealised scale economies. The
income distribution effects of tariff liberalisation are captured through the changes in
income levels of the six household groups and changes in factor income and factor
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returns. The redistribution of income under liberalisation appears to favour the low
income household groups. However, it appears that the relative progressivity and
regressivity in the distribution of household income depend on the relative changes of
capital and labour income.
The association between market structure variables and profitability in the
manufacturing sector of Bangladesh is also analysed in this study. This exercise
provides some evidence on the association between industrial structure and
profitability and assesses the importance of foreign and domestic factors on industry
profitability. Two alternative measures of concentration namely concentration ratio
and Hirschman-Herfindahl index and two foreign competition variables such as
import shares and effective tariff rates are used to examine this association. The
results of this exercise indicate that profitability is significantly related to
concentration levels in the manufacturing sector of Bangladesh. It also reports that
foreign competition variables play a significant role in affecting profitability in
domestic industries. It is observed that the profitability is higher in those industries
where concentration levels are high and import shares are low and effective tariff rates
are high.
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Chapter One
Analysis of Trade and Tax Policies in Bangladesh
1.1 Introduction and objectives
Trade policies have historically been restrictive in Bangladesh. Tariffs and non-tariff
barriers such as quantitative restrictions have traditionally been used to restrict the
free flow of imports into the domestic economy. Such restrictive policies tend to
reflect the policy makers concern about the need to raise revenue, reduce balance of
payments pressure and offer protection to domestic industries to encourage import
substitution.
The costs of these policies to the national economy appears to be high. The inevitable
price distortions resulting from these policies are expected to channel resources to
import-competing industries because protection permits domestic industries to operate
with value added higher than that prevailing under free trade thereby providing
incentives for the movement of resources into protected industries. Incentives for
import substitution and against exports are also provided by the fact that firms can
obtain higher domestic price in the home market while getting the world market price
on export sales, although paying the same price for imported inputs. Export activities
have also been penalised by the coexistence of overvalued currency with the
restrictive trade regime (Balassa et al, 1971; and Krueger, 1984). It is, thus only
reasonable to expect that the restrictive trade policy in Bangladesh has unfavourable
resource allocation and welfare consequences. Thus elimination of such restrictions is
therefore expected to improve resource allocation and national welfare.
The restrictive trade polices could result in other important sources of wastages as
well. For instance, while the quantitative restrictions could lead to rent-seeking
(Krueger, 1974), tariff restrictions could lead to revenue-seeking (Bhagwati and
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Srinivasan, 1980), both involving wastages. Further, since the elasticity of import
duty is low, the lopsided dependence on import duty as a source of revenue could
mean serious uncertainty for public expenditures.
Furthermore, over the last decade the incorporation of market structure variables and
economics of scale, etc. into trade theory reveals additional sources of potential gains
from trade. In many sectors (evidence suggests at least for the manufacturing sector),
industrial structure is better depicted by a small number of large firms rather than a
large number of small firms which individually have no control over market prices.
Lack of competition allows a few domestic firms to use their monopoly power. Such
monopoly power allows domestic firms to charge price a higher than the average cost
of production thereby reaping excess profits. It is also argued that protection allows
domestic firms to operate at production levels far below minimum efficient scale
(Rodrik, 1988). Thus the domestic firms would be operating somewhere up the
average cost curve. Under such circumstances, trade liberalisation can yield
additional efficiency gains by reducing the monopoly power of domestic firms (i.e.
pro-competitive effects) and rationalisation of domestic industry through exploitation
of scale economies.
Chapter 5 of this study provides some estimates of the extent of concentration in the
major manufacturing sectors in Bangladesh. These estimates (e.g. four-firm
concentration ratios and Hirschman-Herfindahl index) suggest that the extent of
competition is rather weak in most industries in Bangladesh. Even though the
concentration ratios on their own can not show how collusive the behavioural
outcomes in particular industries are, these numbers seem broadly indicative of the
extent of imperfect competition (Rodrik, 1988). Furthermore, measures of
concentration (i.e. concentration ratios and Hirschman-Herfindahl index) are found to
be statistically significant determinants of 'profitability'-measured by price-cost
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margins. Considering the evidence of imperfect competition in the manufacturing
sectors, it seems reasonable to include features of 'industrial organisation' within trade
policy analysis in Bangladesh.
Possible consequences of such restrictive trade policy have already generated serious
debates in Bangladesh with regard to its advisability. The recent wave of structural
adjustment programmes, involving in particular trade liberalisation, all over the
developing world perhaps also have influenced this debate. Accordingly, Bangladesh
has been gradually liberalising her foreign trade regime since the early eighties. The
trade liberalisation strategies in Bangladesh have involved gradual elimination of non-
tariff barriers during the first phase and reduction of tariff rates during the later phase.
Some features of the trade regime and trade reforms are discussed in Appendix A. 1.
Thus one of the objectives of this study is to examine the resource allocation, welfare
and income distribution effects of tariff liberalisation in Bangladesh within the
paradigm of both the 'traditional' and 'new' trade theories. This also appears overdue
in the absence of any study undertaken specifically to analyse the resource allocation,
welfare and income distribution effects of the tariff liberalisation within the paradigm
of 'new trade policy' involving imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale.
Apart from their protective role, tariffs have traditionally been the major source of tax
revenue in Bangladesh. Taxes on imports such as customs duties (i.e. tariffs) and
sales taxes account for a significant proportion of tax revenue in Bangladesh. It is
observed that in 1974-79 period the proportion of taxes (i.e. customs duties and sales
taxes) on imports was 60 percent of total tax revenue. The corresponding proportions
for 1980-84 and 1985-90 were 57 and 52 percent respectively. Thus, on average taxes
on imports account for 54 percent of tax revenue in Bangladesh. Another important
source of tax revenue is excise tax. Over 97 percent of taxes on domestic production
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activities used to come from excise taxes which are levied ex factory on domestic
production and also on some services. However, the contribution of excise tax in tax
revenue is moderate, particularly in comparison to taxes on imports. On average
excise taxes account for about 26 percent of tax revenue. On the other hand the
contribution of direct taxes (e.g. income, land and other direct taxes) is around 16
percent of tax revenue in Bangladesh (Table A.3). The main features of the tax
system are:
(i) Import-based taxation typically does not lead to an elastic tax system. A tax
system is said to be elastic where tax revenue expands in line with GDP, without the
need for frequent discretionary changes in the tax rates. However, heavy dependence
on import taxation has made the indirect tax system inelastic in Bangladesh. The
income elasticity of all taxes is estimated to be 0.71 for 1975/76 to 1984/85 period.
The values of elasticity of customs duties and sales tax on imports are reported to be
0.55 and 0.56 for the same period. On the other hand the excise and income tax
elasticities are 0.83 and 1.11 respectively for the same period (Table A.4).
(ii) Since the tax system is inelastic, in almost every budget government adopts some
discretionary measures (e.g. changes in tax rates of some sectors) to raise additional
revenue. Discretionary measures have not been adopted in a consistent and systematic
manner. It is difficult to ascertain beforehand which sectors would be targeted for
such measures. Thus such measures tend to create uncertainty in decision making
(e.g. costing and pricing, etc.) and discriminate against such sectors.
(iii) The indirect tax system also relied on the taxation of intermediate goods. In the
absence of tariffs, sales taxes and excise taxes relief on inputs used in production of
exports, the systems tend to discriminate against exports, especially non-traditional
exports.
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(iv) The cascading effects of taxes on inputs, of taxes on inputs to those inputs, and
so on made it difficult to ascertain how much different goods are taxed in production
process and perhaps led to consequences different from those intended by the policy
makers. Thus, input taxation can discourage sectors which government policy was
originally formulated to encourage. Some estimates of extent of input taxation and
the cascading effects of taxes on inputs are discussed in Appendix A.2.
It is argued by policy makers in Bangladesh that the objectives of efficiency,
elasticity, automatic tax relief and transparency of the indirect tax system may be
achieved by taxation on consumption. Accordingly the Government of Bangladesh
introduced a consumption-type and destination-principle based value added tax in
1991.
It is too early to claim that the VAT system would achieve all the above mentioned
objectives. However, limited experience with the VAT system in Bangladesh seems
to suggest that the VAT system is efficient in term of revenue collection compared
with the pre-VAT system. After the introduction of the VAT in 1991, revenue rose
from 11 percent of GDP in 1992 to 12 percent of GDP in 1993. During the same
period the share of trade taxes in total revenue fell from 37 percent of total revenue in
1992 to 34 percent in 1993. Lower tariff revenue was more than offset by
improvements in VAT and direct tax collection. In particular, the revenue from the
VAT system increased from 23 percent of total revenue in 1992 to 42 percent in 1993
(the World Bank, 1994). In this context it is relevant to note that Mansur and
Khondker (1991) studied the revenue effects of the VAT in Bangladesh and
concluded that the VAT system would improve revenue mobilisation in Bangladesh,
provided that the system is administered properly. The above revenue collection
statistics appear to support their findings.
However improvements in revenue mobilisation may be achieved at the expense of
equity. The equity issue is no less important than the efficiency and revenue aspects
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of tax policies. To highlight the importance of equity issues Ferh et a! (1994) in their
conclusion argued that" beginning in the early 1970's, the public economics literature
concentrated more on the efficiency aspects of fiscal policy whereas the older
literature emphasised the redistributional side of the ledger. Our numerical findings
suggest that emphasising efficiency effects may be highly misleading. We have even
dare to say that the time is ripe for re-orientation, putting at least same or even more
emphasis on distributional problems than on efficiency issues." Considering the
importance of distributional consequences of tax reforms, another objective of this
study to examine the distributional consequences of a uniform rate of VAT system in
Bangladesh.
Though a partial equilibrium framework can be used to answer some questions of
policy interest, the general equilibrium approach has clear advantages in dealing with
multiple policy distortions in the economy. In recent years, computable general
equilibrium models have been used to analyse the resource allocation, income
distribution and welfare consequences of trade and tax policy reforms. Thus, in this
study computable general equilibrium models have been developed to analyse
different aspects of tax and tariff reforms in Bangladesh.
1.2 Overview of the chapters
Chapter 2 discusses the compilation of a social accounting matrix for 1988/89. The
main purposes of 'this chapter are to discuss the methodological and statistical
procedures used to compile the SAM by integrating different data sources and to
highlight the importance of such a framework in simulation exercises using both
SAM-based fixed-price models and flex-price computable general equilibrium
models.
The social accounting matrix integrates different data sources and the input-output
table to depict the major macroeconomic relationships between producers, institutions
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in Bangladesh. Such a framework is particularly useful for a country such as
Bangladesh with conflicting data sources. The SAM is an attractive framework for
locating inconsistencies and for resolving those in best possible ways. Since different
data sources are not readily compatible, the compilation exercise needs various
assumptions, extensive data manipulation, reconciliation and balancing items. In
particular, the SAM integrates the system of national accounts, input-output table and
census of manufacturing industries to depict income generation by different types of
labour and the distribution of operating surpluses between institutions. An important
feature of this SAM is the disaggregation of the household sector into six household
groups. Sir Richard Stone (1985) pointed out the importance of this disaggregation.
According to him "it seems to me that of all the interesting and useful things that
could be done to improve the national accounts, the one most worthy of consideration
is the disaggregation of household sector." It also brings together macroeconomic
data (such as national accounts) and microeconomic data sets (such as 'Household
Expenditure Survey'), within a consistent framework for decomposition of
'households', distribution of household income, consumption expenditure and savings
patterns. It also captures the linkage between factoral and household distribution of
income which is essential to examine the distributional consequence of policy
reforms. A particular novelty of this SAM is the construction of an inter-household
transfer matrix from limited and partial information. The methodology used to
construct the inter-household transfer matrix is so general that it can be applied to any
other SAM quite easily.
To rationalise the indirect tax system the government of Bangladesh introduced a
value added tax on imports and manufacturing goods from 1991. The VAT replaced
the prevailing excise tax on domestic production and sales taxes on imports at the
import stage. The VAT system is consumption-type and is based on the destination-
principle. It is generally believed that in its most conventional form, a single rate
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VAT with a zero rate applied only to exports may be regressive. Therefore, in chapter
3 a model of the Bangladesh economy is developed to examine the regressiveness of
the indirect tax system in general and the value added tax system in particular. Model
explicitly captures specific features of a consumption-type and destination-principle
based value added tax system which has been adopted in Bangladesh.
The results of indirect tax incidence under pre-VAT and VAT systems are discussed
in chapter 4. The empirical analyses reported in this chapter are based on two
approaches: a simple approach and a computable general approach. In the simple
approach, the tax incidence of the indirect tax system with and without VAT is
estimated by determining how much tax is borne by each household group in relation
to their consumption expenditure, assuming that other things remaining unchanged.
The general equilibrium analysis derives the benchmark solutions for incidence under
the pre-VAT system by endogenously estimating the tax payments by the six
household groups as a proportion of their consumption expenditures. The CGE
approach allows for the effects of relative price changes and the consequent secondary
effects on resource allocation, production, consumption and on the incidence of the
indirect taxes. Both approaches indicate that because of exemptions on subsistence
agricultural products, and because of the progressive structure of the tariffs, the
overall indirect tax system would remain progressive even after the introduction of a
single rate VAT. However, the overall indirect tax incidence appears to be less
progressive under the VAT system compared with the pre-VAT system.
Empirical research on industrial organisation has revealed useful insights into the
relationship between industrial structure and performance both for developed and
developing countries. Most studies have confirmed the hypothesised relationship
between market structure and profitability by finding a significant association between
industrial concentration and profitability. However in recent years there is a growing
8
consensus among economists that, along with concentration, the extent of foreign
competition significantly affects the performance of domestic industries. Such
consensus led to a number of industrial organisation studies incorporating a foreign
competition variable. Such studies have also confirmed that foreign competition
variables exerted a strong impact on the domestic profitability.
So far no study has been under taken to examine the relation between profitability and
market structure variables in the manufacturing sector of Bangladesh. Thus the
objective of chapter 5 is to provide some empirical evidence on the relation between
industrial structure and profitability in the manufacturing sector of Bangladesh and to
assess the importance of foreign and domestic factors on industry profitability. Two
alternative measures of concentration, namely the concentration ratio and Hirschman-
Herfindahi index, and two foreign competition variables e.g. import shares and
effective tariff rates, are used to examine the robustness of the findings. The results of
this study indicate that concentration is an important factor explaining differences in
profitability between different industries. This result is robust even when alternative
measures of concentration are employed. It is also observed that foreign competition
variables play a significant role in affecting profitability in domestic industries. The
results thus support the observation that the profits are higher in those industries
where concentration levels are high and import shares are low or effective tariff rates
are high.
Bangladesh has been gradually liberalising her foreign trade regime since the early
eighties as an integral part of the structural adjustment programmes. The trade
liberalisation strategies in Bangladesh have involved a gradual elimination or
replacement of non-tariff barriers (by suitable tariff rates) during the first phase and
reduction of tariff rates during the later phase. Given the evidence that the
manufacturing sector in Bangladesh appears to be have imperfectly competitive
9
features, it seems reasonable to examine the consequences of tariff liberalisation
within the paradigm of both 'traditional trade theory', based on assumptions of perfect
competition and constant returns to scale and 'new trade theory' involving imperfect
competition and increasing returns to scale. Thus in chapter 6, a model of Bangladesh
economy is developed to analyse the effects of tariff reform on resource allocation and
income distribution under both competitive and non-competitive assumptions. The
model explicitly incorporates market structure variables such as marginal costs, the
number of domestic firms, the excess profit condition, the market demand elasticities
for domestic firms and increasing returns to scale.
In chapter 7, alternative computable general equilibrium models are used to assess the
resource allocation, welfare and income distribution effects of tariff liberalisation in
Bangladesh. It is observed that the results of tariff liberalisation are sensitive to the
way the model is specified. It is observed that in the competitive and constant returns
to scale model variant, resources move from the heavily protected sector (e.g.
manufacturing sector) to less protected sectors as a result of tariff liberalisation.
When imperfect competition is introduced the heavily protected manufacturing
sectors turning out to be the main beneficiary of liberalisation. Almost all the
manufacturing sectors show much larger output growth with the incorporation of
increasing returns to scale. This magnification comes from a reduction in unrealised
scale economies in these sectors. The income distribution effects of tariff
liberalisation are also examined. The change in the distribution of income appears to
favour the low income household groups. It also appears that the progressivity and
regressivity in income distribution of household groups depends on the relative
change of the capital and labour income.
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Appendix to chapter one
A.l Some features of the trade regime and trade reforms in Bangladesh
A. 1.1 Tariff structure
The tariff structure in Bangladesh conforms to the pattern observed in many
developing countries: the lowest duties are levied on machinery and equipment,
higher duties on unprocessed raw materials, higher still on processed raw materials
and highest on non-durable consumer goods and consumer durables. The levels of
import duties and spread of tariff structure have also increased over time. For
instance, the statutory rates of import duties range from as low as 2.5 percent to as
high as 400 percent (The World Bank: An agenda for Tax Reforms in Bangladesh,
1989). There are also inter-industry variations in the rates of import duties resulting
from ad hoc actions taken at different times. There appears to be no adequate
attention given to the interdependence of the decisions regarding the setting of tariff
rates for different industries. As a result no evaluation seems to have been made with
regard to the effects of tariffs on the inputs and outputs of the different industries.
Two types of taxes are levied on imports in Bangladesh. These are customs duty and
sales tax. These taxes are levied to achieve the twin objectives of providing
protection to domestic industries and generating revenues for the government. Table
A. 1 shows average effective customs duties and sales tax rates for selected years in
Bangladesh. It is observed that the effective customs duty and sales tax (CDST) rate
in 1974-79 period was 61 percent. During 1980-84 period the corresponding rate was
43 percent. The effective CDST rate was 39 percent in 1985-90 period. The average
effective CDST rate on imports is estimated to be 43 percent in 1974-90 period.
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Nominal Protection Rate1
Weighted mean2
Coefficient of variation
No. of customs duty rates
No. HS-8 codes with
Customs duty = zero
Customs duty = 100%
Customs duty > 100 %
Table A. 1 Effective Customs Duty and Sales Tax Rates for Selected Years
Taxes on Imports	 1975-79	 1980-84	 1985-90	 Average
Customs Duty	 42.95	 31.10	 29.92	 31.76
Sales Taxes
	 17.70	 12.00	 9.18	 10.77
CDST
	
60.65	 43.09	 39.10	 42.61
Source: Bangladesh Fiscal Statistics, 1992.
Tariff reforms started in early 1990's and it involves reduction and compression of
customs duty rates (i.e. tariff rates). Some progress on tariff reform is reported in
Table A.2. It is observed that the mean rate of nominal protection (weighted) declined
from 42 percent in 1991 to 28 percent in 1994. There has also been significant
reduction in dispersion, as indicated by the coefficients of variations. Over the same
period, the number of HS-8 codes with customs duty rate above 100 percent reduced
from 274 products to 17 products. The spread of duty rates has also been reduced
considerably. The number of duty rates declined from 18 in 1992 to 12 in 1994.
Compression of duty rate is also evident from the reduction in the number of HS-8
codes with duty rates of zero and duty rates above 100 percent.
Table A.2 Impact of Tariff Reforms in Bangladesh, 1991-94
(%, unless otherwise noted)
	
1991	 1992
	
42	 40
	
59	 68
	
16	 18
	
346	 376
	
2460	 2315
	
274	 249
	
1993	 1994
	
30	 28
	
62	 63
	
15	 12
	
323	 308
	
768	 39
	
46	 17
Note 1: Expressed as percent of assessed import values.
2: These are import weighted mean. 1991 is weighted by 1991 imports; 1992 is weighted
by 1992 imports; 1993 and 1994 are both weighted by 1993 imports.
Source: Bangladesh: From Stabilisation to Growth, The World Bank (1994)
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A. 1.2 Quantitative restrictions
Along with tariffs, Bangladesh also relied on quantitative restrictions to control
international trade. Such restrictions were introduced by the British Indian
government during the second world war and have continued in the countries of the
sub-continent after 1947. However in 1985, the government's commitment to
eliminate the restricted list of imports, the government initiated a new list of imports
which covered 20% of all categories of items listed in Bangladesh tariff codes'. This
new restricted list consisted of three components. The first component listed banned
items that are importable by the established exporters and foreign-exchange-earning
hotels. The second component listed items that required prior permission for imports.
The third component listed items that are only importable by registered industrial
enterprises, up to the value specified in their pass book (The World Bank: An agenda
for tax reform in Bangladesh, 1989).
However, not all these bans were effective due to the following reasons: (i) the
extreme nature of the quota made many of the items redundant. There were many
items that were on the list but which at the same time had a tariff declared against
them; and (ii) many of the banned items were available in the market as they came
via industrial importers. The above features of the quota regime imply that the
premium commanded by these items (which in 1985 was estimated to be 35 percent)
accrued to the licensed importers rather than in the form revenue to the government.
This negated the protection objective without raising revenue. To redress the rent-
seeking problem, the government decided to reduce the restricted list of imports with
suitable customs duty and sales tax rates by middle of 1989. According to the
World Bank (1989), "this will ensure that the reform of trade regime undertaken by
government of Bangladesh yields revenue within the next year or two by transferring
scarcity premium from licensed importers to the government."
I The Bangladesh tariff code lists a total 1192 products at the four-digit level of classification.
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A
40.16
13.44
26.34
3.96
13.27
1.70
1.30
Table A.3 Proportion of Different Taxes in Total Tax Revenue
Taxes
Customs Duty
Sales Taxes
Excise Taxes
Other Duties
Income Tax
Land Tax
0th. direct Tax
1975-79
42.40
17.47
20.85
4.29
12.19
1.74
1.05
1980-84
41.02
15.82
23.55
3.58
13.62
1.42
0.98
1985-90
39.72
12.19
27.80
4.15
13.09
1.85
1.20
Note: Other duties include stamp duties and motor vehicle registration fee etc.
Other direct tax consists of taxes on corporation income, taxes on immovable
property, gift taxes and capital gains tax etc.
Source: Bangladesh Fiscal Statistics, 1992.
Table A.4 Tax Elasticities and Buoyancies in Bangladesh
1979/80 to 1984/85
Elasticity	 Buoyancy
	
0.71	 0.99
	
0.55	 0.71
	
0.56	 0.54
	
0.83	 1.34
	
1.11	 1.24
Taxes	 1975/76 to 1984/85
_______________ Elasticity
	 Buoyancy
All Taxes	 0.91	 1.10
Tariffs	 0.72	 0.84
Sales Taxes	 0.83	 0.81
Excise Taxes	 0.76	 1.18
Income Tax	 0.75	 0.90
Source: Fiscal Statistics of Bangladesh, 1986.
A.2 Total Tax Element in Price
This section discusses the estimation of the total tax element in price. The section is
based on the report" World Bank: An Agenda for Tax Reform in Bangladesh (1989)."
To estimate the total tax element in price, one may start with answering the following
question: what would be the increase in government revenue as a result of a unit
increase in the final demand of a sector? To see this, let X denotes gross output by
sector and Y shows final demand by sector. In a closed economy the gross output
equals the sum of intermediate and final demand. Thus
X=AX+Y
	 (A.1)
where A is the input-output matrix. Manipulation of A.!. yields the following
X =(l -	 (A.2)
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where (1— A ) is the inverse of A. Also let t depict effective tax rates on gross
output. Then
= t .( AY'Y	 (A.3)
So that t .(l— A)' may be regarded as total tax on final demand.
The above arguments may be modified in an open economy as follows. Let A"
denote the domestic input-output matrix, A tm denote the matrix of imported inputs
required per unit of domestic goods. According to this view imported inputs are
assumed to be non-competitive with domestic output. Since tax on gross output is
now the sum of domestic taxes (td) and import taxes (tm ) weighted by the proportion
of imports in production, equation becomes
(td + tm . A"') .X =(td + t I . A') . (1 - A') 1. Y	 (A.4)
d	 rn	 ni	 d-1Hence total tax is (t + t . A ) . (1 - A ) . This consists of two components. Total
tariffs and sales tax on intermediates is depicted by (t" A'')(1 - Ad)_ l . This is
shown in column (1) of Table A.5. The total excise tax on intermediates is denoted by
t' .(1 - A') 1 . This is depicted in colunm 2. The above model is used to calculate
the extent of input taxation in Bangladesh.
The cascading effect of input taxation on the domestic economy is shown in Table
A.5 which reports the total tax effects of excises and tariffs and sales tax on domestic
production. The estimates are based on an input-output table updated to 1984/85
using the 1976/77 input-output table. Total amount of tariffs and sales elements in the
price is shown in column 1 of Table A.5 while column 2 depicts the total excise
elements in the price. The sum of these two elements yields the amount of total tax in
the price which is shown in column 3. The total tax is the revenue accruing to the
government as a result of a unit increase in the final demand of the sector, i. e., net of
inter industrial demands. On the other hand the effective tax (column 4) is the
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5=3-4
0.43
1.26
1.19
0.39
1.87
0.24
0.42
0.55
0.09
0.46
0.89
0.57
0.64
3.92
6.81
0.98
3.74
1.29
1.28
1.24
2.60
4.69
3.27
2.70
6.69
5.39
4.97
0.67
0.29
1.82
0.47
1.01
0.34
6=5/3
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.05
0.43
0.53
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.10
0.47
0.01
0.17
0.21
0.94
0.30
0.22
1.00
0.97
0.16
0.17
0.18
0.40
0.25
1.00
0.82
0.24
0.93
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.57
revenue accruing to the government as a result of a unit increase in gross output of a
sector. The base of effective tax rate is gross output while the base of total tax rate is
final demand. Since values of final demand are smaller than gross output, the total tax
rate is higher than effective tax rates. The difference between the total tax element
and effective tax depicts the extent of taxation though cascading. This is denoted as
Tdiff in column 5. An alternative explanation is Intax, which expresses Tdiff as a
proportion of the total tax element. Therefore a value of Intax of 1 indicates that the
sector is not taxed directly, hence the tax element of that sector is entirely due to the
cascading effects of input taxation.
Table A.5 Total Tax Element by Sectors
Tax
3
0.43
1.26
0.19
7.11
4.33
0.46
0.42
0.55
0.09
4.65
1.87
43.13
3.73
18.45
7.20
3.24
16.68
1.29
1.32
7.85
14.91
25.60
8.08
10.98
6.69
6.59
20.58
0.72
0.29
1.82
0.47
1.01
0.60
Sectors
Rice
Wheat
Jute
Cotton
Tea
0th. Crops
Livestock
Fisheries
Forestiy
Sugar
Edible oil
Tobacco prd.
Other food
Cotton yarn
Cloth
Jute textile
Paper
Leather
Fertiliser
Pharm-Chern
Cement
Basic metal
Metal prd.
0th. industry
Construction
Petroleum
Electric-gas
Transport
Housing
Health
Education
Public Adm.
0th. services
Total
Tariff
0.17
0.27
0.07
7.05
1.01
0.31
0.14
0.28
0.04
3.41
1.43
0.40
0.55
16.05
2.78
0.19
10.07
0.74
0.28
6.25
10.94'
25.41
5.95
7.07
5.74
2.88
1.34
0.32
0.24
1.41
0.29
0.67
0.18
Excise
2
0.26
0.99
0.12
0.06
3.32
0.15
0.29
0.28
0.05
1.24
0.44
42.73
3.17
2.39
1.41
3.05
6.61
0.55
1.04
1.61
3.97
0.19
2.14
3.92
0.97
3.71
19.22
0.40
0.06
0.41
0.18
0.34
0.41
Effec-
tive Tax
4
0.00
0.00
0.00
6.72
2.48
0.21
0.00
0.00
0.00
4.19
0.99
42.56
3.09
14.53
0.39
2.25
12.94
0.00
0.04
6.61
12.31
20.91
4.81
8.28
0.00
1.19
15.60
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.26
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Chapter Two
Numerical Specification of Bangladesh Economy
2.1	 Introduction
In this chapter, the economy of Bangladesh is numerically specified within the
framework of an input-output table and a social accounting matrix. An input-output
table shows inter-relationships between economic activities in a economy in a given
period of time. It traces the inter-industry transactions and maintains consistency
between the supply and demand of conimodities. A social accounting matrix is a
generalisation of an input-output table and extends this information beyond the
structure of production to include; (a) the distribution of value added generated by
production activities; (b) formation of household and institutional income; (c) the
pattern of consumption, savings and investment; (d) government revenue collection
and associated expenditures and transactions; and (e) the role of the foreign sector in
the formation of additional incomes for household and institutions.
Social accounting matrices can serve two basic purposes; (i) as a data system for
descriptive analysis of the structure of the economy and (ii) as a basis for
macroeconomic modelling. As a data framework, a SAM is therefore a snapshot of a
country at a particular point in time (Pyatt and Thorbecke 1976). To provide as
comprehensive a picture of the structure of the economy as possible, a particular
novelty of the SAM approach has been to bring together macroeconomic data (such as
national accounts) and microeconomic data sets (such as household surveys), within a
consistent framework2. The second purpose of a SAM is the provision of a
macroeconomic data framework for policy modelling and development planning. The
2 Large discrepancies are often revealed between these two sources. Whilst the conflicting sources must
somehow be reconciled, often by choosing the more reliable of them, the construction of SAM forces
attention to the root of their cause (King, 1985). A consequence of this confrontation between data
source is the highlighting of priority areas for improving and extending the statistical data base of a
country (Hayden and Round, 1982).
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2.2.1 Production accounts
The 48 production sectors classified in the 1986/87 input-output table are aggregated
into 14 production sectors following a simple aggregation shown in Table 2.1. The
sectors of the 1986/87 1-0 table which constitute each of the new 14 sectors are
grouped according to their similarities in use and in the pattern of sectoral trade. For
example fertiliser, cement and basic metal sectors are pure intermediate sectors and
showed no sectoral consumption in 1981/82 and 1986/87 1-0 tables. Observing the
similarities in use as intermediate sectors, the above three sectors are aggregated into
one sector. On the other hand, since jute textile, leather and ready-made garments are
mainly export-oriented they are grouped into one sector. It may be relevant to note
that in this exercise no distinction is made between sectors (activities) and
commodities and we treat these as synonymous.
Table 2.1. Sectoral Aggregation Scheme
Sectors of the Present Study
1. Subsistence-Agriculture
2. Commercial-Agriculture
3. Forestry
4. Food and Tobacco
5. Clothing
6. Garments
7. Chemical
8. Cement
9. Machinery
10. Other Industries
11. Construction
12. Energy
13. Services
14. Trade and
Sectors of the Input-Output Table
Rice, Wheat, Other Crops, Fisheries & Livestock
Jute, Cotton, Sugarcane, Raw Tobacco & Tea
Forestry
Processed Food, Edible oil, Sugar, Salt & Tobacco Products
Yarn, Cloth-Mill Made & Cloth-Hand Loom
Jute Textile, Leather and Ready Made Gannents
Chemical & Pharmaceuticals
Fertiliser, Basic Metal and Cement
Machinery, Metal Product & Transport Equipment
Paper, Wood Products & Other Products
Urban and Rural House Building & Other Construction
Electricity, Gas & Petroleum Products
Public Administration, Health, Education, Housing,
Banking & Insurance & Other Serivces
Transport & Trade Services
The following data are collected to derive a reliable and consistent data set for
1988/89. These are: (a) sectoral and total value added; (b) sectoral and total
intermediate consumption; (c) sectoral and total gross output; (d) public and private
consumption; (e) gross capital formation; (f) sectoral and total imports; (g) sectoral
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and total exports; and (h) sectoral and total indirect taxes (e.g. excise tax, import duty
and sales tax). Information on value added, intermediate consumption and hence
gross output for the agriculture, livestock, fisheries, forestry, energy, construction,
trade and government sectors is collected from the UN national accounts (UN
'National Aggregates', 1991). The UN national accounts, however, do not provide
information on intermediate consumption for transport and other services, although it
reports information on value added. The values of intermediate consumption are
estimated for these two sectors using the information from the 198 1/82and 1986/87 I-
0 tables. Data on value added, intermediate consumption and gross output for the
manufacturing sectors are obtained from the Census of Manufacturing Industries,
1988/89.
2.2.2 Imports, exports and indirect taxes
Sectoral imports and exports data are collected from the Bangladesh Trade Statistics
(1990). These report imports (c.i.f.) and exports (f.o.b.) prices at a detailed level of
classification which are easily aggregated into the 14 sectors. The amount of indirect
taxes collected in 1988/89 is obtained from the National Board of Revenue. The
National Board of Revenue (NBR) reports sales tax, import and excise duties by
products, which are different from the sectors identified in the 1-0 table. So, the
products classified by the NBR are mapped into 1-0 sectors according to the mapping
scheme adopted in the 'Bangladesh revenue estimation model' of the World Bank
(1989). This procedure then generates vectors of import and excise duties by 1-0
sectors.
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2.2.3 Investment demand
The UN account provides aggregate information on gross fixed capital formation and
changes in stock i.e. the components of the gross investment. Infonnation on sectoral
investment is not available in the UN accounts. The national accounts, however,
report gross capital formation by sector. This information is used to derive
investment by sectors of origin. The estimated sectoral investments are then scaled
down in accordance with the discrepancy between the gross capital formation reported
by the UN accounts (taka 80708 million) and the national accounts (taka 85191
million) to be consistent with the over all macro balances reported by the UN
accounts.
2.2.4 Consumption demand
Total private consumption reported in the UN accounts is taka 584233 million. This
is calculated residually given the estimated total supply and all but the private
consumption components of total demand. The components of total supply are gross
output and c.i.f. price of imports. The components of total demand are input demand,
public and private consumption, gross investment and exports. Using the same
procedure, the 1-0 accounts yield an estimate of total private consumption of taka
607717 million which is higher than the UN estimate by taka 23484 million. This
discrepancy between the two estimates of private consumption is due to the
differences in the valuation of imports. The UN accounts valued imports at the c.i.f.
prices while the 1-0 table used the market or purchaser prices of imports. The imports
valued at the c.i.f. prices are converted into imports at market prices by adding import
duties and sales tax. The total of import duties and sales tax in 1988/89 is found to be
taka 23487 million which is almost identical to the observed discrepancy between the
two estimates of private consumption. Since the 1-0 tables in Bangladesh are valued
at purchaser prices, the valuation of imports at market prices appears to be the
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appropriate method. It is also observed that both 1981/82 and 1986/87 1-0 tables
report much higher estimates of private consumption (i.e. taka 264101 and 561841
million respectively) than is reported in the national accounts (i.e. taka 223832 and
481995 million respectively) for the corresponding years. The treatment of margins
on imports is a major problem which is dealt with separately in Appendix A. 1. The
resulting total supply and total demand, and derived components under the two
accounts are shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 Total Supply and Total Demand, 1988/89
(million taka)
Components	 UN	 National
	
Accounts	 Accounts
1. Intermediate Input	 334422	 334479
2. Gross Value Added 	 659598	 659598
3. Gross Output	 994020	 994077
4. Imports, C.1.F.
	
118955	 118955
5. Import Duty & Sales Tax	 0	 23487
6. Imports at Market Prices 	 118955	 142442
7.TotalSupply (3+6)
	
1112975	 1136519
8. Total Demand	 1112975	 1136519
9.InputDemand	 334422	 334479
10. Private Consumption	 584233	 607717
11. Public Consumption	 62430	 62430
12. Gross Investment	 80708	 80708
13. Exports	 51185	 51185
Values of sectoral consumption for 1988/89 are not available. The sectoral
consumption patterns with respect to the total consumption observed in 1981/82 and
1986/87 1-0 tables are used to estimate the sectoral consumption for 1988/89.
Information on government consumption is obtained from the UN account.
23
2.2.5 Derivation of input demand and final reconciliation
Given the sectoral information on gross output, value added, intermediate
consumption, imports, exports, investment, private and public consumption, sectoral
input demands are calculated residually. This then provides two sets of control totals
i.e. row (intermediate consumption) and column (input demand) control totals known
as the 'RAS' multipliers to generate input-output flows for 1988/89 using the input-
output coefficient matrix of 1986/87. Above estimation procedure generates a
consistent inter-industry data set for 1988/89 with sectoral supply corresponding to
sectoral demand. The updated I-U table for 1988/89 is shown in Table 2.3.
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2.3	 Compilation of the social accounting matrix for 1988/89
This section describes the compilation of a SAM for 1988/89. The accounting
relations of the matrix bring together the structure of production, income generation
by factors of production, distribution of income by institutions in return for factor
services and savings and investment patterns. In particular, the accounting matrix
identifies the economic relations through four types of accounts: (i) production
activity accounts for 14 sectors (described in the 1-0 table); (ii) nine factors of
production with eight different types of labour and one capital; (iii) current account
transactions between 4 main institutional agents; households and unincorporated
capital, corporate enterprises, government and the rest of the world; and (iv) one
consolidated capital account to capture the flows of savings and investment by
institutions and sectors respectively.
The methodology and statistical procedures adopted here are based primarily on a
fully disaggregated SAM for Pakistan prepared by Dhanani (1988). This choice is
motivated by two considerations: (i) Dhanani relied exclusively on a fully
disaggregated Malaysian SAM, compiled by Pyatt, Round and Denes (1984)3 , for
methodological and data procedure issues and (ii) the observed similarities in
description, compilation and generation of various statistics in Bangladesh and
Pakistan, such as the household expenditure survey, census of manufacturing
industries and the input-output table.
With reference to the Malaysian SAM, Dhanani argued that besides its extensive disaggregation and
coverage, the study offered a detailed discussion on the conceptual difficulties arising from the fundamental
objective of a SAM, which is to integrate social statistics with major economic data under a common base,
and on ways of dealing with numerous sources of data varying in quality and coverage.'
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2.3.1 An outline of an aggregate SAM of Bangladesh
For purposes of exposition the main economic relations are presented in an aggregate
SAM for Bangladesh in Table 2.4. Twenty six sets of accounts contain four broad
groups of accounts as follows; production (accounts 1-14), factors (accounts 15-16),
institutions current accounts (accounts 17-25), and the consolidated capital account
(account 26). The aggregate SAM satisfies the convention that the totals of
corresponding rows and columns are equal and there is no leakage and injection into
the system. Therefore, the aggregate SAM is a square matrix. The matrix
presentation allows each transaction in the accounts to be represented by a single cell
in the matrix4. The main objective of presenting the aggregated matrix is to
summarise and to show the circular flow in Bangladesh's economy. It also provides a
useful basis for describing the basic structure of accounts upon which subsequent
discussion follows (Pyatt and Round, 1985).
' A SAM is a single entry system because the transactions are shown once only as elements of the
matrix, so that the element (i, j) is the expenditure from account j which is received by account i. In
contrast to the double-entry system, the accounts have to be 'fully articulated' in a SAM. In othex
words, both the origin and destination of each transaction (in terms of the accounts of the system) have
to be specified. A display of origin and destination of each set of transactions can greatly facilitate
understanding of inter-relationships between various parts of the macro economy (Hayden and Round.
1982).
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2.3.2 Derivation of labour income and operating surplus
It is observed from the aggregate SAM that value added at factor cost (taka 645198
million) is decomposed into labour income (taka 355697 million) and operating
surplus (taka 289501 million). The 1-0 table shows the total as well as the ectoral
breakdown of gross value added and into value added at factor cost and domestic
indirect taxes. However in the aggregate SAM all types of indirect taxes are
combined for the purpose of presentation. The total indirect tax of taka 37887 million
comprises domestic indirect tax of taka 14400 million and import duty and sales tax
of taka 23487 million. To split the sectoral value added at factor cost () into labour
income and operating surplus, sectoral labour income by factors (L,,) is estimated
first. The following procedures are adopted to estimate sectoral labour income by
factors (L,1 ): (i) The employment coefficient matrix of the 986/87 1-0 table and the
vector of employment by labour factors for 198 8/89 derived from the 'Household
Expenditure Survey 1988/89' are used to derive the estimates of sectoral employment
by factors for 1988/89. The estimation procedure may be expressed as:
where, c),, is the estimated employment matrix for 1988/89, Q, denotes the
employment coefficient matrix of 1986/87 and T, is the vector of employment by
labour factors for 1988/89. (ii) In the absence of wage estimates for 1988/89, the
wage coefficient matrix of 1986/87 is used assuming that the wage patterns observed
in 1986/87 would remain fixed over these two year periods. Therefore, the sectoral
wage coefficient matrix of 1986/87 and the estimated employment matrix of 1988/89
are used together to derive the sectoral labour income by factors for 1988/89. The
derivation of sectoral labour income by factors is shown as:
L,,
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where, W, is the sectoral wage coefficient matrix of 1986/87. The derivation of
labour income by sectors and factors is elaborated in Appendix A.2. The sectoral
labour income is then deducted from sectoral factor cost value added to derive sectoral
operating surplus (K,) residually. The derivation of operating surplus may be
expressed as:
K, V—L11
The distribution of sectoral value added into sectoral labour factor income and
operating surplus is shown Table 2.5.
Table 2.5. Distribution of Value added at Factor Cost, 1988/89
(million taka)
Sectors
1. Subsistence-Agriculture
2. Commercial-Agriculture
3. Forestry
4. Food and Tobacco
5. Clothing
6. Garments
7. Chemical
8. Cement
9. Machinery
10. Other Industries
11. Construction
12. Energy
13. Services
14. Trade and Transport
Total
Value Added
Factor Cost
I
205203
17716
24187
3303
8668
13470
5271
7452
3490
4307
39262
2971
185340
124468
645198
Labour
Income
2
15927
8028
4383
2294
4243
6265
3558
1494
3490
2075
21164
1602
85932
53719
355697
Operating
Surplus
3=1-2
45956
9689
19804
1009
4425
7205
1712
5959
1691
2322
18097
1397
99408
70749
289501
Source: Based on Table 2.3 and Table A.2.5.
2.3.3 Returns to corporate, unincorporated and government capital
The estimated returns to capital or operating surplus stand at taka 289501 million.
This consists of returns to unincorporated capital, corporate capital and government
capital. This decomposition of operating surplus is depicted in the aggregate SAM
where unincorporated returns are taka 252160 million, corporate returns are taka
32
17781 million and government returns are taka 19560 million. Following methods are
adopted to disaggregate the sectoral operating surpluses.
It is assumed that no operating surplus originated in the subsistence-agriculture,
commercial-agriculture, forestry and trade and transport sectors. Therefore, all returns
to capital or operating surpluses in these four sectors are assigned to unincorporated
capital. The construction sector in Bangladesh is dominated by a large number of
small individual firms and few large firms. Thus it is reasonable to assume that the
operating surplus of the construction sector accrues both to unincorporated and
corporate capital. Again relevant information is not available to distinguish between
them. The information of the 1984/85 Pakistan SAM is used in this regard. In the
Pakistan SAM, the operating surplus of the construction sector was distributed
between unincorporated and corporate capital and their respective shares were 77.8
and 22.2 percent respectively. These shares are borrowed to distribute the operating
surplus of the construction sector. Thus, the estimated amounts of the construction
sector's operating surplus accrued to unincorporated and corporate capital are taka
14070 million (i.e. 77.8 % of 18097) and taka 4027 million (i.e. 22.2 % of 18097)
respectively.
The eight manufacturing sectors together created operating surplus of taka 25799
million (Table 2.5). This consists of returns to unincorporated, government and
corporate capitals since industries are owned by individual, government and private or
corporate firms 5 . The information of 1988/89 CMI are used to distribute the total
manufacturing operating surplus. The CMI shows the breakdown of consolidated
manufacturing operating surplus by government, private and individual firms. The
CMI also provides the breakdown of the manufacturing operating surpluses by
In the 'CMI report' no distinctions are made between private and public limited corporations and both
private and public limited corporations are treated as private or corporate firms. We retained this
definition.
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tax revenue are the income from the government owned corporations, financial
institutions etc. Total government revenue is reported to be taka 65454 million in
1988/89. On the other hand total government expenditure is found to be taka 63955
million (Budget section, Statistical Year book of Bangladesh, 1991). Therefore
estimated government savings is taka 1499 million.
2.3.6 Household classification and accounts
An important feature of this SAM is the decomposition of households into six groups.
The household groups differ with respect to income levels, employment status and
expenditure patterns. Pyatt and Thorbecke (1976) have suggested location,
sociological and wealth criteria to classify the household groups 7 . However, it is
observed that classification of household depends the issues that need to be addressed
and also on the availability of information. For example, if the objective is to study
poverty analysis then the household groups needs to classified by socio-economic
groups rather than by income levels only. However, since information on income
levels is readily available, households are seldom classified by levels of income.
Indeed, grouping households by income levels is an informative approach to describe
income distribution issues at a point in time. However, if the purpose is to provide a
basis for diagnosis and policy change, then the grouping criteria should correspond to
constituencies (e.g. socio-economic groups) which can be influenced differentially by
policy means. It is argued that household groups based on income levels alone cannot
be legislated for as such, on the ground that household units are mobile between these
groups, and hence that target households are to identify with respect to policy
measures (Pyatt and Thorbecke, 1976).
' For instance, the location criterion which distinguishes a household as urban or rural is useful since it
captures many aspects of duality. Depending on this distinction, individuals with otherwise similar
characteristics are likely to be paid different wages, have different job opportunities and employment
expectations and generally be subject to different sets of parameters in their socio-economic behaviour
(Pyattetal, 1984).
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In this SAM, socio economic groups based on the employment status of the principal
earner of the household are used to classify households. Besides the normal
considerations of data availability and coverage, this criterion is likely to capture
differences in lifestyle and assets among the household types which, in turn, have
quite different relationships with factor markets, as previously found in the
construction of SAMs for other countries. For Malaysia, see Pyatt, Round and Denes
(1984). Consequently households are divided initially into self-employed and
employed households. Furthermore, three different household groups based on
income levels are distinguished within the two broad classifications of self-employed
and employee household groups. The purpose of this is to capture the fact that two
self-employed households, who have similar characteristics according to the first
criterion, may be significantly different in other aspects, especially according to
income and patterns of consumption expenditure. For instance, these differences are
likely to be significant between a landless self-employed household and a self-
cultivating land-owning household. So, according to the above two criteria, six
different household groups are distinguished. The classification is summarised below;
a. Principal earner is self-employed
1. Low income household (S LI)
2. Middle income household (SMI)
3. High income household (SHI)
b. Principal earner is an employee
1. Low income household (ELI)
2. Middle income household (EMI)
3. High income household (EHI)
The main source of information for the above disaggregation of household groups is
the 1988/89 Household Expenditure Survey (HES) published in August 1991. The
HES provides a breakdown of earners by employment status of head of household and
employment status of other than head of household according to the 16 income groups
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(HES Table 1.06). The employment status are employer, self-employed, employee
and others. According to the HES definition "employer implies persons who employ
other persons (e.g. as agriculture wage labourers or industrial wage labourers) and
relate to employers engaged in agricultural as well as non-agricultural sectors. Self-
employed include owner-cultivators, owner-tenants, self-employees in forestry,
livestock and fishery sectors as well as persons engaged in non-agricultural self-
employed activities. Employee refers to persons who work as service-holders of
government, semi-government and autonomous bodies, service workers of private
sector enterprises (both organised and unorganised). The category of others includes
agricultural wage labourers andnon-agricu1tura1 labourers etc. "(HES, page 6).
Thus, initially, the head of household is isolated from other earners to obtain a
distribution of head of household by employment status in percentage terms for each
of the 16 income groups (i.e. colunm 2 to 5 of Table 2.8). Observing the similarities
in the employment characteristics, the 'employer' class is merged with the 'self-
employed' class and the 'other' category is merged with 'employee' class. This
procedure then separates the head of households into self-employed and employee
class in percentage terms for the 16 income groups. The distribution of households
into self-employed and employee households is provided in colunm 6 and 7 of Table
2.8.
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Other
5
Emp-
loyee
4
Emp-
loyer
2
0.00 1
0.00 1
0.009
0.005
0.012
0.021
0.065
0.052
0.048
0.033
0.084
0.090
0.028
0.022
0.049
0.071
0.129
0.139
0.175
0.215
0.250
0.278
0.226
0.170
0.210
0.25 1
0.299
0.803
0.733
0.531
0.46 1
0.3 15
0.241
0.169
0.136
0.066
0.061
0.083
0.033
0.049
0.048
0.117
0.008 0.119 0.375
of HHs
Emp-
loyee
7=4+5
0.830
0.755
0.580
0.532
0.444
0.379
0.343
0.351
0.3 16
0.338
0.309
0.203
0.260
0.299
0.416
0.494
Initial D
Self-
employed
3
0.188
0.170
0.245
0.420
0.468
0.556
0.612
0.652
0.637
0.664
0.597
0.639
0.749
0.707
0.617
0.493
0.498
Self-
employed
6=2+3
0.188
0.170
0.245
0.420
0.468
0.556
0.621
0.657
0.649
0.685
0.662
0.69 1
0.797
0.741
0.70 1
0.584
0.506
Groups
<750
750-999
1000-1249
1250-1499
1500- 1999
2000-2499
2500-2999
3000-3999
4000-4999
5000-5999
6000-6999
7000-7999
8000-8999
9000-9999
10000-12499
12500+
All Groups
Table 2.8. Decomposition of Households by Employment Status, 1988/89.
Note: Each entry in this table shows the proportion of household by different employment status for
each of the 16 income groups.
Source: Based on HES Table 1.06.
Finally, the 16 income groups are aggregated into three income groups using the
following mapping; (i) households with incomes less than taka 2500 per month at
1988/89 prices are referred to as the low income household; (ii) households with
incomes between taka 2500 and taka 6999 per month are called the middle income
household; (iii) and households with monthly income of taka 7000 and above are
labelled as high income households. The final distribution of households by these
three income groups and the two employment categories is reported in Table 2.9.
This table is quite central to the rest of this section concerned with the disaggregation
of households with respect to income, receipts, expenditure, outlays and savings,
because it preserves the 16 HES income group classifications on the one hand and
presents the six household group classifications of the SAM on the other hand.
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Table 2.9. Final Distribution of Households, 1988/89.
income
<750
750-999
1000- 1249
1250- 1499
1500- 1999
2000-2499
2500-2999
3000-3999
4000-4999
5000-5999
6000-6999
7000-7999
8000-8999
9000-9999
10000-12499
12500+
All
Self-employed
Low	 middle	 Low
0.188	 0.8 12
0.170	 0.830
0.245	 0.755
0.420	 0.580
0.468	 0.532
0.556	 0.444
0.621
0.657
0.649
0.685
0.662
0.691
0.797
0.741
0.701
0.584
0.239	 0.227	 0.036	 0.358
Employee
Middle
0.379
0.343
0.351
0.3 16
0.338
0.309
0.203
0.260
0.299
0.416
0.123	 0.016
Source: Based on Table 2.8.
2.3.6.1 Distribution of labour income among households
The total labour income generated by the eight labour factors is taka 355697 million.
Households are the recipient of this total labour income. The HIES, 1988/89 provides
some information on the sources of income by the 16 income groups (HES Table
1.08). These include income from agriculture and professional activities. Presumably
these incomes contained returns from both capital and labour factors employed in
agriculture and professional activities. It does not report incomes from other sources
such as income from service activities or trading and transport activities.
Alternatively, HES Table 1.07 reports percentage of earners according to four major
factors such as (i) administrative and professional (ii) service & sales workers (iii)
farmers and fisherman and (iv) production and transport workers by the 16 income
groups. In line with 1-0 factor classification we renamed (i) administrative and
professional as administrative (ADM); (ii) service & sales workers as service (SERV);
(iii) farmers and fisherman as agriculture (AGRL); and (iv) production and transport
workers as workers. These percentage of earners derived from HES Table 1.07 and
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the number of earners obtained from Appendix Table A.2.3 are used to derive a
distribution of earners by the four factors and the 16 income groups.
The income group specific to consolidated agricultural labour is further split into
agricultural hired labour (AHL), agricultural family labour small farms (AFLSF) and
agricultural family labour large farms (AFLLF) according to their shares in total
agricultural employment. Similarly income group specific workers are separated into
skilled (WSK), semi skilled (WSS) and unskilled (WUSK) workers according to their
shares in total employed workers. The average wage rates of the eight labour factors,
W and the estimated matrix of earners by the 16 income groups and labour factors,
are employed to derive labour income by factors and income groups. Symbolically
this can be captured by the following equation:
where, YL 11 shows the derived labour income by the 16 HES income groups.
Derivation of labour income by the 16 income groups is discussed in Appendix A.5.
The estimated labour income by factors and the 16 income groups are converted into
labour income by the six household groups using the information of Table 2.9. The
distribution of household's incomes from labour factors are presented in Table 2.10. It
is important to note that, the procedure applied here to generate the linkages between
labour factor income and the households may not be the most appropriate one. A
more desirable approach would be to use the direct estimates of labour income by
HES income groups or households. As mentioned earlier, this is available only for
one or two labour factors. Therefore, given the paucity of relevant data on one hand
and the essential requirement to establish the linkage between labour factors and
household groups, the above method appears to be a reasonable alternative.
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Table 2.10. Distribution of Labour Income by Household Groups, 1988/89
(million taka)
Factors
ADM
	
4655	 15060
	
6004
	
5344
	
7897
	
2872
	
41833
SERV
	
12944
	
27010
	
8315
	
15584
	
14449
	
3896
	
82197
AHL
	
12226
	
13465
	
2524
	
17647
	
7301
	
1041
	 54204
AFLSF
	
14340
	
15782
	
2959
	
20692
	
8561
	
1222
	
63556
AFLLF
	
12161
	
13389
	
2510
	
17544
	
7260
	
1035
	
53889
WSK
	
1795	 2164
	
448
	
2483
	
1163	 206
	
8261
wSS
	
4481
	
5402	 1119
	
6199
	
2902	 515
	
20617
WUSK
	
6765	 8156
	
1690
	
9361
	
4379
	
777
	
31129
Total
	
69367
	
100428
	
25569
	
94855
	
53914
	
11564
	
355697
Source: Based on Tables 2.9 and A.2.15.
2.3.6.2 Distribution of unincorporated capital income among households
The households are the recipients of the estimated total unincorporated capital income
of taka 252160 million. Again no data are readily available to distribute the total
unincorporated capital income among the six household groups. Due to lack of
relevant data, average monthly incomes of each household by the 16 income groups as
reported in the HES (HES Table 1.01) are used to perform this task. To perform this,
the average monthly household income in each income group is separated into
average monthly income by self-employed and employee household groups according
to the observed proportion of self-employed and employee household groups in each
income group. The disaggregation of average monthly household income of income
groups into self-employed and employee components is elaborated in Appendix A.6.
It is also noted that, on average, the self-employed household group receives 64.91
percent of total monthly income while the share of employee household group is
35.09 percent. According to these shares, the amounts of unincorporated capital
income accrued to the self-employed and employee household groups are taka 163670
million (i.e. 252160*0.6491) and taka 88490 (i.e. 252160*0.3509) respectively. The amounts
of unincorporated capital income accrued to the employee household groups may be
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viewed as income of members of family other than the head or income from land and
properties. The amounts of unincorporated capital income of self-employed and
employee household groups are now distributed to the 16 income groups according to
the share of average monthly income of each of the 16 income groups under self-
employed and employee household groups (i.e. column 1 and 3 of Table 2.11).
Table 2.11. Distribution of Unincorporated Income between Self-employed
& Employee Households, 1988/89.
Income
<750
750-999
1000-1249
1250-1499
1500-1999
2000-2499
2500-2999
3000-3999
4000-4999
5000-5999
6000-6999
7000-7999
8000-8999
9000-9999
10000-12499
12500^
Total
%
0.0019
0.0027
0.0049
0.0103
0.0146
0.0222
0.0.388
0.0514
0.0659
0.0853
0.0971
0.0828
0. 1082
0.1116
0.1231
0.1791
1.0000
Self-employed
Amount
307
439
809
1687
2389
3641
6349
8419
10791
13962
15894
13557
17706
18266
20151
29303
163670
%
0.0150
0.0242
0.0282
0.0263
0.0307
0.0328
0.0496
0.0562
0.0746
0.0823
0.1039
0.0622
0.0462
0.0656
0.0882
0.2150
1.0000
Employee
Amount
1332
2142
2492
2330
2717
2905
4387
4979
6606
7286
9197
5498
4084
5800
7804
18929
88490
Source: Based on Appendix Table A.2.16.
Finally, the distributions of unincorporated capital incomes of self-employed and
employee households by the 16 income groups (Table 2.11) are mapped into
unincorporated capital income by the six household groups using the information of
Table 2.9. The distribution of unincorporated capital income among the six
household groups is presented in Table 2.12.
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Table 2.12. Final Distribution of Unincorporated Income among Households, 1988/89
(million taka)
Sources	 SLI
	
SMI	 Sf11	 ELI	 EMI
	
El-LI
Unincor
-porated	 9272
	
55415	 98984	 13918	 32456
	
42116	 252160
Income
Source: Based on Tables 2.9 and 2.11.
2.3.6.3 Household income from other sources
Besides labour and unincorporated capital incomes, households also receive incomes
from other sources, namely remittances or factor incomes from abroad, government
transfers in the form of pension and dividend incomes from the corporations. We
begin with the remittances or factor incomes from abroad. Assuming that the
remittances are entirely worker's remittances, the remittances are then distributed
among the six households according to their shares in total labour income.
Pension income is very limited in Bangladesh. Persons who are employed in
government, semi-government and autonomous establishments are eligible for
pension income. This is a transfer of resources from government to persons or
households in accordance to their contributions made during their working period.
Hence pension income is only distributed among the three employee household
groups according to their shares in total labour income.
Given the uncertain, unattractive, risky and yet very low yield nature of the capital
market, it is assumed that only the two high income household groups invest their
money in this sector. Therefore, the total dividend of taka 460 million is distributed
between the two high income household groups according to their respective shares in
the total unincorporated capital income of the high income household group.
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SMI
SHI
ELI
EMI
EHI
Total
Total
	
0	 0
	
0	 0
	
0	 323
	
240	 0
	
387	 0
	
898	 137
	
1525	 460
83232
162943
126559
115294
90326
55490
633394
Table 2.13. Sources of Households Income, 1988/89 (million taka)
Labour	 Unincor-	 Remi-
Income	 porated	 ttance
69367	 9272	 4593
100428	 55415	 6650
25569	 98984	 1693
94855	 13918	 6281
53914	 32456	 3570
11564	 42116	 766
355697	 252160	 23552
* Excludes inter-household transfer (see later)
2.3.6.4 Derivation of household's expenditure on goods and services
The derivation of consumption expenditure by households is quite straight forward.
The aggregated 1-0 table depicts the sectoral breakdown of consumption expenditure
on goods and services. The HES provides detailed breakdown of expenditure by 16
income groups and HES products. In particular, the HES identified 40 different
sectors which are somewhat different from the 1-0 sector classification. So, the HES
sectors are mapped to the 1-0 sectors according to the mapping scheme used by the
World Bank in their revenue estimation model for Bangladesh (An agenda for tax
reform in Bangladesh, 1989). The mapping between the HES sectors and the 1-0
sectors is shown in Appendix Table A.2.18. However, sectoral consumption
estimated from HES estimates are found to be different from the 1-0 sectoral
consumption estimates. Therefore, sectoral consumption expenditures by the 16
income groups are adjusted using sectoral scaling factors so that the sectoral
consumption now corresponds to the 1-0 sectoral consumption estimates. The
adjusted distribution of consumption expenditure by 1-0 sectors and the 16 income
groups is shown in Appendix Table A.2. 17. The consumption expenditures by 1-0
sectors and the 16 income groups are converted into sectoral consumption expenditure
by the six household groups using Table 2.9. Table 2.14 reports the distribution of
consumption expenditures by the six household groups.
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ELI
62152
596
2566
4746
3783
2160
3906
0
1092
1227
0
1433
29009
10198
EHI
10932
437
470
5280
873
1058
1084
0
1247
1559
0
406
11890
5112
EM!
45334
961
2347
6258
2950
2601
3540
0
1942
2468
0
1179
10389
7243
SF11
32012
887
1056
9664
1878
2229
2450
0
2849
3248
0
859
38368
11821
SM!
76617
1818
4384
11827
5527
4911
6634
0
3632
4688
0
2211
23402
13576
SLI
48932
561
2088
3975
2928
1801
3127
0
1407
1060
0
1112
15167
7979
275979
5260
12910
41751
17941
14760
20741
0
12770
14250
0
7200
128225
55930
1. Subs-Ag.
2. Corn-Ag.
3. Forestry
4. Food-Tobacco
5. Clothing
6. Garments
7. Chemical
8. Cement
9. Machinery
10. 0th. Industries
11. Construction
12. Energy
13. Services
14.Trade-trans.
Table 2.14. Distribution of Households Expenditure on Goods and Services, 1988/89 (million taka)
Total
	
90137
	
159228
	
107324
	
123468
	
87212
	
40349
	
607717
Source: Based on Tab'es 2.9 and A.2.17.
2.3.6.5 Inter-household transfers
A specific feature of the SAM is the transfer of resources among households in
Bangladesh. The 'Household Expenditure Survey' reports total as well as distribution
of transfer receipts and payments by the 16 income groups. The total receipt of taka
48316 million (or 7.5 percent of total income by all income groups) appears to be
quite large compared with the total transfer receipt observed in the past years. In
particular, the share of transfer receipts increased from less than 1 percent of total
income of household in 1985/86 to 7 percent in 1988/89. According to the HES, the
dramatic increase in transfer receipts in 1988/89 was due to adverse effects of the
floods (in 1986/87 and 1987/88) leading to greater dependence of many vulnerable
households on gifts and remittances from other households. The total transfer
payment should have been taka 48316 million to match receipts. However, the total
transfer payment is reported to be taka 7248 million (or 1.3 percent of total
expenditure) for 1988/89. Therefore, there is a large discrepancy (taka 41068 million)
between the total transfer receipts and payments. Considering the special nature of
problem in 1988/89, the total receipts of taka 48316 million is judged to be more
reliable. Hence the transfer payment by each of the 16 income groups is adjusted
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upwards to total taka 48316 million. The distribution of the total receipts and
payments by the 16 income groups is presented in Table 2.15.
Table 2.15. Transfer Receipts and Payments by Income Groups, 1988/89
(million taka)
Income
<750
750-999
1000- 1249
1250-1499
1500- 1999
2000-2499
2500-2999
3000-3999
4000-4999
5000-5999
6000-6999
7000-7999
8000-8999
9000-9999
10000-12499
12500+
	
Transfer	 Transfer Payments
	
Receipts	 Unadjusted	 Adjusted
	
7773	 42	 277
	
4790	 77	 512
	
3025	 64	 427
	
2227	 102	 683
	
2209	 157	 1045
	
1782	 246	 1643
	
2945	 333	 2218
	
2293	 323	 2154
	
2497	 387	 2581
	
3470	 448	 2986
	
2370	 643	 4288
	
3590	 470	 3136
	
872	 1181	 7871
	
2840	 810	 5397
	
1425	 1059	 7061
	
4191	 906	 6037
Total	 I	 48316
	
7248	 48316
Source: Based on HES Table 1.08.
The transfer receipts and adjusted transfer payments by income groups (Table 2.15)
are mapped into transfer receipts and payments by the six household groups using
again Table 2.9. This is shown in Table 2.16. As expected it is observed that
transfers of resources flow mainly from the high income households to the low
income households. ,
 This is captured in the net transfer column of Table 2.16.
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Table 2.16. Transfer Receipts and Payments by Household Groups 1988/89, (million taka)
HH
Grou
SLI
SMI
SHI
ELI
EMI
EHI
Transfer Received
	
Amount	 %
	
8530	 0.177
	
8892	 0.184
	
8178	 0.169
	
13278	 0.275
	
4690	 0.097
	
4750	 0.098
Transfer Payments
	
Amount	 %
	
1565	 0.032
	
9315	 0.193
	
18660	 0.386
	
3024	 0.063
	
4914	 0.102
	
10840	 0.224
Net
Transfer
6966
-423
-10482
10254
-223
-6090
Total
	
48318	 1.000	 48318	 1.000	 0
Source: Based on Table 2.15.
The inter-household transfers however require further disaggregation because
although total transfer amounts received and paid are known for each household
group, what is not shown yet is who transfers what to whom. The full disaggregation
of inter-household transfers is based on some assumptions and some data
manipulation. (i) It is assumed that inter-household transfer flows from richer
households to either same or poorer households. For instance, transfer from low
income self-employed household only benefits the low income employee household
and vice-versa but not any middle or high income households. Therefore, the initial
coefficient of transfers is 1 (one) between these two low income households. (ii) The
middle income household groups first exchanged resources between themselves
according to their observed shares in the total transfer received by the middle income
household. For example, self-employed middle income household receives 34.53
percent of its total transfer from the employee middle income household. Similarly,
employee middle income household receives 65.47 percent of its total transfer from
the self-employed middle income household.
Table 2. 17. Transfer Received by Middle and High Income Groups and Proportions, 1988/89.
Income Groups	 Total	 Self-employed	 Employee
Amount	 %	 Amount	 %
Middle Income	 13582	 8892	 0.655	 4690	 0.345
High Income	 12927	 8177	 0.633	 4750	 0.368
Source: Based on Table 2.16.
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Then remaining transfer payments of middle income household groups are distributed
between the two low income household groups according to the shares of the two low
income households in total transfer receipts, adjusted so that the three coefficients add
to one. For instance, the self-employed middle income household group pays 34.53
percent of its total transfer payments to the employee middle income household. Then
the remaining 65.47 percent is distributed between self-employed and employee low
income households. Their observed shares in total transfer receipts are 17.65 and
27.48 percent respectively, together generating 45.13 percent. These two shares are
then adjusted by a scaling factor of 1.45 so that the three coefficients add to one (see
column 2 of Table 2.18). (iii) A similar procedure is adopted to determine the
coefficients for the two high income household groups. Accordingly, the high income
household groups first transfer resources between themselves according to their
observed shares in the total transfer received by the high income household. For
instance, self-employed high income households receives 36.75 percent of its total
receipts from the employee high income households. On the other hand, employee
high income households receive 63.25 percent of its total receipts from the self-
employed high income households. Then the remaining transfer payments of high
income household groups are distributed among the four other household groups
according their shares in total transfer receipts, adjusted so that five coefficients add to
one.
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ELI
1.000
Total
1.489
1.043
0.754
2.035
0.420
0.255
EMI
0.088
0.724
0.188
HHs
SLI
SMI
SHI
ELI
EMI
EHI
Total
SLI
SMI
SHI
EL!
EM!
EHI
Total
1565
EHI
0.045
0.079
0.754
0.096
0.026
1.000
485
857
8177
1037
284
10840
SHI
0.136
0.240
0.289
0.080
0.255
1.000
2543
4476
5406
1483
4750
18661
8530
8892
8177
13278
4690
4750
483181565
4347
2927
9315
SLI	 SM!
Final Coefficients
0.219
	
1.000	 0.467
0.314
	
1.000	 1.000
Final Estimates (million taka)
2044
1.000	 1.000
3024	 434
3556
924
3024	 4914
Table 2.18. Initial Coefficients and Estimates of Inter-Household Transfer, 1988/89
HHs	 SLI	 SMI	 SHI	 ELI	 EMI	 EHI
	
Total
Initial Coefficients
SLI	 0.256	 0.153	 1.000	 0.135	 0.089
	
1.632
SM!	 -	 0.159	 0.655	 0.092	 0.906
SHI	 0.633
	 0.633
ELI	 1.000	 0.399	 0.237	 0.210	 0.138
	
1.984
EMI	 0.345	 0.084	 0.049
	 0.478
EHI	 0.368
	 0.367
Total	 1.000	 1.000	 1.000	 1.000	 1.000	 1.000
Initial Estimates (million taka)
SLI	 2385	 2845	 3024	 664	 960
	 9878
SM!	 2966	 3217	 1001
	
7183
SHI	 6857
	 6857
ELI	 1565	 3713	 4429	 1033	 1494
	
12234
EMI	 3217	 2564	 528
	
5309
EHI	 6857	 6857
Total	 1565	 9315	 18661	 3024	 4914	 10840	 48318
(iv) Table 2.18 shows the initial coefficients and estimates of inter-household
transfers. Although the derived estimates of transfer payments satisfied the payment
control totals, the derived estimates of transfer receipts violated the receipt control
totals. Hence given these initial coefficients and using the receipt and payment
column of Table 2.16 as column control and row control vector respectively-the 'RAS'
method is used for this typical constrained matrix problem to arrive at the final inter-
household transfer matrix as depicted in Table 2.19.
Table 2.19. Final Coefficients and Estimates of Inter-Household Transfers, 1988/89
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107324
18660
125984
1392
7361
607717
48318
656035
2800
22877
2.3.6.6 Total receipts, outlays and savings by households
Personal savings by the six household groups are derived in this section. The personal
savings of each household group is calculated residually by deducting household's
total outlays and income taxes from household's total receipts. The total income tax
collection was taka 2800 million in 1988/89. The lIES information on income tax
payments by the 16 income groups is used to determined the amount of income tax
paid by the four household groups. It is noted that only middle and high income
household groups pay income tax. This indeed is the reflection of the HES data on
income tax, where low income groups are not reported to have paid income tax. The
total personal savings is estimated to be taka 22877 million. It is noted that the
national accounts only report consolidated domestic savings amount of taka 36490
million in 1988/89. It is therefore imperative to check whether the sum of the
corporate, government and household savings satisfies the consolidate domestic
savings. It is observed that the sum of these three saving components satisfies the
consolidated savings of taka 36490 million. Total receipts, outlays and savings by the
household groups are shown in Table 2.20.
Table 2.20. Total Receipts, Outlays and Savings by Household Groups, 1988/89 (million taka)
Sources	 SLI	 SM!	 SF11	 ELI	 EM!	 EHI	 Total
Total
Income	 83232	 162493	 126559	 115294	 90326	 55490	 633394
Transfer
Received	 8530	 8892	 8178	 13278	 4690	 4751	 48318
Total
Receipts	 91762	 171385	 134737	 128572	 95010	 60240	 6817712
Total Ex-
penditure
Transfer
Payment
Total
Outlays
Income
Tax
	
90137	 159228
	
1565	 9315
	
91702	 168543
	
0	 477
	
60	 2365
	
123468	 87211	 40439
	
3024	 4914	 10840
	
126492	 92125	 51189
	
0	 240	 691
	
2080	 2651	 8360
Source: Based on Tables 2.13, 2.14 and 2.16.
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2.4 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the numerical specification of the Bangladesh economy
within the framework of an input-output table and a social accounting matrix. The
main achievements of this exercise are:
(a) The compilation of the SAM has been shown as an outcome of integration of
different data sources and the input-output table. It provides a quantitative description
of production, income generation by factors of production, distribution of income by
institutions and savings and investment patterns in a detailed framework. The present
SAM provides a useful framework for exploring both macroeconomic and
multisectoral issues in Bangladesh which are not readily observable from different and
disconnected data sources.
(b) The SAM integrates numerous data that are collected and compiled by different
departments of government. Since sectoral classification and statistics of these
different sources are not readily compatible, the exercise employs various
assumptions, extensive data manipulation, reconciliation and balancing items to
compile the SAM. The methodology and statistical procedures used to compile the
SAM are also discussed in detail. It therefore provides a framework to generate and
extend future social accounting matrices in Bangladesh.
(c) The exercise highlights the importance of the SAM as a useful aid to policy
analysis which can focus on socio-economic linkages in the economy and on
simulation of policy reforms using both SAM-based fixed-price models and flex-price
computable general equilibrium models. The present SAM is also suitable for income
distribution analysis as it shows the linkages between factoral distribution of income
by nine factors and personal distribution of income by the six household groups. A
particular novelty of this SAM is the construction of an inter-household transfer
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matrix from limited and partial information. The methodology used to construct the
inter-household transfer matrix is so general that it can be applied to any other SAM
without to much complication. This feature may be used to examine the role of inter-
household transfers in affecting the income distribution or poverty situation of
different household groups.
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Appendix to chapter two
A.1. Problems with the treatment of margins on imports in Bangladesh
The transactions in 1-0 tables are usually expressed in value terms either at producers'
or at purchasers' prices (market prices). " The difference between the two sets of
values gives the distributive trade margins and the transport margins. The gross
output of the distributive trade and transport units is equal to the value of their gross
margins on internal and external trade (system of material products balance, UN
aggregate account)." The 1-0 tables of Bangladesh (i.e. 1976/77, 1981/82 and
1986/87) are based on transactions valued at purchasers' prices. This implies that all
internal as well as external transactions or trade must be valued at purchasers' prices
(market prices). In published trade statistics the values of exports and imports are
recorded at f.o.b. and c.i.f. prices respectively. In the 1-0 tables of Bangladesh,
exports at f.o.b. prices are treated as equivalent to exports at market prices. However,
imports valued at c.i.f. prices are converted into imports at market prices by adding
the following (domestic) margins to c.i.f. imports. The margins added to the c.i.f.
imports are: (i) transport margin (domestic); (ii) trade margin (domestic); (iii) import
duty and (iv) other margins (e.g. the 'scarcity premium' on restricted imports).
Identification of problems and possible ways of treating these margins
A detailed inspection of the 1-0 table of 1986/87 reveals a major problem in the
treatment of these margins added to c.i.f. imports to derive imports at market prices
and the corresponding domestic sources of supply of these margins.
The treatment of import duty is straightforward; it is a transfer of resources from the
private sector (in Bangladesh, most of the official imports are exempt from such
duties) to the government sector.
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The transport and trade margins are from domestic activity and the source of supply of
these margins should be the transport and trade sector in Bangladesh. The transport
and trade sector generates a composite activity which then is distinguished according
to its usage i.e. transport and trade margins on internal and external trade. The 1-0
table of 1986/87 showed substantial trade and transport margins on c.i.f. imports but
the corresponding supplies were not reflected in the flows of trade and transport
sector. The I-U table of 1981/82 (from which the 1986/87 was updated) is however
consistent in this regard. It showed that the gross output of the distributive trade and
transport unit is equal to the value of their gross margins on internal and external
transactions or trade.
The scarcity premium is a pure rent activity which accrued to the import license
holders when the importation of certain items is restricted. If these license holders are
public agencies then the treatment of the scarcity premium is straightforward and is
similar to an import duty: these are transfer of resources from private to public sector.
In Bangladesh, as in other developing countries, these quota rents are being
appropriated by the private import license holders or agencies who in turn lobbied for
such a license. Being a domestic private sector activity these rents should be reflected
in the flows of the 1-0 table of 1986/87. However, no equivalent entries for the
scarcity premium added to c.i.f. imports are shown in the flows of the 1-0 table of
1986/87. The text of I-U table of 1986/87 does not provide any explanation of the
domestic treatment, of these margins. Also the consistent 1981/82 1-0 table failed to
take account of the appropriate treatment of the scarcity premium. However,
assuming that commercial importers are a subset of the trading activity these margins
may then be considered an activity of the trade sector.
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The adjustment procedures
Having identified the problems, the next step is to derive a consistent I-U table for
Bangladesh that maintains the material balance conditions and subsequently be
consistent with the macro aggregates (e.g. private and public consumption, gross fixed
capital formation, change in stocks, exports etc.). The macro aggregates published by
the United Nations are used for this purpose.
The 1-0 table of 1986/87 depicts that substantial amounts (taka 39306 million) of
transport and trade margins are added to c.i.f. imports. However, the total activity
produced and supplied by the transport and trade sector as reported in 1-0 table is
significantly lower. For example, the total value added of the transport and trade
sector reported in the UN accounts (and in the national accounts) is much higher (taka
107784 million) than the corresponding value added (taka 68392 million) reported in
the 1986/87 1-0 table. Therefore, we decided to boost the value added of the transport
and trade sector to be consistent with the UN accounts and, at the same time, augment
the supply of the transport and trade sector by adding the sectoral transport and trade
margins to the sectoral c.i.f. imports. At this point we arrived at a consistent data set
except for the treatment of the other margins. The data set is consistent in terms of
total value added, sectoral value added (i.e. transport and trade sector) and other
macro aggregates. The reported scarcity premia of taka 21789 million in 1986/87
appears to be very high considering the import trade regime of Bangladesh.
Assuming that the value of all imports in 1986/87 (i.e. taka 80088 million) is binding
(in terms of quota) and the average scarcity premia is 20 percent, the total scarcity
premia is taka 16018 million which is smaller than taka 21879 million reported in 1986/87 I-
0 table8 . Although no estimate is available regarding the value of importables under the
restricted list, it is believed that the value of restricted imports as a proportion of total
8 A study by the Planning Commission reported that the overall scarcity premium is 35 percent, of
which 15 percent may be considered as the normal profit margin. Therefore, the average (pure)
scarcity premium is around 20 percent.
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import value is quite low9. Therefore this estimate appears to be spurious and hence
the reliability of such an estimate is in question. At this stage this problem may be
handled in two possible ways; (a) drop the scarcity premium assuming that the
scarcity premium is being included in the transport and trade margin; or (b) add the
scarcity premium to the value added of the transport and trade sector, which in turn
would generate a higher sectoral (i.e. transport and trade) as well as total value added.
We have decided to adopt the first approach since it is consistent with the macro
aggregates and at the same time maintains the material balance condition. The second
approach might lead to some double counting.
A.2. Estimation of labour income by sector and factor
This section elaborates the derivation of labour income by sector and factor. The
information of 1986/87 input-output table is used to estimate sectoral labour income
for 1988/89. The 1986/87 1-0 table reports the breakdown of sectoral employment
and sectoral value added at factor cost by capital and eight major labour factors or
occupational groups. These are two types of professional labour-administrative
(ADM) and service (SERV) and six types of non-professional labour-agricultural
hired labour (AHL), agricultural family labour small farms (AFLSF), agricultural
family labour large farms (AFLLF), workers-skilled (WSK), workers-semi skilled
(WSS) and workers-unskilled (WUSK). We preserve this labour factor classification.
The employment coefficient matrix of 1986/87 and the employment by labour factors
for 1988/89 are used to derive the estimates of sectoral employment by factors for
1988/89. Information is not readily available to update or generate the employment
and employment coefficient matrix for 1988/89. The Household Expenditure Survey
(HES) of 1988/89 and the provisional Labour Force Survey (LFS) of 1989 report
The World Bank estimated that roughly 20 percent of all imports categories (i.e. 1192 items) at the
four digit SITC level are under the restricted list of imports in 1984/85.
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some estimates of employment for 1988/89. The estimated total employment of 29.2
million reported by the HES is close to the provisional LFS estimates of 30.8 million
reported in the Bangladesh Statistical Yearbook 1991. The provisional LFS does not
report the breakdown of employment by occupation. On the other hand, the FIBS
provides some estimates of employment by major occupation groups which are close
to the 1-0 factor classification albeit not same. Therefore, the HES employment
estimates are used to generate a vector of employment by labour factor following a
mapping between 1-0 and FIBS factor classification.
Table A.2. 1. Mapping of HES Factor Classification and I-U Factor Classification
HES Classification
Agriculture labour
and Fisherman
Tenant Farmer &
Farmer Small Farm
Administrative &
Professional Officer
Other Office Staff,
Services & Others
Transport and
Production
Workers
Total
Numbers	 1-0 Classification
5512695	 Agriculture Hired Labour
(AHL)
Agriculture Family Labour
11950115	 Small Farm (AFLSF)
Large Farm (AFLLF)
	
820262	 Administrative (ADM)
	
5597054	 Service (SERV)
	
5328637	 Workers
Skilled (WSK)
Semi-Skilled (WSS)
Unskilled (WUSK)
29208763
Numbers
5512695
58 15268
6134847
82062
5597054
627900
1658240
3042947
29208763
Source: Based on HES Table 4.19 and 1-0 table 1986/87.
Note: The estimated total employment of family labour and transport and production workers are then
further classified according to the size of farms and skills of workers according to their shares
observed in 1986/87 employment data.
The employment coefficient matrix of 1986/87 () and the vector of employment by
labour factors for 1988/89 (T,) are used to derive the estimates of sectoral employment
by factors for 1988/89 (a,,). Sctoral wage coefficient matrix of 1986/87 and
estimated employment matrix of 1988/89 are then used to derive the sectoral labour
income by factors for 1988/89. The estimated sectoral labour income is shown in
Table A.2.5.
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2. Commercial Agriculture
3. Forestiy
4. Food and Tobacco
5. Clothing
6. Garments
7. Chemical
8. Cement
9. Machinery
10. Other Industries
11. Construction
12. Energy
13. Services
14. Trade & Transport
1986/87
Capital out-
put ratio
1.1057
0.6771
0.5287
0.2265
0.3613
0.7517
1.4753
1.5883
1.4515
1.5064
0.8124
4.3338
3.3449
1.5 156
Output
275165
22630
27176
34099
26409
45168
13492
19368
13120
14874
98155
17096
224992
162623
Capital
stock
15322
14368
7722
9541
33951
19905
30763
19044
22407
79742
74093
752588
246471
A.3. Derivation of sectoral capital stock estimates
Sectoral capital stocks for 1988/89 are derived using the capital output ratios of the
1986/87 input-output table and the sectoral outputs of 1988/89. Estimated sectoral
capital stocks are shown in Table A.2.6.
Table A.2.6 Capital Stock by Sectors, 1988/89 (million taka)
A.4. Distribution of manufacturing operating surplus
The operating surpluses of the eight manufacturing sectors stand at taka 25799
million. This consists of returns to corporate, unincorporated and government capitals
since industries are owned by individual, government and private or corporate firms.
The information of 1988/89 CMI are used to distribute the total manufacturing
operating surplus. The CMI reports manufacturing operating surplus of taka 10826
million for government, taka 11506 million for private firms and taka 4128 million for
individual firms. Together they generated manufacturing operating surplus of taka
26426 million which is very close to 1-0 estimates of taka 25799 million. A scaling
factor of 0.9763 (i.e. 25799/26426) is employed to adjust the CMI estimates so that
the total manufacturing operating surplus reported by CMI conforms to taka 25799
million.	 Consequently, the adjusted manufacturing operating surpluses for
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government, private and individual finns are taka 10569 million, taka 11200 million
and taka 4030 million respectively (Table A.2.7).
Table A.2.7. Manufacturing Value Added and Operating Surplus by Ownership, 1988/89 (million taka)
Types
Government
Private
Individual
Total
Value	 Wage or	 Indirect
added	 Salary	 Tax
23158	 8106	 4226
28726	 8962	 8258
8974	 3807	 1039
60858	 20875	 13523
Operating Surplus
CM!	 Adjusted
	
10826	 10569
	
11506	 11200
	
4128	 4030
	
26426	 25799
Note: Here the value added refers to gross value added.
Source: Table hA, CMI 1988/89.
The CMI also provides the breakdown of the manufacturing operating surpluses by
government and private firms at three-digit industry groups. This information is
aggregated according to the 1-0 sector classification to derive the distribution of
manufacturing operating surplus by government and private firms for the eight
manufacturing sectors (i.e. columns 1 and 2 of Table A.2.8). It is observed that
sectoral as well as total manufacturing operating surpluses derived from CMI are
different from the estimated sectoral and total manufacturing operating surpluses (see
Table A.2.7). Therefore, sectoral totals derived from CMII are adjusted by their
respective scaling factors to generate estimated sectoral control totals. This process
however, produced government and private totals of taka 10548 and 15251 million
respectively which differed slightly from the government and private control totals of
taka 10569 and 15230 million. To reconcile this, the 'RAS' technique is adopted. The
'RAS' technique while preserving the sectoral as well as the government and private
control totals, produces some new shares for the government and the private
corporation. The final distribution of manufacturing operating surpluses between
government and private corporations is shown in columns 8 and 9 of Table A.2.8.
The estimated sectoral operating surpluses of private corporations are further
disaggregated into operating surpluses by individual and private corporations (Table
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A.2.9). It is noted that the share of individual operating surplus is taka 4030 million
out of total private operating surplus of taka 15230 million. The following procedures
are adopted to carry out this disaggregation due to lack of relevant information. The
consolidating clothing sector is composed of yarn, mill-made clothing and hand loom
sub-sectors. The hand loom sub-sector is predominantly rural small-scale cottage
activity, employing less than 10 persons. It is, therefore, assumed that the operating
surplus of the hand loom sub-sector may be considered as part of individual operating
surplus. The estimated operating surplus of the hand loom sector is taka 941 million.
It is also assumed that no more individual operating surplus originated in the clothing
sector and there was no operating surplus at all in the energy sector. The remainder of
the total individual operating surplus i.e. taka 3089 (4030-941) million is then
distributed among the remaining six manufacturing sectors (i.e. except clothing and
energy sectors) according to their shares of private operating surpluses in the total
private operating surpluses of these six sectors' 0.
An illustration may make this clear. The total operating surplus of these six sectors is taka 12257
million (i.e. 12257= 15230 -295 1-22). The share of food and tobacco sector with respect to this total is
0.0475 (i.e. 582/12257). When this share is multiply by the remainder of the total individual operating
surplus i.e. 0.0475*3089, the food and tobacco sector's operating surplus of taka 147 million is
obtained.
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A.5. Distribution of operating surplus of the service sector
This section reports the estimation of the operating surpluses of the five sub-sectors of
the consolidated service sector. The National accounts section of Bangladesh
Statistical Year Book, 1991, reports operating surpluses of private and public sector
banks and insurance companies. This information is presented in Table A.2. 10.
Table A.2.10. Breakdown of Operating Surplus of Financial Services, (million taka)
Types	 Operating	 Government	 Corporate
_________________________	 Surplus	 Share	 Share
1. Commercial Banks &	 3030	 1365	 1665
Insurance Companies
2. Private Banks	 890	 890
3. Central Bank	 2630	 2630
Total	 6550	 3995	 2555
Source: Based on Tables 9.19, 9.20, 9.21, 9.22 and 9.24; Statistical Year Book of
Bangladesh, 1991, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.
The operating surplus of the Central bank, taka 2630 million, is assigned to the
government. On the other hand, the operating surplus of taka 890 million generated
by private banks is trated as corporate capital. Furthermore, it is also reported that
the government received taka 1365 million from the nationalised commercial banks
and insurance companies. Having incorporated this amount as the government share,
the corporate share of taka 1665 million is determined residually from the operating
surplus of the commercial banks and insurance companies.
Information is not readily available to estimate the operating surplus of the remaining
four sub-sectors of the service sector. So a different method is adopted to estimate the
operating surpluses of these sub-sectors. Information on value added by these sub-
sectors for 1988/89 is obtained from the Bangladesh Statistical Year Book, 1991. The
1986/87 1-0 table reports the ratio of operating surplus to value added by these sub-
sectors. These observed ratios and the reported value added for 1988/89 are used to
derive the operating surpluses of these sub-sectors for 1988/89. The estimated
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Government
0
3995
3535
1460
0
8990
Sectors Corporate
Housing
Financial Service
Public administration
Health & Education
Other Services
Total
59886
0
0
0
27998
87864
	
0	 59886
	
2555	 6550
	
0	 3535
	
0	 1460
	
0	 27998
	
2555	 99408
operating surpluses of these sub-sectors, along with other relevant information, are
provided in Table A.2. 11.
Table A.2. 11. Breakdown of Service Sector's Operating Surplus (million taka)
Ratio
3=2/1
1.000
0.050
0.110
0.545
Value
Added
Housing	 48508
Public Adm-
inistration	 16369
Health &
Education	 19580
Other
Services	 31201
Op. Surplus
2
48508
819
2147
17000
Value
Added
4
59866
29203
32245
51384
Op. Surplus
54*3
59866
1460
•	 3535
27998
Source: Based on 1-0 table, 1986/87 and Table 11.07, the Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh, 1991.
Table A.2. 12 Distribution of Operating Surplus of Service sector among Institutions, (million taka)
Source: Based on Tables A.2. 10 and A.2. 11.
The information of Table A.2.10 and A.2.11 is assembled in Table A.2.12 to depict
the final distribution of the operating surplus of the service sector. It is observed that
more than 88 percent of the service sector's operating surplus accrued to
unincorporated capItal. The shares of government and corporate capital are 9 percent
and 2.6 percent respectively.
A.6. Distribution of labour income by HES income groups
This section discusses the distribution of labour income by the 16 HES income
groups. The information of HES Table 1.07 and Appendix Table A.2. I is used for
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this purpose. First, the percentage of earners by four factors derived from HES Table
1.07 and the number of earners obtained from Appendix Table A.2. 1 are used to
derive a distribution of earners by the four factors and the 16 income groups. This
distribution is presented in Appendix Table A.2. 13.
Table A.2. 13. Initial Distribution of Earners by HES Income Groups, 1988/89.
	
Income	 ADM	 SERV	 AGRL	 PRTRW	 Total
	
<750
	
9594
	 36939	 442778	 160376	 651407
	
750-999
	 8498	 100190	 941797	 228168	 1270945
	
1000-1249	 6764	 158712	 1345759	 335951	 1836841
	
1250-1499	 29120	 307561	 1439443	 364569	 2131293
	
1500-1999	 54815	 626548	 3072364	 857064	 4599032
	
2000-2499	 87288	 712608	 238 1988	 813921	 4003564
	
2500-2999	 70075	 583739	 1961916	 492784	 3000680
	
3000-3999	 128440	 1054986	 2546492	 763259	 4493161
	
4000-4999	 89737	 607111	 1233188	 470518	 2411656
	
5000-5999	 88621	 332761	 636573	 243349	 1308374
	
6000-6999	 73267	 244445	 412014	 176416	 913178
	
7000-7999	 43761	 228830	 228173	 90723	 595002
	
8000-8999	 22274	 115653	 308821	 109360	 557924
	
9000-9999	 27916	 74049	 231379	 31778	 361919
	
10000-12499	 19782	 171406	 137910	 40700	 370511
	
12500+	 60311	 241524	 242216	 149701	 703276
	
Total	 820262	 5597054	 17462810	 5329087	 29208763
Source: Table 1.07, the Household Expenditure Survey of Bangladesh, 1988/89.
The income group specific to consolidated agricultural labour is further split into
agricultural hired labour (AHL), agricultural family labour small farms (AFLSF) and
agricultural family labour large farms (AFLLF) according to their shares in total
agricultural employment as observed in Table A.2. 1. Similarly income group specific
workers are separated into skilled (WSK), semi skilled (WSS) and unskilled (WUSK)
workers according to their shares in total employed workers (see Table A.2.1). This is
shown in Table A.2. 14.
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Income
AFLLF
155552
330862
472778
505690
1079350
836815
654108
894606
433230
223634
144744
80159
108492
81285
48449
85093
<750
750-999
1000-1249
1250- 1499
1500-1999
2000-2499
2500-2999
3000-3999
4000-4999
5000-5999
6000-6999
7000-1999
8000-8999
9000-9999
10000-12499
12500+
AHL
139777
297308
414832
454406
969890
751951
587773
803886
389295
200955
130065
72030
97489
73042
43536
76463
Total 5512695 6134847
Agriclulture Labour
AFLSF
147449
313627
448150
479347
1023124
793223
620043
848004
410662
211984
1372004
75984
102840
77051
45925
80660
58
Production & Transport Workers
WSK	 WSS	 WUSK
18896	 499004	 91576
26884	 70999	 130286
39584	 104537	 191831
42955	 113442	 208172
100984	 266691	 489390
95900	 253266	 464755
58062	 153339	 281383
89931	 237502	 435827
55439	 146410	 268669
28673	 75722	 138954
20786	 54895	 100375
10689	 28230	 51803
12885	 34029	 62445
3797	 10028	 18403
4795	 12664	 23250
17639	 46582	 85481
627900
Table A.2. 14. Further Distribution of Agriculture Labour and Production and Transport Workers by
Factors & HES Income Groups, 1988/89.
Source: Based on Tables A.2.1. and A.2.13.
The average wage rates of the eight labour factors, 14 and the estimated matrix of
earners by the 16 income groups and labour factors, T 1
 are employed to derive labour
income by factors and income groups. The distribution of labour income by the 16
HES income group is shown in Table A.2.15.
Table A.2.15. Distribution of Labour Income by FEES Income Groups, 1988/89 (million taka)
Income	 Adm	 Serv	 Ahi	 Aflsf
	
Afllf	 Wsk
	
Wss	 Wusk
	
<750	 489	 542	 1374	 1611	 [367	 249	 621	 937
	
750-999	 433	 1471
	
2923	 3428	 2907	 354
	 883
	
1333
	
1000-1249	 345	 2331
	
4177
	
4898	 4154
	
521	 1300
	
1963
	
1250-1499	 1485	 4517
	
4468	 5339	 4443	 565	 1411
	 2130
	
1500-1999	 2796	 9201
	
9537
	 11182	 9483	 1329
	
3316
	
5007
	
2000-2499	 4452	 10465
	
7394	 8669	 7352	 1262
	
3149
	
4755
	
2500-2999	 3574
	
8573
	
5779
	
6776
	
5747	 764
	
1907	 2879
	
3000-3999	 6550	 15493
	
7904
	
9268
	
7860	 1183	 2953	 4459
	
4000-4999	 4577	 8916
	 3828
	
4488	 3806	 729	 1820	 2749
	
5000-5999	 4520
	 4887	 1976
	 2317	 1965
	
377	 942
	
1422
	
6000-6999	 3737
	 3590	 1279
	
1500
	
1272
	
273
	 683
	
I03I
	
7000-7999	 2232
	 3361	 708
	 830	 704	 141	 351	 530
	
8000-8999	 1136
	 1698	 959
	 1124	 953	 170	 423
	
639
	
9000-9999	 1424	 1087	 718
	 842	 714	 49
	
123	 186
	
10000-12499	 1009
	
2517	 428	 502	 426
	
63
	
157	 238
	
12500+	 3076	 3547	 752	 882	 748	 232	 579
	
875
Source: Based on Tables A.2.3 and A.2.13 and A.2.14.
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A.7. Distribution of the average monthly incomes of households
The average monthly income of each household by the 16 income groups is separated
into average monthly income by self-employed and employee household groups
according to observed proportion of self-employed and employee household groups in
each income group. The disaggregation of average monthly incomes by self-
employed and employee households is shown in Table A.2. 16. The first column
shows the average monthly income of households as reported in HES Table 1.01. For
example, the average monthly income of households with income less than 750 taka
per month is 557.99 taka. The shares of self-employed and employee households for
this income group are 0.1880 and 0.8 120 respectively (see Table 2.9). Multiplying
amount 557.99 by 0.1880 and 0.8120 we get amounts 104.90 and 453.09 respectively.
These are the estimated average monthly incomes by self-employed and employee
households for the first income group. This procedure is repeated for other income
groups to separate the average monthly income into the average monthly income by
self-employed and employee households. The estimated average monthly incomes of
these two household groups are then used to derive the share of average monthly
income of each of the 16 income groups under self-employed and employee
household groups.
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Self-employed
Amount	 % Amount
453.09
731.50
851.10
795.79
928.00
992.14
1036.71
1176.51
1560.91
1721.70
2173.28
2323.59
1725.89
2451.17
3298.12
7999.72
30219.22
104.90
149.93
276.19
576.03
816.03
1243.41
1698.68
2252.55
2887.39
3735.89
4252.75
5191.25
6780.24
6994.57
7716.55
11221.11
55897.37
0.00 19
0.0027
0.0049
0.0 103
0.0 146
0.0222
0.0.388
0.05 14
0.0659
0.0853
0.097 1
0.0828
0. 1082
0.1116
0.1231
0. 1791
1.0000
Table A.2.16. Breakdown of Average Monthly Income of Per Household, 1988/89.
Income
<750
750-999
1000- 1249
1250-1499
1500-1999
2000-2499
2500-2999
3000-3999
4000-4999
5000-5999
6000-6999
7000-7999
8000-8999
9000-9999
10000-12499
12500^
Total
Av. Monthly
Income per HH
557.99
881.43
1127.29
1371.82
1744.03
2235.55
2735.39
3429.06
4448.30
5457.04
6426.03
7514.84
8506.13
9445.74
11015.77
19220.82
55894.37
Employee
%
0.0150
0.0242
0.0282
0.0263
0.0307
0.0328
0.0496
0.0562
0.0746
0,0823
0.1039
0.0622
0.0462
0.0656
0.0882
0.2150
1.0000
Source: Based on HES Table 1.01 and Table 2.9.
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Table A.2. 18. Mapping between HES Sectors and Input-Output Sectors
Sectors of the Present Sti
Subsistence-Agriculture
Commercial-Agriculture
Forestry
Food and Tobacco
Clothing
Garments
Chemical
Machinery
Other Industries
Energy
Services
Trade and
HES Sectors
Rice, Wheat, Other Crops, Fruits, Fish, Meat, Milk
Jute, Sugarcane, Raw Tobacco and Tea
Firewood
Bread, Biscuits, Edible oil, Sugar, Salt & Tobacco Products
Textiles
Footwear and Wearing Apparel
Chemical & Pharmaceuticals
Machinery, Crockery and Kitchen Equipments
Furniture, TV-Radio and Other Products
Electricity, Gas and Kerosene
Public Administration, Education, Housing, Personal Care
and Personal Effects
Travel and Transnort and Trade Services
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Chapter Three
A General Equilibrium Value Added Tax Model of Bangladesh Economy
3.1.	 Introduction
In this chapter a model of the Bangladesh economy is developed to analyse the tax
incidence of the indirect tax system in general and the value-added tax system in
particular. Except for the VAT specification this model closely follows the models
developed by Condon et a! (1986) and J. D. Lewis (1995). The model explicitly
captures the specific features of the consumption-type and destination-principle-based
value-added tax system which has been adopted in Bangladesh. The methodology is
quite general and can be applied to other developing economies where a similar type
of VAT system is adopted. The model also shows decomposition of sectoral and
household consumption expenditures into committed and supernumerary expenditure
within a linear expenditure system. The equilibrium base of the model is assumed to
replicate the economy of Bangladesh for 1988/89 set out in the SAM data base. The
plan of the chapter is follows. Section 3.2 sets out the equations of the computable
general equilibrium model. Section 3.3 describes the general equilibrium formulation
of the VAT system. The parameterization of the model is discussed in section 3.4.
Concluding observations are presented in section 3.5.
3.2 The model structure
3.2.1 Production and supply
The production structure used in this model is represented by a set of nested functions.
Domestic output is a Cobb-Douglas function of value added and composite
intermediate inputs. The production structure is presented in figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Production Structure of the Bangladesh Model
The production technology is described by the following equation:
X = AX,fl . V,'' IN''	 (3.1)
where, X, is sectoral output. AX, and 2, are the production function shift and share
parameters respectively. ' is sectoral value added and IN, is aggregation index of
intermediate inputs. The composite intermediate input demand function is derived
from the first order condition of equation (3.1):
IN. = V.11 PN,.2,
	 (3.2)
where,	 and PN, are the value added and composite intermediate input prices
respectively.
The value added is a CES aggregate of nine factor inputs which includes capital and
eight different categories of labour inputs. The value added function is therefore
specified as:
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(3.3)
I
where, A V and a 1. are value added function shift and share parameters respectively.
j.i, denotes the elasticities of substitution between factors. FD,1 shows sectoral
factors. The factor demand function is derived from the cOst minimisation condition.
Minimisation of(3.3) with respect to cost yields following factor demand function:
o1•P
FD,. =V[
AV .w
where, W1 is the average return of factor f and zii.,. is a sector-specific parameter
derived from base year data which captures the fact that in a developing economy
factor returns generally differ across sectors. This sector-specific parameter measures
the extent to which the sectoral marginal revenue product of the factor deviates from
the average return across the economy". As a consequence of such factor market
distortions, the economy is operating inside the production possibility frontier rather
on it thereby providing scope for changes in overall, production even with full
employment of factors (Dervis et al, 1982).
(3.4)
This sector-specific parameters (v) depict the usual characteristic of factor markets in developing
countries that factors in the same category do not earn the same return in each sector. In the bench
mark data, the factor bill divided by factor employed reveals that the factor return is not equal across
sectors for the same category. The difference between these factor returns is generally attributed to
sector-specific features, assuming that they (i.e. sector-specific features) are a fixed fraction of the
endogenous factor return in that category . Thus, the actual payment to factors in category f by sector i
is	 = WJ .	 where W1 endogenous factor return and	 is the the sector-specific parameters
derived from the base year data.
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3.2.2 Prices
3.2.2.1 Domestic price of imports
On the import side we retain the price-taker small-country assumption of classical
trade theory. This implies that the domestic price of imports, PM, is determined
exogenously and is linked to the world price in dollars, PWM, by:
PM, =PWM,•ER•(1+tm1 +st,) 	(3.5)
where tin, and st, are the tariff and sales tax rates on sector i and ER is the nominal
exchange rate between US dollars and Bangladesh currency, taka.
3.2.2.2 Domestic price of exports
On the export side, Bangladesh is assumed to have some market power. This
assumption is particularly relevant for traditional exports, such as jute and jute
products, where Bangladeshi exports are significant and where Bangladesh has some
market power. For other sectors, Bangladesh may not have such market power.
However, given such a high level of sectoral aggregation it is difficult to identify
sectors with and without market power. In such a situation both the domestic price of
exports and the world price of Bangladeshi exports are endogenous. The domestic
price of exports is defined as a function of world price of exports PWE,, and the
nominal exchange rate, ER:
PE,=PWE,.ER	 (3.6)
The world price of Bangladeshi exports are determined by the domestic production
costs of exports, and by exchange rate policy. Following Dervis et al (1982) the
world price of Bangladeshi exports may be estimated as PWE, = PE,/ER.
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3.2.2.3 Composite price
The composite or unit price is defined by the following equation'2:
PD1.D+PMM1
Qi
where, D, and M are the domestic and imported goods respectively. PD, is the price
of domestic goods.
3.2.2.4 Sales or activity prices
The sales or activity price is composed of domestic price of domestic sales and
domestic price of exports activities:
x. = 
PD, .(1 - td1) . D, + PE, E,
xi
where, td1 is the production or excise tax on sector i.
3.2.2.5 Composite intermediate input price
The composite intermediate input price is specified by the following equation:
PN
	 (3.9)
where, r, are the input-output coefficients.
12 Following the approach of Devarajan et al (1995), both the composite price and sales or activity price
equations (e.g. 3.7 and 3.8) specified here are the linear approximation of the dual price equations for the
import aggregation (CES) and export transformation (CET) functions. Devarajan et al argued that although
the dual price equations may be expressed as CES and CET forms, in practice it is often convenient to
replace the dual price equations with expenditure indentities, invoking Euler's theorem for linearly
homogenous functions. Considering its convenience, it has been a common practice in CGE models to use
expenditure identities in place of price equations. Since this approach is well accepted in CGE models,
expenditure identities are adopted here instead of actual price equations.
(3.7)
(3.8)
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3.2.2.6 Value-added price
The value-added price is defined as:
PV=	 ''''
	 (3.10)
3.2.2.7 Composite capital goods price
The composite capital goods price is defined as:
where, ic,, is a capital composition matrix.
(3.11)
3.2.3 Imports and exports
3.2.3.1 Imports
The specification of foreign trade and its interaction with the domestic economy
constitutes the important part of the model. In the classical trade theory of
international trade, a traded good is assumed to be one for which (i) the country is a
price-taker (i.e. the small-country assumption) and (ii) the domestically produced
good is a perfect substitute for imported goods. This specification leads to the results
that the domestic price of a traded good is equal to its world price. Certain models
adhere to the framework of pure trade theory assuming perfect substitutability
between domestic and imported goods (e.g. Taylor and Black, 1974; and Clarete and
Whalley, 1988). This assumption implies that cross-hauling is ruled out and net
trading status of a country takes place, commensurately reducing the revenue figures.
Secondly, imports become a residual and except for the case of complete
specialisation, there are no explicit import demand functions; rather there are demand
functions for imported goods. Thirdly, since domestic prices are determined
completely by world prices, given the small country assumption, there is a tendency
for over-specialisation, a feature pointed out as early as 1953 by Samuelson and later
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discussed by Travis (1972) and Melvin (1968). The over-specialisation problem
arises because of the assumptions of: constant returns to scale; perfect competition;
perfect substitutability; small-country; and number of factors being less than number
of traded goods. In such a situation, there are more price equations in the models
than unknowns (factor prices) and overdetermination clearly results. In the literature,
the problem is tackled in several ways. Taylor and Black (1974) assume capital to be
sector-specific, whereas Clarete and Whalley (1988) avoid this problem by bringing
in a new set of sector-specific factors rather than fixing capital sectorally. Finally,
when domestic and imported goods are perfect substitutes, the trade creation effects of
trade policies tend to be larger than when products are imperfect substitutes.
On other hand a large part of literature adopts a specification of imperfect
substitutability between domestic and imported goods (Dervis et al, 1982 and
Devarajan et al, 1995). These models invoke the Armington (1969) assumption which
treats goods of the same type but different countries of origin as imperfect substitutes.
According to this assumption, each country produces a unique sets of goods which, to
a varying degree, are substitutes for, but not identical to, goods produced in other
countries. This has two advantages. First, it can accommodate cross-hauling in trade
data. Second, it avoids the over-specialisation problem discussed earlier. According
to Fretz, Srinivasan, and Whalley (1986) this is achieved by 'bounding the production
response to trade policy changes from the demand side, since commodities
subscripted by country are treated only as imperfect substitutes'. Since imported and
domestic goods are only imperfect substitutes a certain percentage change in the
domestic price of imports due to say a change in trade tax will lead to a smaller
percentage change in the price of the domestically traded goods. Thus, dropping of
perfect substitution between imports and domestic goods solves the specialisation
problem noted above (de Melo, 1987).
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In this model the Armington specification is adopted because the perfect substitution
assumption seems unrealistic for two reasons. First, in Bangladesh there are quality
differences between imports and domestic substitutes for most products. Second, at
such a high level of aggregation each sector represents a bundle of different goods.
For example the machinery sector includes goods which are produced in Bangladesh
(i.e. machine tools) and others (i.e. heavy machinery) which are not. It is therefore
reasonable to suggest that these two goods are not perfect substitutes; rather they are
imperfect substitutes.
Thus for each commodity category an "aggregate" or composite commodity Q1 is
defined, which is a CES function of imports M. and domestic goods D1 . Domestic
consumers are assumed to have a CES utility function over these two goods:
= AQ1	 +(1—,).E']"'	 (3.12)
where, AQ1 and , are shift and share parameters respectively and o, elasticity of
substitution is given by	 1	 This formulation implies that consumers will
1+ p1
choose a mix of M and D, depending on their relative prices. Minimising the cost of
obtaining a 'unit of utility', subject to (3.12) yields the following import demand
function:
M.D.[_PD1•1I	
I PM,.(1—,)
(3.13)
As a result of this specification, PD1 is no longer equal to PM, and PD1 is
endogenously determined in the model13
13 Not only does this specification make PD1 different from PM, but it also allows for a richer set of
responses. Condon et al (1986), argued that" equation (3.13) allows for a richer set of responses, but as
M.	 PD.
cy . gets larger, the sentivity of __!. to changes in 	 ' rises".
R	 PM,
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E1=E10.[_PWE,1111
PWSE1
(3.14)
3.2.3.2 Exports
As mentioned earlier Bangladesh is assumed have some market power for her exports.
Thus, following Devarajan et al (1995) a downward sloping world demand curve for
all exports is assumed. The export demand function can be shown as:
where, E,° is a constant, , is the price elasticity of export demand and PWSE, is
world price of goods which are close substitutes of Bangladeshi exports.
A substantial part of the literature assumed that producers are indifferent between
sales on domestic and export markets as long as they receive the same price. Thus
there is no supply function for exports as such, but rather a supply function for
domestic and exports as a whole, derived from production function (Drud et al, 1983
and Drud and Kendrick, 1986). In such models, domestic and export market prices
are identical before tax. As a consequence, the supply of exports may exhibit strong
response to changes in domestic prices. When a domestic price rises, producers are
induced to increase supply and consumers to reduce their demand. The net effect is a
dramatic increase in exports (i.e. the difference between supply and domestic
demand). However, in reality, exports may not rise this fast, because there may be
differences in the quality of goods produced for exports and for domestic
consumption. A classic example of this in Bangladesh is the ready made garment
sector where there are significant quality differences between garments produced for
home and abroad. To capture this, following Dervis et a! (1982) we postulate a
constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function between domestically consumed
goods D1 and exported goods E,:
= AT1 [L E1 +(l-71).D1']4
	
(3.15)
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PE,.(l—'y,) ]91i
I PD,.(1—td1)•y1
(3.16)
where X1 is domestic output, AT, and . are constant and the elasticity of
transformation is given by v, = 1
	
• Maximising revenue from given a output,
subject to equation (3.15) yields the export supply function as:
The treatment of imports and exports allows two-way trade (that is simultaneous
exports and imports, known as cross-hauling) at the sectoral level, again reflecting
empirical realities in developing countries. Similar reasons were put forwarded by
Condon et al (1986) to model the foreign trade regime of Cameroon based on CES
and CET specifications.
3.2.4 Incomes
3.2.4.1 Household income
There are several sources of income for households in the model. The main sources
of household income are income from labour and capital. These primary factors (i.e.
different types of labours and capital) earn income from their contributions to value
added. These factor incomes are in turn allocated to institutions who supply these
primary factors. In this model, incomes from different labour categories are
distributed across the six households according to an allocation matrix. However, not
all the capital income accrues to households, part of the capital income goes to
government and 'corporations according to their initial endowment of capital.
Therefore, capital income is distributed to the six households, government and
corporations according to an allocation matrix. This allocation matrix is derived
directly from the SAM data base and provides the crucial linkage between functional
(i.e. factors) and institutional distribution of income. The household income from
factors is specified as:
YF,, = > cDhf .
	 (3.17)
J
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where, YFh , cI hf and Y1 define household income from factors, the factors to
households allocation matrix, and income by factors, respectively. The following
equation is used to calculate factor income:
1 =flW1 .. FD 	 (3.18)
Besides factor incomes, the households also receive remittances from abroad,
dividend income from corporations, direct transfers from government and net transfer
of resources from other households. The shares from all these sources are fixed in the
benchmark level and thus relative shares do not change across experiments.
Spendable income equation of household is specified as:
Yh = [YFh +RMh .ER+DVh +GTRh +NHTRh] . (1—thh —sh)
	 (3.19)
where, RMh , DVh and GTRh are the shares of household income from remittances,
dividends and government transfers respectively. NHTRh is the net transfer of
resources among households. This is calculated as NHTRh - IT/TR - Ffl'Ph' where
HTRh and HPYh are transfer receipts and transfer payments by the same household
groups. Income tax rates and savings rates for different household groups are denoted
by thh and; respectively.
3.2.4.2 Government income
Government derives income from all indirect and direct taxes and part of capital
income to reflect the income generated from public sector corporations. The income
equation has the form:
YG 
=>thh.Yh+tmPWM,.M,.ER+>stI.PWMI.M.ER
+td,.X,.PD,+tc•YC+YFG	 (3.20)
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where, t denotes the corporate tax rate. YFG shows government income from
capital. This is endogenously derived as YFG = • Y. Where,	 is a scalar showing
government share of income from the capital factor only.
3.2.4.3 Corporation income
Corporations generate all their income from capital only. There are no other sources
of income for the corporate institutions in the model. Corporation income is
represented by the following equation:
l'c
	 (3.21)
where, X1 is a scalar showing corporation share of income from the capital factor
only.
3.2.5 Product demand
3.2.5.1 Consumption demand
Total consumption demand is composed of private and government consumption.
Consumption behaviour of each household is specified in the form of a representative
household (for each household group), maximising a Stone-Geary utility function
subject to the budget constraint of the household:
	
U =lII(CD.	 ih
h	 .	 ih	 i/i
(3.22)
Maximisation of utility function subject to the household income constraint yields a
linear expenditure system of the form:
= PIh +( !h/J ( l -	 . P)
	 (3.23)
where, CDIh is consumption of good i by household group h, p denotes floor or
committed consumption of good i by household h and 13,,, depicts the marginal budget
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share of good i by household h and l - 	 • 1 denotes the supernumerary income
of each household.
3.2.5.2 Government demand
The government is assumed to keep the real level of expenditure on each commodity
fixed. Hence, government demand for commodity i is:
öñ, 
=13f.GTOT
	 (3.24)
where, GTOT is total real government expenditure which is assumed to be fixed. In
the applied model	 is zero for all sector except services, for which 	 = 1.
3.2.5.3 Intermediate demand
Since the shares among different intermediate inputs in a sector and the ratios of
intermediate inputs to total outputs are fixed, one can write the demand for
intermediate inputs as:
IN7 
=t.INj
	 (3.25)
where,t are input-output coefficients and IN are sectoral intermediate inputs.
3.2.5.4 Investment demand
Total investment is always equal to savings in equilibrium. Total investment is
composed of fixed capital formation only (i.e. inventory investments as stock change
are not modelled due to the lack of data). Capital investment by sector of destination
is given by:
PK,•DK,	 (3.26)
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where, DK, is capital investment by sector i, PX. is the composite price of capital
installed in sector i and , is the proportion of total capital investment accounted for
by sector i. Investment by sector of destination is then translated into demand for
capital goods by sector of origin (ID,), using a capital composition matrix
ID, =K.DK
	 (3.27)
3.2.6 Savings
Total savings is the stun of household, government, corporate and foreign savings.
Households save a fixed proportion of their income. The following equation specifes
the savings behaviour of households:
SHh 	 (3.28)
Government saving is the difference between the endogenous government income and
exogenous government expenditure and transfers to the household groups.
Government saving is thus:
SG YG 
—GL—>GTRh
	 (3.29)
Corporate saving is the difference between endogenous corporate income and
corporate tax and dividend payments. Corporate saving is thus:
SC = YC 
_DVh_tc•YC
	 (3.30)
h
The last component of aggregate saving is the foreign saving. Foreign saving is the
difference between the value of imports and the value of exports, at world prices. The
dollar value of foreign savings is then converted into domestic currency value using
the relevant exchange rate. The aggregate or total saving is thus:
S=>SH,,+SG+SC+SF.ER
	 (3.31)
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3.2.7 Equilibrium conditions
3.2.7.1 Factor market equilibrium
Labour is generally considered a mobile factor in CGE models 14 . Almost all models also
assume full employment of labour. In most models, labour supply is exogenously given and
full employment is assured through the equality of labour demand and supply with average
wage rates as the equilibrating variables. In certain models unemployment of labour is also
assumed. In such models, unemployment of labour is assumed to allow examination of
issues relating to the labour market such as the effects of elimination of a minimum wage
rate (Devarajan Ct al, 1 995b) and rural-urban labour migration effects (Clarete and Whalley,
1988). Alternatively unemployment of factors can be assumed: In this case, changes in wage
rates may have some effects on labour supply and hence unemployment of certain factors.
Accordingly this may have some ramifications on for households income. However,
unemployment of labour is considered here as data on unemployment by factors and sectors
are not available in Bangladesh.
Analogously, full employment of capital is assumed in all models. Since in most models
capital is fixed sectorally, distinct capital market for each sector needs to be specified. With
sector-specific capital stocks, sectoral rental rates will vary to each of these distinct capital
market. In certain models (Devarajan and Rodrick, 1990 and Clarete and Whalley, 1988)
where capital is mobile between sectors the full employment of capital is assured when the
demand for capital equals the fixed supply of capital.
Since issues relating to labour market are not examined here and the labour market is
particularly simple, full employment of factors (i.e. labour and capital) is assumed. Thus, the
factor market clearing requires that total factor demands equal exogenously fixed factor
supplies and the equilibrating variables are the average factor prices (W1).
14 One exception to this rule is the ORANI model of Australia (Dixon et a!, 1982), where a sector-specific
labour is considered.
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FD1 . - FS1 =0	 (3.32)
All primary factors are also assumed to be mobile across sectors. In fact, the factor mobility
assumption can be viewed in the context of the time period of a model: a model may assume
short or long run character according to the factor mobility assumption. In the long run, all
primary factors (including capital) can be considered inter-sectorally mobile and market
clearing is achieved through variation of factor prices. On the other hand, a model assumes
short run character when capital stocks are fixed sectorally. The core CGE model is static,
with aggregate capital stock fixed exogenously. Within the single period,, the model does
generate savings, investment and demand for capital goods. However, this capital goods are
not installed during the period, so investment simply denotes a demand category with no
effect on supply in the model. In a longer-term or dynamic model both investment and
capital stocks are endogenous and affect the properties of different growth paths.
3.2.7.2 Product market equilibrium
Q1 =INT,+CDh,+GD,+IDI	 (3.33)
Equation (3.33) is the material balance equation for each sector, requiring that total
composite supply (Q) is equal to the sum of composite demands. The equilibrating variables
for equation (3.33) are sectoral prices. This adjusted market clearing condition implies that
no separate market clearing condition is required for domestic output (X), since this involves
adding exports to both sides of the equation (3.33).
3.2.7.3 Balance of payments
We impose the balance of payment (BOP) equation to clear the foreign exchange market.
The inflows are exogenous but imports and exports are determined endogenously in the
model. Since the nominal exchange rate is fixed in this model, foreign savings are allowed
to vary to clear the foreign exchange market.
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PWM .M1 —>PWE1 .E,—>RM—SF--O	 (3.34)
In this model government expenditure is fixed, investment is also fixed exogenously
revealing that the model is 'investment driven'. The neutrality of government revenue
is also maintained in all experiments by adjusting the indirect tax rates, so that
government savings are not altered in different equilibria. In such a situation, changes
in foreign savings are used to achieve the savings and investment balance. Changes in
foreign savings are not likely to affect income and expenditures of government. This
specification may have some effects on household income, consumption and saving
behaviour. However, as our objective is to examine income distribution effects of
policy reforms, this specification appears to be a reasonable external closure'5.
Alternative foreign exchange market closures are also discussed in the literature. One
alternative is to fix foreign savings exogenously and allow the nominal exchange rate
to vary. In that case the equilibrating variable is the nominal exchange rate.
Equilibrium will be achieved through the movement in the nominal exchange rate
which affects import and export prices relative to domestic prices, i.e. by changing the
relative price of tradables and nontradables (Devarajan et a!, 1995).
3.2.7.4 Savings-investment balance
The final macro closure is achieved through the equality of endogenously determined
aggregate savings and exogenously fixed total investment. Thus, this closure is
"investment driven", in which total investment is fixed and the saving components are
endogenous:
15 A similar foreign exchange market closure is adopted by Devarajan and de Melo (1987) in a CGE
model applicable to Franc-zone African countries. In these countries, the local currency is pegged to
the French Franc. It is also observed that both government expenditure and investment are fixed
exogenously. Tax rates are also fixed. The balance of trade or foreign savings is treated as an
endogenous variable. In such a situation any short fall in government budget and private savings are
financed by foreign borrowing. If neutrality of government revenue is maintained, say by changing
taxes, the effect will be to change the foreign savings to equate aggregate savings and investment. It is
the macro equilibrating variable which will vary to equate savings and investment.
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I=S=>SHh +SG+SC+SF . ER	 (3.35)
In applied general equilibrium models only relative prices are determined. Thus it is
necessary to normalise the price system. We make the nominal exchange rate the
numeraire against which all relative prices will be determined. One can virtually
normalise around any nominal magnitude because it has no effect on real variables.
On the other hand normalisation basically closes the system and generally allows one
to solve the model for prices as a function of exogenous parameters and policy
variables.
3.3	 General equilibrium formulation of the value-added tax system
The theory of value added tax suggests three broad types of value added taxes which
differ in their treatment of capital goods and depreciation of the capital stock in
calculating their respective tax bases (Ferh et al, 1994 and Shcup, 1990). These are
consumption, income, and gross product type VAT. For instance, under the
consumption type, each firm computes its tax base by subtracting all its purchases of
intermediate inputs and capital goods and depreciation of the capital stock from its
total sales. The tax base for an income type VAT is calculated by deducting
purchases of intermediate inputs and depreciation of the capital stock from total sales.
The gross product type VAT base is computed by subtracting only the purchases of
intermediate inputs from total sales. Purchases of capital goods and depreciation are
not subtracted. Thus the difference between the three types of value-added tax bases
is in their treatment of capital goods and depreciation of the capital stock. Under the
consumption type VAT, both purchases of capital goods and depreciation are
deductible. In the case of income VAT, only the depreciation of the stock is
subtracted. Neither deduction of purchases of capital goods, nor even depreciation, is
allowed under the gross product type VAT.
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Sullivan (1965) also argued that the three concepts of national income accounts are
related to the three bases suggested for the value-added tax. These three concepts of
national income accounts are personal consumption expenditures; national income,
proper; and gross national product. The corresponding tax bases are the consumption
type, income type and gross product type respectively. To show the linkages between
national income accounts and the tax bases Ferh et a! (1994) consider a closed
economy at an aggregate or macro level. At an aggregate level total sales minus total
outlays on intermediate inputs yields the gross national product. Purchases of capital
goods are equal to gross investment expenditures (net investment and depreciation).
When gross investment is deducted from gross national product, one obtains
aggregate consumption as the aggregate tax base. Under the income VAT, only the
depreciation is subtracted from gross national product. In this case, the aggregate tax
base equals aggregate net value added or national product. In the case of gross
product type VAT, gross investment is not deductible from gross national product.
The aggregate tax base, therefore, equals the gross national product.
With respect to international trade taxation two distinct principles are in operation
(Ferh et al, 1994 and Shoup, 1990). Under the 'destination principle' exports leave a
country free of any VAT, while imported commodities are subject to (import) VAT at
the rate applied to comparable domestic goods. The 'destination principle' ensures
that commodities are taxed in a country where they are consumed (the country of
destination), regardless of the country where they are produced. Exports are zero
rated under this principle. This means that no VAT is charged on export sales, and
that VAT on all inputs used in the production of exports is rebated. In contrast, under
the 'origin principle' there is no rebate for VAT on exports, and imports are not taxed
in the importing countries. If this principle is applied, commodities are taxed in the
country where there are produced, regardless of the country where they are consumed.
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There are three methods by which a taxpaying firm can assess its tax liability. These
are subtraction, tax credit and addition. However, the tax credit method is widely
used as it is compatible with consumption type VAT system.
Almost all countries that have introduced a value-added tax system, adopted the
consumption type VAT because it is much easier to compute and because all
purchases, including purchases of capital goods from other firms, are deductible from
a firm's sale (Shoup, 1990). However, certain countries such as Argentina, Peru and
Turkey have adopted the income type VAT. On the other hand Finland, Morocco and
Senegal have employed a gross product type VAT. The gross product VAT, as it does
not allow deduction of both purchases of capital goods and depreciation, discriminates
strongly against the use of capital goods which perhaps explains its restricted use
(Shoup, 1990). It is also observed that the developed and semi-industrialised
economies that adopted the VAT system, have been using the VAT system in its
comprehensive form. A comprehensive VAT refers to a system that includes
producers, wholesaler and retailers. Thirty-nine countries were using a
comprehensive VAT in 1990 according to Shoup (1990), while some twenty
countries use the value added technique that does not extend through the retail sector
and it is usually restricted to manufacturing and extractive industries and imports.
Most of these countries are in Africa and Asia.
The Government çf Bangladesh introduced a value added tax (VAT) in 1991. Like
many other developing economies, at present VAT is restricted only to domestic
manufacturing activities and imports. The VAT system introduced in Bangladesh is
of the consumption type and is based on the destination-principle. Thus, all imports
and domestic production, excluding primary agriculture type products and most
services, intended for final consumption in Bangladesh are subject to VAT. In
accordance with the destination-principle, all exports are zero-rated. This means that
no VAT is charged on export sales, and that VAT and other indirect taxes on all
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inputs used in the production of exports are rebated. The VAT is consumption type
since all VAT paid on intermediate inputs and capital machinery is creditable against
VAT payable on the sale of domestic output.
To incorporate the VAT system in the above model, we start with revenue
specification of the VAT system and subsequently modify the income equation of
government (i.e. equation 3.20). Under the VAT formulation the excise duty on
domestic manufacturing activities and sales taxes on imports are replaced by the
VAT, and the VAT paid on intermediate and capital goods are credited to the
domestic manufacturers as offset against the VAT on domestic output. Thus, only
the domestic sales are subject to the VAT and there is no VAT on intermediate and
capital inputs. In a generalised framework, assuming that domestic sales (D,) equal
the sale of the i-th manufactured product and that the VAT paid on composite
intermediate inputs are rebated against the VAT on domestic sales, revenue under the
VAT system (VATREV) should equal:
(3.36)
where, lv. is the uniform value-added tax rate. The first component of the above
equation denotes revenue from the domestic VAT base; the second part shows the
VAT from imports and the third component captures the rebated amount of VAT paid
on composite intermediate inputs. Subsequently, the government income equation is
modified by incorp'orating the revenue from the VAT system (i.e. VATREV).
YG =thh•Yh+tm.PWMI.M.ER+tdI.X,.PD,+tc.YC
h	 i	 I
+YKG +VATREV	 (3.20 *)
The rebate or credit mechanism is specified through the composite intermediate input
price equation (i.e. equation 3.9). The adjusted composite intermediate input price is
defined as:
94
N =
	
- {(PD. D + PWM.• M. ER).tv1}1
J	 )	 i	 J
Qi
(39*)
The second part of the right hand side of 39* [{(PD . + PWM . M ER).tv}/Q]
depicts the amount of VAT paid on composite intermediate inputs which is deducted
from the gross price of composite intermediate inputs.
The domestic price of imports is also modified to incorporate the value added tax
payable on c.i.f. imports:
PM, = PWM,.ER•(1+tm,+tv1) 	 (3.5*)
The other price that is directly influenced by the VAT system is the sales or activity
price. Thus, the sales or activity price is adjusted to include the VAT specification:
Px. = PD,.(l—td1—tv)D,+PE,•E,
I	 xi
(3.8*)
Subject to the condition that when tv. >0, td, =0, and when tv =0, td1 >0, so that,
the VAT and excise duty can not be applied on the same product simultaneously.
The export supply equation is also modified to take into account the influence of the
value added tax;
E.=D..[	 PE1 . (1—y,)	 ]4I
PD,.(1—td1—tv1).'( (3.16 *)
3.4 Parameterization of the model
Once the equilibrium data as contained in the SAM and the model structure are put in
place, the next step is to specify the parameters of the model. The values of all
parameters in the model are estimated using the given equilibrium data set (i.e. the
SAM) as point estimates in combination with a literature search for key additional
parameters such as the elasticities of substitution between factors, the elasticities of
substitution between imports and domestic goods, elasticities of transformation
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between exports and domestic goods and price elasticities of demand for exports.
Since these elasticities are not based on direct econometric estimation, sensitivity
analysis is usually carried out for the parameters as these are pivotal to the results. In
fact, as Mansur and Whalley (1984) have pointed out, it is not even possible to define
a likelihood function necessary to econometrically estimate the elasticities for a
complete general equilibrium model. From the structure of the general equilibrium
model, it is noted that the parameters for four different kinds of functions need to be
specified. These are the: (i) production function, (ii) value added function, (iii) CES
substitution function and CET transformation function and (iv) export demand
function.
3.4.1 Production function parameters
The production side of the model is specified by a Cobb-Douglas production function.
In order to express numerically the sectoral production and composite intermediate
input demand equation, it is necessary to determine the value added shares () in the
production process. It is possible to obtain value added shares from the following
equation:
x.=
Pxi.xi
	 (3.36)
The values of and X, are given by base year SAM, assuming all prices to be unity
in keeping with Harberger convention of decomposing value terms into prices and
quantities, where the quantities are so defined that the prices are unity. The values of•
PX1 are obtained from equation (3.8). On the other hand, the composite intermediate
input shares are determined residually. Once the values of A, and (1 - ?,) are
obtained, AX can be determined from the production function (3.1);
AX. = 
IlIE 
yXi
	 (3.37)
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3.4.2 Value-added function parameters
Value added is a CES aggregate of factor inputs. In order to express numerically the
sectoral factor demand equation, it is again necessary to determine the factor shares
(ar) given the values of the elasticity of substitution between factors. The factor
shares can be obtained from the factor demand function (3.4):
= Wf .	 (3.38)
For generating the values of (a t,.) it is necessary to specify the elasticity of
substitution between factors. No studies have so far been conducted to estimate
econometrically these values for Bangladesh. Devarajan et al (1995b) used a uniform
substitution elasticity of 0.5 among the primary factors (and across all sectors) in
generating value added in their CGE model for Bangladesh and these are assumed
hare too. The shift parameter of the value added function can be calculated from the
value added function (3.3):
AV;= 
[c f .FJi]'4uI
	 (3.39)
f
3.4.3 CES and CET function parameters
CES and CET functions are characterised by an elasticity of substitution (different
from one), share parameters (sum to one), and a shift parameter. The share parameter
of the CES function, Ei, can be obtained from the import demand function (3.13):
i =(PM./PD).(IvL/D.)°
	 (3.40)
The values of M, and D, are available from the base year SAM. As already
mentioned following the Harberger convention, the relevant prices are set equal to one
in the base year. For generating the values of S, 's it is necessary to specify the
sectoral elasticities of substitution. Again no studies have so far been conducted to
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estimate econometrically these values for Bangladesh. The values used here are
obtained from Chowdhury for Bangladesh (1993). The substitution elasticities for
subsistence and commercial agriculture sectors are assumed to be 1.8 and 1.6
respectively. For clothing, garments and other industry sectors the elasticities are 1.3.
While for all other sectors the substitution elasticities are 1.2. However, these values
were used to specify both the CBS substitution and CET transformation elasticities.
Once the share parameters are determined, only the shift parameters remain to be
calibrated. The shift parameter can be calculated from the Armington function (3.12):
a,4' = Q/[6 M_ 7
	(3.41)
The computation of share and shift parameters of the export supply (CET) function is
similar.
3.4.4 Export demand elasticities
The values of the price elasticities of export demand are taken from Shilpi's (1989)
study on "estimating income and price elasticities of imports and exports of
Bangladesh." She estimated the income and price elasticities for major exports items
of Bangladesh and the elasticities are estimated for the period 1972-73 to 1986-87. In
particular, the elasticities are estimated for the major export sectors such as raw jute,
tea, frozen food, jute products, leather products, ready-made garments. We used the
weighted elasticity values of raw jute and tea to specify the elasticity of subsistence
and commercial agricultural products. The elasticity estimate of frozen food is taken
to model the elasticity of food and tobacco product. Finally the weighted elasticity
values of jute products, leather products and ready-made garments are used to specify
the export demand elasticity for all other exporting sectors. The export demand
elasticities for subsistence and commercial agriculture sectors are -3. For food and
tobacco sector it is -1.7. For other sectors the export demand elasticities are -1.5.
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3.4.5 Consumption demand parameters
As indicated earlier, the household demand function is specified by a Stone-Geary
Linear Expenditure System (LES). The LES is a complete set of consumer demand
equations linear in total expenditures. The demand equation for each household group
is given by:
CDIb	 PIh +(Pjh/F)•(Yh
	
• I)	 (3.42)
In the LES demand functions, only two parameters are required to be estimated: (a)
floor consumption levels (p) and (b) marginal budget shares (f3). The above two
parameters can be estimated in a number of ways although it is appropriate to
estimates these parameters econometrically by using household expenditure data
(Liuch, Powell and Williams, 1977).
In Bangladesh, the 'Household Expenditure Survey' (HES) reports are published
every two years by the Bangladesh Bureau Statistics. The most recent household
survey is available for 1988/89 and was published in 1991. The survey reports
income and expenditure patterns of the 'HES' income groups. It also provides
information on income and expenditure patterns of urban and rural income groups.
The information of the survey, however, is not sufficient to estimate the floor
consumption levels of the household groups and marginal budget shares. For the
present study, thus, these parameters are computed, using the information of average
budget shares, expenditure elasticities and the Frisch parameter (Frisch 1959).
Differentiation of equation (3.42) shows that the expenditure elasticities (Engel
elasticity) are given by:
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(3.44)
Im	 =P!!
ih P•CD	
°th
P•CD
where, 
°ih =
(3.43)
is the average budget share of good i by household group h.
Since no econometric estimates for the expenditure elasticities are available in
Bangladesh, the expenditure elasticities are estimated using the modified household
expenditure data for 1988/89 16 . Following Deaton and Case (1987) the expenditure
elasticities are estimated as:
where, &, is total expenditure elasticity, Z1 is mean budget share and b, is regression
coefficient of per capita expenditure. The derivation of the total expenditure elasticity
is discussed in Appendix A.1. The values of b, coefficients are obtained from the
following equation:
Z=a1 +b,•lnPCE"
	 (3.45)
where, PCEh denotes per capita expenditure by household group h. The estimated
values of b-coefficients, mean budget shares and total expenditure elasticities are
shown in Appendix Table A.3.1. It is noted that the values of estimated expenditure
elasticities appear to be reasonable when compared with the expenditure elasticities
reported for Sri Lanka in Deaton and Case (see Appendix Table A.3.2). Again the
information is not sufficient to estimate total expenditure elasticities for each of the
six household groups. Thus, it is assumed that the expenditure elasticities estimated
16 It is relevant to note that the modified household expenditure data are derived from the household
expenditure data reported in the HES, 1988/89. As mentioned earlier, the sectoral classification used in
the household expenditure survey data is converted into 1-0 sectors according to a mapping scheme
shown in the SAM. This mapping scheme generates household expenditure data by the 14 1-0 sectors.
Although some aggregation problems may be present, the modified household expenditure data are
preferred over the HES data since expenditure elasticities for the 14 sectors are derived directly from
the modified data set. Alternatively, the HES data may be used to estimate the expenditure elasticities
for the [-IES sectors. Then some kinds of adjustment are required to make these estimates conform to
the 14 1-0 sectors.
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for the 14 sectors are same for the six household groups. Further manipulation of
equation (3.43) yields the marginal budget shares as:
Ph = °ih &ih
	 (3.46)
The imposition of Engel aggregation condition leads to:
1m =O1h & ih =1
	 (3.47)
The values of Frisch parameters are now needed to estimate the floor consumption
levels. The Frisch parameter measures the elasticity of marginal utility of expenditure
with respect to expenditure. Lluch, Powell and Williams (1977) showed an
approximate relationship between Frisch parameter, —® and GNP per capita in 1970
U.s. dollars. The approximate relationship is depicted as —® 36 . PcY36 . Following
their approach, Frisch parameters for the six household groups (-Oh) are computed
using the per capita income (Pci) of the six household groups. The estimated Frisch
parameters for the self-employed low, middle and high income household groups are -
3.72, -2.70 and -1.75 respectively. For the employee low, middle and high income
household groups the corresponding estimates are -3.86, -2.68 and -1.68 respectively.
The above estimates conform with Frisch's (1959) conjecture that the expenditure
elasticity of the marginal utility of expenditure is negative, and declines in absolute
values with per capita income or GNP.
Given the values of Frisch parameter, average budget shares and estimated marginal
budget shares, the values of floor consumption levels are computed using the
following equation:
Pah = • (oth + Ih'0h . P)
	 (3.48)
The estimated values of floor consumption by sectors and the six household groups
are shown in Table 3.1. Total subsistence expenditure is 62 percent of total
consumption expenditure. This appears to be a reasonable bench mark given that the
per capita GNP of Bangladesh lies between $ 100-500. Liuch, Powell and Williams
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EHIELISLI SHI
18942
502
690
2622
665
1031
956
0
861
982
0
492
13581
4673
45995
242
303
1325
294
473
404
0
353
441
0
227
3993
1935
16333
465
2118
3002
2550
1574
2705
0
708
795
0
1123
19557
7088
91037
431
1702
2430
1919
1285
2110
0
883
666
0
858
9941
5406
65907
744373 40
SM!
54268
1254
3299
5670
2976
3025
3744
0
1822
2351
0
1533
12601
7711
100254
63
EMI
31779
665
1752
2918
1554
1557
19591
0
950
1270
0
809
5474
4036
546705
63
Sectors
Commercial-Ag.
Forestry
Food and tobacco
Clothing
Garments
Chemical
Cement
Machinery
Other Industries
Construction
Energy
Services
Trade & Transport
All Households
% of Total
Total
3475
9716
16992
9574
8704
11461
0
5301
6117
0
4939
62631
29778
374195
62
suggested that total subsistence expenditure would be around 62 percent of total
expenditure for countries with per capita GNP between $ 100-500.
Table 3.1. Floor Consumption Levels by Sectors and Household Groups, (million taka)
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter a model of the Bangladesh economy is developed to examine the
incidence of the indirect tax system in general and a value added tax system in
particular. The model incorporates specific features of a consumption-type and
destination-principle based value added tax system which has been adopted in
Bangladesh. The model shows the revenue specification of the VAT system and
subsequently modifies the income equation of the government. It also shows the
credit mechanism of the. VAT system. The credit mechanism is specified through the
composite intermediate input price equation. 	 Equations for the domestic price of
imports, sales or activity price and export supply are also modified to take into
account the influence of the value added tax. The model also shows the
decomposition of sectoral and household consumption expenditures into committed
and supernumerary expenditure within a linear expenditure system.
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Appendix to chapter three
A. 1 Derivation of a formula for total expenditure elasticity
This section discusses the derivation of a formula for total expenditure elasticity.
According to Deaton (1981) the derivative of lnZ. with respect to the logarithm of
total expenditure is b1 /Z; which, in turn, is the elasticity & less unity. Thus, it is
calculated as:
To derive the total expenditure elasticity equation (3.45) is modified by replacing per
capita expenditure with total expenditure. Hence the re-specified equation takes the
following form'7:
Z. =a1 +b1nTE
	
(A.!)
Differentiation of Z. with respect to in TE yields b. However, we are interested in
deriving a formula for the expenditure eiasticity. Thus, in Z is differentiated with
respect to in TE to get the following:
ö1nZ ainZ ÔTX ---Lb —L
01nTEÔTXÔ1nTEZ, 1Z, (A.2)
Deaton and Mueilbauer (1980) argued that many economists see the estimation of
elasticities as the primary objective of empirical demand analysis. The following
equation has frequently been estimated on time series data of expenditures, outlays
and prices.
17 An important feature of this formulation is that, unlike most other empirical Engel curves, it satisfies the
most obvious requirement of an allocation model that, if applied to all goods in the budget, its predicted
budget shares add up to unity. From (A.1), this will happen if 	 =1 and	 =0 . Also note that for
those goods with b, > I, the budget shares increases with expenditures, for those with b1 <I, the share
declines and when b, =0, the share is independent of expenditures. Hence, luxuries and necessities are
naturally indentified by the model (Deaton and Case, 1987).
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alogZ, 
=& —1
8logTE
(A.6)
logq1 a + &1logTE	
'ik logp +u
	 (A.3)
where q. is expenditure on goods i, TE is total expenditure and Pk is the price of
goods k, & and 9ik denote total expenditure elasticities and price elasticities
respectively. Estimates of & and &jk can be obtained from ordinary least square
regression applied to equation (A.3). On the other hand the logarithm of budget
shares (e.g. Z, = p1 . q./TE) can be specified as:
logZ1
 =logq1+logp1—logTE
	 (A.4)
Now substitution of equation A.3 for log q, in equation A.4 yields
logZ1 a1 +(& —1)logTE +(&u +1)logp1 +	 logp,1	 (A.5)
Differentiation of log Z1 with respect to log TE yields
It is observed that left hand sides of equations A.2 and A.6 denote expressions for
elasticities. Hence by combining equations A.2 and A.6 the following formula for
total expenditure elasticity can be obtained.
Where 3, is the total expenditure elasticity. Deaton and Case (1987) " argued that
these elasticities are not constant as Z, and PCE vary, so that they are usually
presented at the sample mean of Z,, where predicted and actual budget shares
automatically coincide. The above elasticity formula also implies that, if &, is not
unity, then it falls as PCE increases. This is simply an automatic feature of Engle
curves like (3.45), and it may or may not be true in reality."
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Table A.3.1. Mean Budget Shares, b-Coefficients and Expenditure
Elasticities, Bangladesh 1988/89
Sectors	 Mean budget	 b-coefficient	 Expenditure
share	 Elasticities
_______________________ (S. deviation)
	 (S. Errors)
Subsistence-Agriculture 	 41.74	 -12.73	 0.70
	
(12.67)	 (1.64)
Commercial-Agriculture 	 0.82	 0.14	 0.84
(0.20)	 (0.08)
Forestry	 1.90	 -0.63	 0.67
(0.68)	 (0.100
Food and Tobacco	 7.00	 2.86	 1.41
(2.75)	 (0.14)
Clothing	 2.71	 0.69	 1.25
(0.68)	 (0.08)
Garments	 2.77	 0.88	 1.04
(0.32)	 (0.16)
Chemical	 3.14	 0.56	 1.18
(0.62)	 (0.16)
Machinery	 1.99	 0.69	 1.35
(0.69)	 (0.11)
Other Industries 	 2.39	 0.83	 1.35
(0.85)	 (0.15)
Energy	 1.10	 -0.19	 0.83
(0.19)	 (0.03)
Services	 21.50	 5.36	 1.25
	
(10.48)	 (4.74)
Trade and Transport
	 9.17	 1.54	 1.17
Source: Household expenditure data, 1988/89.
Table A3.2. b-Coefficients and Expenditure Elasticities: Sri Lanka, 1969-70 and 1980-81
b-coefficient
-11.72
0.68
2.25
-1.54
1.68
2.03
1.24
3.78
1.44
0.16
0.16
Sectors
Food
Liquor-Tobacco
Housing
Fuel
Clothing
Household
Health
Transport
Recreation
Communication
Durables
1969-70
	
b-coefficient	 Elasticities
	
-16.08	 0.75
	
0.62	 1.09
	
3.02	 1.44
	
-0.67	 0.82
	
5.08	 1.83
	
1.31	 1.50
	
1.02	 1.39
	
1.22	 1.50
	
2.46	 2.16
	
0	 0
	
2.03	 2.46
1980-81
Elasticities
0.84
1.15
1.49
0.76
1.42
1.71
1.47
2.18
1.95
2.48
2.48
Source: Deaton and Case (1978)
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Chapter Four
Equity Aspects of the Value-Added Tax System in Bangladesh
4.1 Introduction
The Government of Bangladesh introduced a Value Added Tax (VAT) at the import
and manufacturing stage from 1991. The VAT replaced the prevailing excise tax on
domestic production and sales tax on imports at the import stage. The VAT was, and
still is levied at a uniform rate of 15 percent on both domestic manufactures and
imports. Based on international experience and given the proposed broad-based
structure, it is expected that the VAT system should improve the revenue mobilisation
efforts of the Government 18 . It is generally believed that in its most conventional
form, a single rate VAT with a zero rate limited only to exports would imply that the
payment of tax by low income households will be a higher proportion of household
expenditure or income than under the pre-VAT tax system. Thus, questions may arise
whether the VAT system with single primary rate of tax and zero rates limited to
exports would make the tax system regressive in Bangladesh.
The revenue and welfare effects of the VAT system in Bangladesh have already been
analysed by Mansur and Khondker (1991). Thus, in this chapter we examine the
regressiveness of the VAT system. In line with this objective the following important
aspects are considered:
(i) whether a revenue-neutral uniform rate of VAT is more regressive than the
combined effect of the excise duty and sales tax;
18 For more on the revenue effects of the VAT system in Bangladesh please see, "Revenue Effects of
the VAT system in Bangladesh" by Mansur and Khondker (1991). Mansur and Khondker concluded
that the VAT system would improve revenue mobilisation in Bangladesh, provided that the system is
administered properly. Limited experience with the VAT system seems to support these findings.
After the introduction of the VAT in 1991, revenue rose from 10.9 percent of GDP in 1992 to 11.7
percent of GDP in 1993. During the same period the share of trade taxes in total revenue fell from 36.5
percent of toal revenue in 1992 to 33.7 percent in 1993. Lower tariff revenue was more than offset by
improvements in VAT and direct tax collection. In particular, the revenue from the VAT system
increased from 23.3 percent of total revenue in 1992 to 41.9 percent in 1993 (the World Bank, 1994).
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(ii) what might be the overall progressivity or regressivity of the overall indirect tax
system after the introduction of VAT compared with the situation prevailing prior to
its introduction;
(iii) how might the overall progressivity or regressivity of the VAT system be
affected by the extension of the VAT base compared to the situation observed before
the extension of the VAT base.
The empirical analyses reported in this chapter are based on two approaches:
(i) in the simple approach the information on expenditure patterns by the household
groups, effective tax rates and revenue data is combined to derive the incidence of the
indirect tax system by household groups; and (ii) combining the first approach with
the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model already elaborated in chapter three,
to derive the tax incidence by household groups. Both approaches indicate that
because of exemptions on subsistence agricultural products, and because of the
progressive structure of the tariffs, the overall indirect tax system would continue to
remain progressive even after the introduction of a single rate VAT.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 provides a brief outline of the VAT
system in Bangladesh and discusses how the equity issue was addressed in other
countries adopting the VAT. Section 4.3 describes the methodologies used in this
chapter to analyse the equity aspect of the VAT and pre-VAT system. Section 4.4
reports the findings on the tax incidence by the six household groups based on both
the simple and the CGE approaches. Also in section 4.4 the findings of the CGE
approach are compared with the findings based on the simpler methodology. Some
concluding observations are reported in section 4.5.
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4.2	 The Value-added tax system in Bangladesh and international experience
of incidence
4.2.1 The Value-added tax system in Bangladesh
The VAT system introduced in Bangladesh is a consumption-type system and is based
on the destination-principle. Thus, all imports and domestic production, excluding
unprocessed primary agriculture type products and most services, intended for final
consumption in Bangladesh is subject to VAT. In accordance with the destination
principle, all exports are zero-rated in the sense that no VAT is payable on exports.
It has previously been estimated (Mansur and Khondker, 1991) that a uniform value
added tax rate of 15 percent would ensure neutrality of government revenue. On the
basis of effective excise and sales tax bases, alternative VAT rates were used within a
CGE model to calculate the 15 percent revenue-neutral value added tax rate. The
VAT is thus levied at 15 percent uniform rate for all taxable sales at the import and
domestic manufacturing stage. The sectors that are covered by the VAT system in
Bangladesh are; food and tobacco; clothing; leather-jute-garments, chemical and
pharmaceuticals; cement and fertiliser; other industries; and energy. Sectors such as
commercial agriculture, services and trade and transport still remained under the
excise tax system. The subsistence agriculture, forestry and construction sectors are
exempted from the VAT system. Thus all sales of unprocessed agricultural activities
are exempted from the VAT. In the VAT literature "exemption" means that no VAT
would be payable on sales of exempt products, while VAT should be payable on
taxable inputs without being able to claim any credit for the VAT paid on inputs
(Shoup, 1990). Thus, under the VAT system, exemption essentially relieves the value
added of exempt sellers from the VAT, but all his intermediate purchases, including
capital machinery, are taxed.
The provisions for zero rating and exemptions have been determined on the basis of
three important justifications:
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(i) the exemptions to subsistence or primary agricultural products are designed to
improve the progressivity of the VAT system;
(ii) following Musgrave's (1959) terminology'9, the exemption of most services (e.g.
private educational and training institutions, clinics, water and sewerage disposal,
many professional activities, etc.) may be considered as "merit" goods;
(iii) some goods and services (e.g. primary agricultural products, many forms of
services rendered in an organised or unorganised manner) are administratively too
difficult to tax.
Exemption of subsistence agricultural products could be justified under all three
headings. Like many other countries, in the case of Bangladesh the exemptions are
limited to only unprocessed agriculture type products and most services. The VAT
system does not allow for successively exempting the inputs used into the production
of these commodities. The brief description of the VAT system noted above reveals
that in terms of its simplicity, coverage, and the rate structure, the VAT system for
Bangladesh is similar to the standard type of rudimentary VAT. Thus, the
international experience of other countries coping with the potential equity aspects of
this type of standard VAT system should be of some interest.
4.2.2 International experience in coping with equity issue of the VAT system
International experience indicates that countries adopting the VAT reacted to the issue
of regressivity in various ways. As noted earlier, the only way to remove entirely the
incidence of VAT on low income household groups is to apply a zero-rate to products
with a higher weight in the consumption basket of low income household groups. In
practice, however, most countries (including the members states of European Union),
19 According to him this is a category of goods where the state makes ajudgement that certain goods
are "good" and "bad", and attempts to encourage the former (e.g. education) and discourage the later
(e.g. alcohol).
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have not extensively used the zero rate facility. The United Kingdom and Ireland used
a zero rate on such products as processed and basic foods and medical drugs. A
review by Tait (1988) shows that Ireland and the United Kingdom adopted zero rating
more than in other countries. In the United Kingdom 35 percent of consumption was
zero rated, and the corresponding proportion was 36 percent for Ireland. On the other
hand in countries like Belgium, Denmark, and Italy, zero rating was used very
selectively. A review of the VAT system in developing countries by Tait (1988) also
indicated that most of the essential goods and services were exempted in these
countries but not zero rated.
In general, zero rating has been used less extensively than exemptions, even though it
is the only true way to ensure that goods are provided free of tax. Experience shows
that, extensive use of zero rating leads to a significant loss of revenue and enormously
increases the cost of administering the system. As indicated in Tait (1991), zero
rating of food can eliminate up to 40 percent of the tax base and clothing and housing
may take out another 10 and 15 percent respectively from the potential taxable
spending. Collecting revenues and again refunding these to traders or manufactures in
zero rated goods, introduce administrative inefficiencies into the tax system.
Some countries have also resorted to other special devices to ensure greater equity
among households or among manufacturers. In Turkey, an expensive structure of
VAT rebates to households has been introduced to reduce the impact of the tax on
lower income households and to simultaneously help enforcement of the VAT system
under the scheme. The scheme requires the consumers to submit receipts showing
purchases of "eligibl&' basic items on a monthly basis and get VAT rebate on the sale
or purchase price on a progressive scale. The complex scheme seems to increase
compliance, but almost half the revenue is returned through a cumbersome method.
In India, in order to maintain or enhance the competitiveness of small manufactures
under the value added tax (in India the VAT system is known as modified VAT or
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MODVAT) system, a "notional credit" scheme was introduced, so that, the firms
buying inputs from these small manufacturers would be able to take input tax credit at
a rate much higher than the rate at which VAT was paid by the small manufacturers.
Review of special programs under the Turkish or Indian system indicates that such
structures create implicit multiple rates of VAT and add considerable stress to the
administrative system.
In most countries, exemption of unprocessed agricultural products has been used as a
way of softening the regressivity of the VAT system. Although such exemptions do
not entirely escape the VAT, since unlike zero rating no credit is allowed for the VAT
paid on their purchases, the overall tax incidence is generally very small for such
products. Apart from basic foods, in many countries (both industrial and developing
types) medicines, newspapers, sports, museums and financial services are exempted
from the VAT mostly on the criteria of "merit good or service". Experiences also
indicate that, lobbyists, special groups and politicians seek to extend exemptions to
numerous other types of manufactured goods and services rendered. The pressures for
exemption of new products may become overwhelming. Such exemptions not only
cause direct loss of revenue, but cut the credit chain and introduce other major
economic and administrative distortions into the system. International experience also
indicates that, once more than one rate is allowed, many countries adopt an increasing
number of VAT rates over time because of political considerations. Some of these
countries are Belgium, Cote d' Ivoire, France, Italy, Taiwan and Turkey.
In many countries, the policy makers have used multiple rates to soften the
regressivity of the VAT system. Generally, a higher rate is applied to non-essential
products and lower rates are applied to essential basic types of goods and services. A
summary of 60 countries adopting VAT, as reported in Tait (1991), reveals that about
half of these countries adopted more than one positive rate of VAT. More over, about
two-thirds of them have three or more positive rates of VAT. For instance, the
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numbers of VAT rates are as high as five in some countries such as Belgium,
Colombia, France, Morocco, Sweden and Turkey. In India, the value added tax rates
are product-specific, numbering more than one hundred rates. However, value added
tax may be progressive even with a zero rate and a single rate. For example, with
reference to the United Kingdom where a single rate for most products and a zero rate
for selected products are used, Davis and Kay (1985) showed that the VAT and the
overall tax structure is progressive with the average rate of tax increasing with
income. However, the contribution of VAT to the overall progressivity was small
compared to the income tax.
4.3 Methodology and the data
The incidence analyses reported in this chapter are based on estimates obtained from
simple and general equilibrium approaches. In the simple approach, the tax incidence
of the indirect tax system with and without VAT is estimated by determining how
much tax is borne by each household group in relation to their consumption
expenditure, assuming that other things remaining unchanged. Tax payments by
household groups are determined by exploiting the household expenditure patterns of
each household group and determining the average tax rates for those class of
products. The general equilibrium analysis derives the benchmark solutions for
incidence under the pre-VAT system by endogenously estimating the tax payments by
the six household groups as a proportion of their consumption expenditures. The
CGE model allows for the effects of relative price changes and the consequent
secondary effects on resource allocation, production, consumption and on the tax
burden of the indirect taxes. The incidence effect of the VAT at revenue-neutral
alternative rates on the six household groups are determined in the CGE framework to
compare with the original solution under the pre-VAT system.
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4.3.1 The simple approach to derive the tax incidence of indirect tax system
The derivation of the incidence of the indirect tax was not particularly complicated as
the required information is readily available from the SAM data base for 1988/89.
The information needed to calculate incidence patterns of the indirect tax system are;
consumption expenditure of the six household groups; the expenditure patterns of the
six household groups in terms of proportion of consumption expenditure on each type
of product; the average rates of excise duty on domestic taxable products, the average
rates of tariff and sales tax on imported items; and finally the total amount of revenues
collected from excise duty, tariffs and sales tax. The derivation involved the
following steps:
(1) Household consumption expenditures are derived directly from the information
provided in the SAM data base. In particular the SAM data base shows the
distribution of consumption expenditure of six household groups by the fourteen 1-0
sectors (for detailed discussion on the derivation of household's consumption
expenditure please see Table 2.14, chapter 2). Sununing over the 1-0 sectors
generates the benchmark consumption expenditure by each of the six household
groups:
CON,, = CON,,,	 (4.1)
where CON1, shows the consumption expenditure by household group h on
commodity i.
(2) The expenditure pattern of the six household groups in terms of proportion of
consumption expenditure on each type of product (HES,,,) is:
HES.h = CON1,,
CON,,
(4.2)
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(3) Revenues from the indirect tax system are calculated. Under the base scenario for
each sector (INDEX,) are:
INDEX, = EXREV + TARIFF + ST, 	 (4.3)
where EXREV,, TARIFF, and S7 are revenues from excise duty, tariffs and sales tax
respectively. The corresponding revenue under the VAT scenario is:
IND VAT, = EXREV, + DOM VAT S + TARIFF, + IMP VAT,	 (4.4)
where DOMVAT is the VAT on domestic manufacturers, and subject to the condition
that when DOMVAT >0, EXREV, = 0, and when EXREV >0, DOM VAT, = 0, so
that, the VAT and excise duty cannot be applied on the same product. IMP VAT, is the
import stage VAT.
(4) The amount of indirect tax paid by each household group (RPAIDh ) is:
RPAIDh = (LIES,,, . ETR1 . CONh)	 (4.5)
where HES h depicts proportion of household expenditure by household group h on
products i; ETR, is the economy wide average tax rate by sector i for each type of
taxes depending upon the VAT and pre-VAT system under consideration; and where
the economy wide effective tax rates are derived by using their respective economy
wide tax bases. While deriving RPAID,,, the overall tax revenue constraints have also
been imposed without disturbing the relative shares of tax paid by household groups
under each scenario. This ensures total annual payments of indirect taxes by all
household groups correspond to the annual collection of indirect tax revenue. This re-
scaling is essential as estimated indirect tax revenues from sectoral consumption bases
are different from the actual collection of indirect tax revenue from sectoral
production and import bases (i.e. the actual indirect tax bases).
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(5) The indirect tax revenues paid by the six household groups are then expressed as a
percent of their corresponding consumption expenditure to derive the indirect tax
incidence under the VAT and pre-VAT regimes:
INDTh = RPAJDh •100
CON,,
	
(4.6)
where INDT,, shows the amount of indirect taxes paid by each of the six household
groups as a percentage of their consumption expenditure.
4.3.2 The computable general equilibrium approach
Incidence of indirect tax system under the pre-VAT and VAT scenarios are based on a
multi-sector, multi-factor and multi-household CGE model in the CGE approach.
Under the general equilibrium analysis the initial values of tax incidence of the
indirect tax system with and without VAT are endogenously estimated by determining
how much tax is borne by each household group in relation to their total consumption
expenditure. The amount of indirect tax paid by each household group (REVPAID h)
is determined by the following the equation:
REVPAID h = (HESs,, P . ETR, . CON,,)	 (4.7)
where HES1,, depicts the proportion of household expenditure by household group h
on products i; ETR, is the average tax rate by sector i for each type of taxes depending
upon the VAT and pre-VAT system under consideration. l are consumer prices,
assumed to be unity in the benchmark equilibrium; and CON, shows the base
consumption levels by household groups. Again deriving RE VPA ID h the overall tax
revenue constraint is imposed without disturbing the relative shares of tax paid by
household groups under each scenario. This ensures total annual payments of indirect
taxes by all household groups correspond to the annual collection of indirect tax
revenue. It is noted that, contrary to the simple approach both J and CON,, would
now change following tax reforms. Hence in the CGE approach, total amount of tax
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paid by each household group would be affected by changes in F, CONh and ETR.
Finally, the incidence patterns of indirect tax system of the six household groups are
computed as follows:
INDTh = RE VPA ID h
CONh
The numbers indicate the respective amount of tax paid by the six household groups
as a percentage of their total consumption expenditure.
4.3.3. Design of policy experiments
As noted earlier, the uniform rate of 15 percent VAT was approximately revenue
neutral on the basis on effective excise and sales tax bases. The effective excise and
sales tax bases which take into account numerous exemptions are smaller than the
economy wide excise and sales tax bases. Conversely, the indirect tax rates estimated
on the basis of economy wide bases are smaller than the effective indirect tax rates
based on effective tax bases. In the SAM data base and in the CGE model the
economy wide tax bases are used rather than the effective tax bases. Therefore, when
the 15 percent VAT rate and the economy wide bases are used together, the revenue
from the indirect tax system would be significantly higher than the revenue reported in
the SAM. There are two alternative ways to mitigate this problem. One approach is
to retain the economy wide tax bases and use the economy wide indirect tax rates that
are significantly smaller than the effective indirect tax rates. An alternative approach
is to convert the economy wide tax bases into effective tax bases and then apply the
effective indirect tax rates. The first approach has been adopted to design policy
experiments. Two policy experiments are now conducted to examine tax incidence of
the value-added tax system in Bangladesh.
(i) According to the first approach it is estimated that a uniform rate of 7 percent
value-added tax would ensure revenue neutrality. Therefore, in experiment one,
(4.8)
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Sales Tax
	 Tariff
(2)	 (3)
	
0.810	 3.100
	
0.616	 2.553
	
0.935	 3.523
	
0.878	 3.213
Total	 Total Repla-
ced by VAT
1+2+3)	 (lb+2)
6.276	 2.752
5.143	 2.205
7.053	 3.168
6.63 1	 2.882
	
0.859
	
3.164
	
6.562
	
2.933
	
0.545
	
2.100
	
4.463
	
1.973
	
0.906
	
3.442
	
6.558
	
2.960
	
1.127
	
3.950
	
8.366
	
3.846
excise duties on domestic production activities and sales taxes on imports are replaced
by a revenue neutral uniform rate of 7 percent value-added tax.
(ii) In experiment two, the value-added tax is extended to the service sector with a
revenue neutral uniform value-added tax rate of 3.5 percent. It is again estimated that,
with the extension of the VAT system to service sector, a uniform rate of VAT that
would keep government revenue neutral is 3.5 percent rate.
4.4	 Incidence of indirect tax system under pre-VAT and VAT system
4.4.1 Incidence of indirect tax system under pre-VAT system
Estimates of indirect tax incidence before the introduction of VAT are provided in
Table 4.1. It reports the incidence of excise duty, sales tax, tariffs and overall indirect
tax system by the six household groups.
Table 4.1 Incidence of Indirect Tax System in Bangladesh, Base Scenario
(as percent of consumption)
[I-I Groups	 Excise Duty
Retained	 Replaced
_______________	 (Ia)	 (Ib)
elf-employed	 0.428	 1.942
Low Income	 0.385	 1.589
Middle Income	 0.363	 2.233
High Income	 0.537	 2.004
Employee	 0.435	 2.104
Low Income	 0.390	 1.428
Middle Income	 0.344	 2.166
High Income	 0.570	 2.7 19
For the purpose of analysis the incidence of excise duty is reported under two separate
headings: the incidence of excise duty collected from sectors that remained under the
existing excise system and incidence of excise duty from sectors that are replaced by
the value added tax. lit is observed that except for the middle income self-employed
households, the incidence of excise duty from replaced sectors is significantly
progressive in nature. In particular, the incidence is 1.589 percent of consumption
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expenditure for the self-employed low income household group compared with 2.233
percent and 2.004 percent of consumption expenditure for self-employed middle
income and high income household groups respectively. For households under the
employee category, the pattern of excise tax incidence appears to be more progressive
with tax incidence of low income households of 1.428 percent compared with 2.166
and 2.7 19 percent for the middle and high income household groups respectively.
In the case of sales tax, the incidence of tax as percent of household consumption
steadily increases with the income level for the employee household groups. Like the
excise tax system, the pattern of tax incidence appears to be more progressive for
employee household groups than the self-employed household groups. Therefore, the
combined incidence of replaced excise duty and sales tax is also significantly
progressive in nature. Except for the self-employed middle income household, the
combined incidence increases with the level of income revealing that the excise and
sales tax system, notwithstanding its indirect form, is inherently progressive in terms
of its incidence.
The incidence of overall indirect tax system including the effect of tariffs is also
progressive, with the incidence of tariffs being 3.2 13 and 3.95 0 percent for the self-
employed and employee high income household groups compared with 2.553 and
2.100 percent for the self-employed and employee low income household groups
respectively. Therefore tariffs, which accounted for around 40 percent of the indirect
tax revenue are progressive and much of this progressivity is attributable to variations
in the rate structure and partly to exemptions, both favouring the low income
household groups in terms of tax incidence. In Bangladesh tariffs apart from their
conventional protective role, also served revenue and equity purposes like excise duty
and sales tax, thus making it progressive.
The degree of progressivity in the indirect tax structure before the introduction of
VAT is the result of tax exemption and very low effective tax rates for products which
118
constituted the major part of the consumption basket of the low income household
groups. All primary agricultural products including forestry are exempted from the
indirect tax system. Although some services are taxed under the excise tax system
the effective tax rate is very low. Further more, services are exempted from the tariff
and sales tax system. These measures have made the indirect tax system progressive
in nature. Our observations indicate that, because of these mixed objectives followed
by policy makers and because of progressive tariff structure, the overall indirect tax
system is largely progressive in Bangladesh.
4.4.2 Incidence of the indirect tax system under alternative VAT scenarios:
a simple approach
Table 4.2 reports the incidence of value added tax on domestic manufacturing
activities and on imports, tariffs and overall indirect tax system by the six household
groups under alternative VAT scenarios.
Table 4.2. Indirect Tax Incidence in Bangladesh under Alternative VAT Scenarios: Simple Approach
(as percent of consumption)
HH Groups	 Excise Duty	 Domestic	 Import	 Total VAT	 Tariff	 Total
VAT	 VAT
(1a	 (2a)	 (2b	 2(2a+2b	 (3	 (la+2^3
The VAT Scenario
Self-employed
Low Income
Middle Income
High Income
Employee
Low Income
Middle Income
High Income
Self-employed
Low Income
Middle Income
High Income
Employee
Low Income
Middle Income
High Income
	
0.428	 1.733	 0.993	 2.726
	
3.100
	
6.254
	
0.3 84
	
1.419
	
0.821	 2.240
	
2.553
	
5.177
	
0.364
	
2.055	 1.123	 3.178
	
3.523
	
7.066
	
0.535
	
1.724	 1.036	 2.760
	
3.213
	
6.507
	
0.435
	
1.840	 1.003	 2.844
	
3.164
	
6.440
	
0.388
	
1.272	 0.648	 1.920
	
2.100
	
4.409
	
O.346	 1.992	 1.093	 3.085
	
3.442
	
6.873
	
0.571	 2.257	 1.269	 3.526
	
3.950
	
8.046
The EVAT Scenario
	
0.343	 2.189	 0.620	 2.803	 3.100	 6.268
	
0.320	 1.714	 0.506	 2.200	 2.553	 5.093
	
0.309	 1.819	 0.662	 2.481	 3.523	 6.372
	
0.399	 3.036	 0.691	 3.727	 3.213	 7.338
	
0.353	 2.210	 0.622	 2.832	 3.164	 6.349
	
0.299	 2.061	 0.436	 2.497	 2.100	 4.896
	
0.301	 1.676	 0.636	 2.312	 3.442	 6.054
	
0.459	 2.894	 0.794	 3.688	 3.950	 8.097
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Except for the self-employed middle income households, the combined incidence of
domestic and import stage VAT appears to be progressive with low income
households paying less tax as proportion of their total consumption expenditure
compared with high income households. For example, the combined incidence of
domestic and import stage VAT are 1.23 and 1.84 times higher for the self-employed
and employee high income household groups compared with the self-employed and
employee low income household groups respectively. Incidence estimates of high
income household groups are divided by the incidence estimates of low income
household groups to derive the degree of progressivity of the tax system. The
corresponding estimates under the pre-VAT scenario are 1.31 and 1.95 for the self-
employed and employee household groups respectively. It is also observed that the
incidence of import VAT is somewhat higher than sales tax. This is because more
revenue is now collected from the import base which is different from the pre-VAT
scenario. On the other hand, since less revenue is now collected from domestic base
compared with pre-VAT scenario the incidence of domestic VAT is lower than the
incidence of excise duty from sectors replaced by VAT.
These estimates, therefore, suggest that the VAT system is still progressive although
the progessivity is lower than that observed under the excise or pre-VAT scenario due
to the uniformity in the rate structure. However the effect on incidence is small since
only a small part of consumption expenditure is affected by the uniformity in the rate
structure. On the other hand, the factors that may have attributed to a progressive
value added tax system are exemption of primary agricultural type operations and.
services. These activities remain outside the VAT system. Further more, the taxable
products had relatively low weights for the low income households, so the effect of
small variations in tax rates would have only a marginal change in tax incidence20.
20 It is observed that although the excise and sales tax structure allowed for variations in tax rates, in
practice, the variations are small, most products were taxed within 3 to 8 percent range on an economy
wide base.
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As the combined incidence of value added tax is progressive and the incidence of
tariffs is unaffected, it is expected that the overall indirect tax incidence remains
progressive even after the introduction of a uniform rate of value added tax. The
overall incidence of the indirect tax system with VAT is still 1.26 times higher for the
self-employed high income household compared with the self-employed low income
household (the relevant estimate in the pre-VAT case was 1.29). On the other hand,
the overall indirect tax incidence is 1.82 times higher for the employee high income
household compared with the employee low income household (the relevant estimate
in the pre-VAT case is 1.87), revealing that the tax incidence appears to be more
progressive for employee household groups than the self-employed household groups
even after the introduction of the VAT. Like the base scenario, except for the self-
employed middle income households, the incidence of indirect tax is greater on the
high income household groups compared to the low income household groups.
The experiment which extends the value-added tax (EVAT) to the service sector with
a revenue neutral VAT rate of 3.5 percent depicts that the pattern of tax incidence of
domestic VAT and import VAT would still remain progressive. However, in contrast
to the previous two scenarios the combined incidence of the VAT system is higher for
the self-employed household groups compared with the employee household groups.
For instance, the combined incidence of the EVAT system is 1.69 times higher for the
self-employed household group compared with the self-employed low income
household group. 'The corresponding estimates for the self-employed household group
under the VAT and pre-VAT scenarios are 1.23 and 1.31 respectively. On the other
hand, the combined incidence of the EVAT system is 1.48 times higher for the
employee household group compared with 1.84 and 1.95 observed under the VAT and
pre-VAT scenarios.
A review of collection of value-added tax at domestic and import stage under
alternative VAT scenarios indicates that despite the reduction of value-added tax rate
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from 7 percent rate to 3.5 percent, the collection of VAT at the domestic stage is much
higher under the EVAT scenario compared with the VAT scenario. This is because
the revenue from the service sector is large enough to compensate for the fall in the
revenue from the domestic manufacturing base. On the other hand, the collection of
VAT at import stage is somewhat smaller under the EVAT scenario than the VAT
scenario due to the reduction in value-added tax rate. In this case, the revenue from
the augmented import stage VAT base (i.e. services) is not large enough to cover the
loss in revenue due to the reduction in the value-added tax rate.
Again, as the incidence effects of excise duties and tariffs are not affected and remain
progressive, the progressivity in the combined incidence of VAT leads to a
progressive indirect tax structure. The incidence of the indirect tax system with
extension of VAT to the service sector would still be 1.44 times higher for the self-
employed high income household compared with the self-employed low income
household. Analogously, the overall indirect tax incidence would be 1.65 times
higher for the employee high income household compared with the employee low
income household. Unlike the base and the VAT scenario, tax incidence of the self-
employed middle income household group is less than self-employed high income
household depicting a clear progressive pattern of tax incidence for the self-employed
household group.
4.4.3 General equilibrium approach and major findings
This section reports the incidence of the indirect tax system under alternative value
added tax scenarios using the multi-sector and multi-household computable general
equilibrium model developed in chapter 3. The CGE model allows for the effects
of relative price changes and the consequent secondary effects on resource
allocation, production, consumption, revenue, the tax incidence of the indirect taxes
and on economic welfare. Since the tax incidence estimation under the general
equilibrium approach takes into account all the secondary but important
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6.217
5.021
6.323
7.307
6.333
4.841
6.026
8.133
effects of allocation of resource and economic welfare, the estimates of tax incidence
are expected to be different from the estimates observed under the simple approach.
Estimates of indirect tax incidence are reported in Table 4.3. It reports the incidence
of indirect tax system under VAT and extended VAT scenarios.
Table 4.3. Indirect Tax Incidence in Bangladesh Under Alternative VAT Scenarios: CGE Approach
(as percent of consumption)
HH Groups	 Excise Duty	 Domestic	 Import	 Total VAT	 Tariff	 Total
VAT	 VAT
(la	 (2a	 (2b	 2=(2a+2b	 (3	 (la+2+3
The VAT Scenario
6.255
5.159
7.066
6.54 1
6.477
4.414
6.887
8.130
Self-employed
Low Income
Middle Income
High Income
Employee
Low Income
Middle Income
High Income
Self-employed
Low Income
Middle Income
High Income
Employee
Low Income
Middle Income
High Income
	
0.436
	
1.740
	
0.989	 2.729
	
3.090
	
0.389	 1.416
	
0.815	 2.231
	
2.539
	
0.377
	
2.058
	
1.118	 3.176
	
3.513
	
0.543
	
1.746
	
1.034	 2.780
	
3.218
	
0.444
	
1.856
	
1.004	 2.860
	
3.172
	
0.392
	
1.274
	
0.648	 1.921
	
2.100
	
0.358
	
1.998	 1.091	 3.089
	
3.440
	
0.583
	
2.296
	
1.273	 3.570
	
3.977
The EVAT Scenario
	
0.352	 2.168	 0.564	 2.732	 3.133
	
0.326	 1.675	 0.458	 2.133	 2.562
	
0.321	 1.848	 0.602	 2.451	 3.551
	
0.409	 2.982	 0.632	 3.614	 3.284
	
0.363	 2.184	 0.569	 2.753	 3.218
	
0.304	 2.020	 0.397	 2.416	 2.121
	
0.313	 1.656	 0.579	 2.235	 3.477
	
0.472	 2.875	 0.732	 3.607	 4.055
A comparison of the revenue-neutral VAT scenario under simple and CGE approach
reveals that the combined incidence of VAT system appears to be slightly more
progressive under the CGE estimates compared with the simple approach. For the
self-employed household group, the degree of progressivity of combined VAT system
is 1.25 compared with the degree of progressivity of 1.23 observed under the simple
approach. Analogously for the employee household group, the corresponding CGE
estimate is 1.86 compared with 1.84 obtained under the simple approach.
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The estimates of CGE approach not only depict a higher degree of progressivity of the
VAT system but also reveal a higher degree of progressivity for tariffs with the
introduction of the value-added tax. For the self-employed household group, the
degree of progressivity of tariffs is 1.27 under CGE approach compared with the
degree of progressivity of 1.26 observed under the simple approach. Similarly, for the
employee household group the corresponding CGE estimate is 1.90 compared with
1.88 obtained under the simple approach.
The estimated high degree of progressivity of tariffs (which accounts for 40 percent of
indirect tax in Bangladesh), along with the progressivity of the domestic and import
stage value-added tax, resulted in a more progressive structure of indirect tax system
than was observed in the simple approach. For example, the estimated indirect tax
incidence for the self-employed low income household is 5.159 percent compared
with 6.54 1 percent for the self-employed high income household in the CGE
estimation, implying a degree of progressivity of 1.27 compared with 1.26 under the
simple approach. For the employee household group, the estimated tax incidence for
the low and high income household groups are 4.4 14 percent and 8.130 percent
respectively. This estimate implies a higher degree of progressivity of 1.84 under the
CGE approach compared with 1.82 under the simple approach.
When value-added tax is extended to the service sector at a revenue-neutral 3.5
percent rate, the pattern of combined incidence of domestic and import stage VAT
still remains progressive. In contrast to the previous two scenarios (i.e. pre-VAT and
VAT scenarios) the combined incidence of the VAT system is, however, higher for
the self-employed household groups compared to the employee household groups.
For instance, the combined incidence of the EVAT system is 1.69 times higher for the
self-employed household group compared with the self-employed low income
household group. On the other hand, the combined incidence of the EVAT system is
1.49 times higher for the employee household group.
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On the other hand, the degree of progressivity of the overall indirect tax system is
1.46 for the self-employed household group compared to the degree of progressivity
of 1.68 for the employee household group thereby reversing the incidence pattern of
combined EVAT system. This result again reflects the relative strength of the tariff
system in dictating the incidence pattern of the overall indirect tax system.
A comparison of the revenue-neutral alternative VAT scenarios under simple and
CGE approaches reveals that the patterns of indirect tax incidence are not significantly
different under the two approaches. Under the VAT scenario, for the self-employed
household group the degree of progressivity of the indirect tax system is 1.27 in the
CUE estimation compared with 1.26 under the simple approach. For the employee
household group, the estimated degree of progressivity is 1.84 under the CGE
approach compared with 1.82 under the simple approach. Similarly in the case of the
extended VAT scenario, for the self-employed household group the degree of
progressitivity of the indirect tax system is 1.46 in the CGE estimation compared with
1.44 under the simple approach. For the employee household group, the
corresponding estimates are 1.68 under the CUE approach compared with 1.65 under
the simple approach.
The apparent similarity in the incidence estimates obtained in the simple and CGE
approaches may be attributable to two factors.
(i) A review of the results of CGE model suggests that the overall production and
consumption effects are small under the two VAT scenarios. Moreover, the
redistributive effects of tax reforms also appear to be small.
(ii) Any policy reform is likely to change the sectoral as well as general price level
and these changes in prices may have some effects on the distribution of consumption
expenditure and tax payments of different household groups. In particular, large
changes in the prices of non-taxed primary agricultural products significantly affect
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the consumption pattern of household groups even though they might be paying
almost the same amount of tax as before, thereby influencing the degree of the
progressivity or regressivity of the tax system. It is observed that in the two VAT
scenarios the rise in the general price level is low. The increases in the general price
levels are 0.45 and 0.85 percent in the VAT and EVAT scenarios. Analogously the
rise in the prices of primary agricultural and forestry products are also small. The
prices of subsistence agricultural products and forestry products increased by 0.70 and
1.50 percent respectively in the VAT scenario. While in the EVAT scenario, the
respective rise in the prices of subsistence agricultural products and forestry products
are 0.86 and 1.74 percent.
Therefore, changes in the distribution of consumption expenditure and tax payments
across the six household groups are not significantly different from the patterns
observed under the simple approach and hence the estimates of the CGE approach are
not significantly different from the estimates of the simple approach.
4.4.4 Some qualifications of the results
(1) Possible consequences of the introduction of imperfectly competitive behaviour
into tax theory are not yet well recognised. Since such an well established theoretical
framework is not yet available, almost all tax policy analyses assume perfect
competition in markets and constant returns to scale in production. Therefore, no
attempt has been 'made in this study to include features of imperfect competition and
increasing returns to scale.
(2) One surprising finding of this exercise is that there are no significant differences
in the indirect tax incidence estimates observed between the simple and CGE
approaches. This revelation, although surprising is also observed in other studies. In
particular, Ferh et al (1994) observed similar close approximations between the first
126
round calculations and the general equilibrium estimations. They developed a
computable general equilibrium model to evaluate the welfare and revenue effects of
different VAT proposals for EU member states. They concluded that " after having
finished our work we still believe in the virtues of CGE analysis, but also regard
rough-and-ready first round calculations much more favourably than before. The
disturbing fact is that in most cases first round calculations proved to be reasonable
approximations for general equilibrium quantifications."
(3) Analogously, Mansur and Khondker (1991) used an heuristic, an input-output and
a CGE approach to examine the revenue and price effects of the VAT system in
Bangladesh. Although the findings of the CGE model were somewhat robust, the
findings were not significantly different from those observed under the heuristic and
input-output approaches.
(4) Another important observation is that the introduction of revenue-neutral uniform
VAT is likely to make the overall indirect tax system less progressive than the degree
of progessivity observed under the pre-VAT scenario although the impact is small. It
is also observed that the combined incidence effect of the domestic and import stage
VAT is expected be small under the VAT system compared with the combined
incidence effect of excise and sales tax system. Similar small consequences of
various fiscal reforms have been reported by Pleskovic (1989) for Egypt. To examine
the incidence of various fiscal reforms on urban and rural households, Pleskovic used
a CGE model based on a modified Harberger (1962) model and a Social Accounting.
Matrix (SAM). The model was applied to 1979 SAM data for Egypt to analyse the
redistributive effects of four hypothetical policies involving indirect taxes and
subsidies. Neutrality of the government budget was maintained in each case by
adjusting taxes and transfers. One of the major conclusions of the paper was that the
distributional effects were small when existing indirect taxes were replaced by a
uniform sales tax.
127
(5) It is difficult to check the validity of our results due to a lack of comparable
studies or evidence on the incidence pattern of the VAT system in Bangladesh. The
redistributive effects of a new tax system are best captured by comprehensive
expenditure surveys such as the Household Expenditure Survey (HES). The last HES
was conducted in 1988/89. The next HES survey is therefore expected to provide
some evidence on the redistributive effects of the value-added tax system in
Bangladesh.
However, Chowdhury (1993) reported some redistributive effects of a revenue-neutral
value-added tax experiment for Bangladesh on the basis of changes in the
consumption expenditure of four household groups.
He used a CGE model based on 1984/85 data to evaluate the efficiency and welfare
effects of various hypothetical tax reforms. One of the tax reform policies relates to
the introduction of value-added tax in place of excise tax. A uniform and revenue-
neutral rate of 2.8 percent value-added tax was levied on domestic production
activities in place of the excise duty21 . The results of his VAT experiments are
presented in Appendix Table A.4. 1 while our results of consumption and production
effects are shown in Appendix Table A.4.2. He reported that both production and
consumption effects were negative. Gross domestic product and total consumption
declined by 2.6 percent and 0.67 percent respectively. On the other hand, in contrast
to his findings, both production and consumption effects are observed to be positive in
our experiments. It is noted that GDP and total consumption increased by 1.04 and
1.25 percent in the first experiment (i.e. VAT experiment), while in the second (or
EVAT) experiment the corresponding changes are 0.81 and 0.62 percent.
21 To perform the VAT experiment, he adjusted the data set instead of modelling the specific features
of the VAT system. In his experiments, taxes were added to value-added, before intermediate inputs
were added. He argued that" since a model can be considered as an interpretation of observed data and
is based on both data and the underlying behavioural assumption, we have to adjust the data for the
changing assumption of the new tax system".
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A review of the performance of the economy of Bangladesh during the post-VAT
years appears to support our findings of favourable production and consumption
effects, despite the introduction of a uniform rate of value-added tax. GDP and
consumption growth for selected fiscal years are presented in Appendix Table A.4.3.
It is observed that the overall production and consumption effects are favourable in
the post-VAT years (i.e. 1992 and 1993). Moreover the manufacturing sector which
is directly influenced by the VAT, showed favourable growth performances during the
post-VAT years.
However the results of our CGE model are significantly different from the results
reported by Chowdhury and thereby tend to refute his claim that a VAT system would
be detrimental to overall production and consumption in Bangladesh. Our model has
also possibly produced improved estimates of the redistributive effects of the VAT
system in Bangladesh. It could be conjectured that any CGE model where policy
reforms are carefully and explicitly specified and designed should generate more
satisfactory outcomes than the models where policy reforms are not well specified.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter the incidence patterns of indirect tax system have been examined when
excise tax on domestic manufacturing activities and sales tax on imports are replaced
by a revenue-neutral uniform rate of value-added tax. Two different approaches are
employed to analyse the incidence pattern; a simple approach and a CGE approach.
With the introduction of a revenue-neutral 7 percent VAT, the overall indirect tax
incidence appears to be less progressive than the pre-VAT system, although the
impact is small. That is the VAT system would still remain progressive
notwithstanding the use of a single rate, with zero rate applied only to exports.
Similarly, the VAT system would still remain progressive when VAT is extended to
the service sector.
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One surprising finding of this exercise is that there are no significant differences in the
indirect tax incidence estimates observed under the simple and CGE approach. It is
observed that in the two experiments, the incidence calculations under the simple
approach are close to the general equilibrium estimates. According to these results it
appears that simple calculations are a reasonable approximation of the CGE
quantifications. It is relevant to note that since all the secondary but important effects
are considered in a CGE model, it tend to produce more reliable and robust estimates
than the estimates generated by the simple or input-output approaches. Thus it is
important to use CGE models to derive reliable and robust estimates and thereby
check the validity of estimates generated by the simple or input-output approaches.
The results of our CGE model refuted some of the previous claims that a uniform rate
of value-added tax would be detrimental to growth and welfare in Bangladesh. We
believe the satisfactory outcomes provided by our model is due to careful and explicit
modelling of specific features of the value-added tax system for Bangladesh.
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Appendix to chapter four
Table A.4.1. Summary Results of Chowdhury's Value-Added
Tax Experiments, (million taka)
Household Groups 	 Base Level of	 New Level of
Household One	 92101.17
	 90538.01
Household Two	 89531.67
	
88188.69
Household Three	 67532.42
	
67593.19
Household Four	 47205.25
	
47960.53
Total
	
296279.51
	
294280.42
GDP
	
319122.00	 310824.00
Note: Households are divided into four groups according to their
income levels with household one is the poorest and household
four is the richest household.
Table A.4.2. Consumption and Production Effects of VAT System in Bangladesh
(million taka)
Household
Self-employed
Low Income
Middle Income
High Income
	
Base Level of
	
New Level	 of Consumption
	
Consumption	 VAT Scenario	 EVAT Scenario
	
356689	 362521	 359625
	90137	 90584	 90308
	
159228	 161500	 159820
	
107324	 110437	 109497
Employee	 251029
	 252786
	
251846
Low Income	 123468
	
124020
	
123603
Middle Income	 87212
	
87904
	
87584
High Income	 40349
	
40862
	
40656
Total
	
607717
	 615306
	
611467
GDP
	
659598
	 666463
	
664911
Table A.4.3. Gross Domestic Product and Consumption Growth for
Selected Fiscal Years, (percent)
	
___________________ FY91
	 FY92	 FY93
GDP Growth Rate	 3.4	 4.2	 4.5
Agriculture	 1.6	 2.2	 1.9
Manufacturing	 2.4	 7.3	 8.0
Construction & Utilities 	 7.0	 6.8	 6.7
Services	 4.6	 4.8	 5.4
Consumption Growth Rate
	 1.9
Private	 1.9
Public	 1.6
Note: In constant FY85 prices.
Source: Statistical Year book of Bangladesh, 1991.
	
2.5	 3.3
	
2.1	 3.2
	
4.8	 3.7
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Chapter Five
Foreign Competition, Industrial Concentration and Profitability in
Manufacturing Sectors in Bangladesh
5.1 Introduction
Empirical research on industrial organisation has provided useful insights into the
relationship between industrial structure and performance both for developed and
developing economies. Most studies have confirmed the hypothesised relationship
between market structure and profitability by finding a significant association between
profitability and industrial concentration. In recent years there is a growing consensus
among economists that, along with concentration, the extent of foreign competition
significantly influences the performance of domestic industries. This leads to a
number of industrial organisation studies incorporating a foreign competition variable.
The incorporation of foreign competition variable has been achieved in different
ways. Some studies (Esposito and Esposito, 1971; Pagoulatos and Sorensen, 1976)
treated the market share of imports as an additive influence on domestic profitability.
In other studies (Jacquemin et al, 1980; Pugel, 1980; and Turner, 1980) the influence
of import competition on profitability is conditional upon the competitive structure of
domestic sellers as foreign and domestic sellers together represent the supply side of
the market. Accordingly, in such studies, market shares of imports are used
interactively with domestic concentration to test their joint influence on profitability.
There is now ample evidence for developed countries that foreign competition
variables exerted a strong impact on the domestic profitability (see Nakao Appendix
Table Al). There is relatively little evidence for developing countries. So far no
study has been undertaken to examine the relation between profitability and market
structure variables in the manufacturing sector of Bangladesh.
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The purpose of this chapter is to provide some empirical evidence on the relation
between industrial structure and profitability in the manufacturing sector of
Bangladesh and to assess the importance of foreign and domestic factors on industry
profitability. This study incorporates some improvements over previous studies by
using two alternative measures of concentration and two foreign competition variables
to examine the robustness of the findings. However, this study does not consider the
endogenous estimation of key explanatory variables such as concentration measures
(Jacquemin et al, 1980; and Geroski, 1982) and the market share of imports (Geroski,
1982; and Marvel, 1980). Estimation of such variables requires additional variables
such as minimum efficient scale, degree of diversification, industry demand elasticity,
elasticity of supply of firms, average hourly earnings of skilled and unskilled workers,
and a geographic dispersion index. Since such variables or close proxies for such
variables are not available in Bangladesh, no attempt has been made to estimate
concentration measures and market share of imports endogenously in this study.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 describes the measurement and
nature of industrial concentration. Statistical and econometric estimation of the
relationship between profitability and measures of concentration is discussed in
section 5.3. The effects of alternative foreign competition variables on domestic
profitability based on regression analysis are examined in section 5.4. Concluding
observations are presented in section 5.5.
5.2 The measurement and nature of industrial concentration
This section describes the unit of measurement employed to construct alternative
measures of concentration. The four and five firm concentration ratios and
Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) estimated for 1985/86 and 1986/87 are also
reported here. The choice of 1985/86 and 1986/87 is governed by the availability of
relevant data. No comparable information is available for 1988/89 or any other recent
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year. The nature and extent of industrial concentration in the major industries in
Bangladesh are also discussed.
5.2.1 Construction of concentration indexes
Both the physical units of output and employment by size of firms are used to
construct the concentration indices for the year 1986/87. Since employment by size of
firms is not available for 1985/86, only the physical units of output are used to
construct concentration indices for that year. Similarly, the HHI indexes are
constructed only by using the physical units of output by firm size as employment data
are not available for 1985/86. The basic data used for the estimation of concentration
measures of the different industries is the Directory of Industrial Establishments 1988.
This identifies the size of finns by physical units of output and by level of
employment22. The study covers 28 major industries of Bangladesh23 . The sample
accounted for more than eighty-five percent of output of manufacturing sector in
Bangladesh for 1986/87 (see Appendix Table A.5. 1 where industries are ranked in
order of volume of output).
5.2.1.1 Concentration ratio
The most widely used concentration index is the concentration ratio. This is a partial
index as it is based upon only a portion of the total number of firms in a given market.
22 The choice of above two units of measurement for construction of concentration indices is, therefore,
governed by availability of data on firm size. Among different units of measurement, the appropriate
unit of measurement is not immediately obvious. The most commonly used measuring units are (1)
value-added, (2) value of shipment, (3) sales, (4) employment, (5) assets and (6) output. Most of these
measures are potentially deficient in some respects. Koch (1974) pointed out that measurement of
value-added, value of shipment, and sales are susceptible to price inflation and deflation. The
employment measure can be seriously compromised by technological change, which alters the capital-
to-labour ratio in production, Another potential difficulty with employment measure is the heterogeneity
of labour. The asset measure, although not optimal, may be best among the available measures.
However, according to Koch the ideal measure of firm size would rely upon a physical unit of output
rather than the possibly biased measurement proposed above (p 127)."
23 The ready made garment, which is now one of the leading industries in Bangladesh, is not included
in the sample since no data are available for the two representative years. In this regard it is important
to note that, the ready made garment activities started during this period (mid eighties) in Bangladesh.
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It is defined as the proportion of industry output (or any other unit) accounted for by
the k largest firms, where k is an arbitrary number. Thus Ck = x,ix = s
Whereas when k is 4, we have the four firm concentration ratio which depicts the
share of industry accounted for by the largest four firms. The overwhelming reason
for its popularity is pragmatism. It requires only partial information to show the
extent of concentration in a given market. Davies (1989) argued that the concentration
ratio is a reasonable measure since large values indicate more dominance for the
leading firms. Hart and Clarke (1980) also provided a pragmatic defence and added
that it is a more immediately understandable index of concentration than some of the
other available measures. Nevertheless there is unease with the concentration ratio
because it has little to commend it theoretically24.
5.2.1.2 Hirschman-Herfindahl index
The Hirschman-Herfmdahl index (1964) is the sum of squares of the relative sizes of
the firms in the market, where the relative firm sizes are expressed as a percent of the
total size of the market. That is
HHI=(x,/x)2=>s,2 = H-v2
Thus, the index depends both on market share inequality (as measured by v2 ) and on
number of firms, N. It takes some value between 0 and 1, with larger values
indicating higher concentration. The main attraction of HHI index is that it has a
background in oligopoly theory as it measures changes in market shares. Yet the
index has some defects: (i) it is too sensitive to firm numbers, in the sense that entry
24 To construct the concentration ratio, it is assumed that numbers of firm colluding in all industries are
the same. In that case it is reasonable to argue that why the size of the colluding group should be the
same in all industries. In fact it is quite unlikely that this type of pricing behaviour is common for all
industries in the first place (Davies 1989, p 127). The main problem of this measure is that it does not
describe the entire number and size distribution of firms, only a slice of it. That is it emphasises
inequalities between top k firms and the rest of the industry at the expense of all else.
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of relatively small firms will lead to non-trivial reductions in HHI, indicating a
significant reduction in concentration which is not really justified (Hart, 1975; and
Hart and Clarke, 1980)25 ; and (ii) it is arbitrary. Squaring the market shares has no
inherent superiority over raising them power of 1.5, 1.8 or any other number. Each
number implies a distinctive weighting among large and small market shares. To pick
a single power (2.0) without serious evaluation may not be a good scientific method
(Shepherd, 1986).
5.2.2 Nature and extent of industrial concentration
Table 5.1 shows the estimated four and five firm concentration ratios of the 28 major
industries for the years' 1985/86 and 1986/87. Although the choice of four and five
firm concentration ratios is necessarily arbitrary, their choice may be supported by
their wide and perhaps accepted use in industrial organisation studies to depict and
compare the extent of concentration in and between particular industries. It is notable
that the extent of industrial concentration is high for both of the representative years.
The average four-firm output concentration ratios are 68 and 69 percent for 1985/86
and 1986/87 respectively. The average five-firm output concentration ratios are 72
and 73 percent for 1985/86 and 1986/87 respectively. Since employment data are not
available for 1985/86, employment concentration ratios are calculated only for
1986/87. The average levels of four and five firm employment concentration ratios
are somewhat lower than corresponding average output concentration ratios. The four
and five firm employment concentration ratios are 61 and 66 percent respectively. It
therefore appears that the extent of competition is weak in most of the industries in
Bangladesh.
25 Davies (1979), however, showed that other popular indexes are even more sensitive to small-scale
entry.
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Table 5.1. Measures of Concentration in Major Industries in Bangladesh
Output Based
	
Employment Based
Industry	 Year 1985/86	 Year 1986/87
	
Year 1986/87
1. Jute Textiles	 26.40
	 30.00
	
31.00
	
36.70
	
37.80
	
43.40
2. Rice Milling	 58.90
	
62.10
	
58.10
	
62.00	 36.50
	
43.06
3. Edible Oils	 40.00
	
55.90
	
48.40
	
64.10	 25.90
	
30.20
4. Bakery	 45.90
	
49.90
	
41.00
	
45.20
	
41.50
	
44.90
5. Beverage	 98.00
	
98.40
	
99.40
	
99.80	 97.60
	
98.90
6. Leather Products	 87.70
	
88.40
	
88.50
	
88.90
	
81.70
	
84.00
7. Fertiliser	 95.60
	
98.90
	
90.70
	
99.00
	
74.10
	
88.20
8. Pharmaceuticals	 35.00
	
38.50
	
49.80
	
53.60	 21.90
	
24.90
9. Cement	 100.0
	
100.0
	
100.0
	
100.0
	
100.0
	
100.0
10. Glass	 65.50
	
78.80
	
78.90
	
81.70
	
69.40
	
77.30
11. BPCI Sheet	 98.30
	
98.60
	
99.70
	
99.70
	
67.50
	
68.30
12. Electric Product	 81.90
	
84.80	 77.30
	
80.50
	
54.70
	
61.80
13. Battery	 91.10
	
91.70
	
98.50
	
99.40
	
79.50
	
81.10
14. Machinery	 57.00
	
60.30
	
49.80
	
52.30
	
34.10
	
36.90
15. Sewing Machine	 90.60
	
100.0
	
99.50
	
100.0
	
88.20
	
100.0
16. Petroleum Product	 100.0
	
100.0
	
100.0
	
100.0
	
100.0
	
100.0
17. Steel Rerolling	 26.60
	
31.20
	
31.10
	
35.80
	
17.40
	
20.30
18. Hand loom	 13.70
	
16.50
	
13.50
	
16.40
	
16.10
	
18.90
19. Cutlery	 95.60
	
100.0
	
84.70
	
90.90
	
81.60
	
91.90
20. Sugar	 40.40
	
48.36
	
40.00
	
48.80
	
38.20
	
44.90
21. Tobacco Product
	
73.10
	
75.50
	
57.70
	
60.13
	
77.90
	
86.20
22. Rubber Products	 58.40
	
65.40
	
70.35
	
79.75
	
64.00
	
73.30
23. Tanning-Finishing	 58.90
	
59.10
	
52.20
	 58.10
24. Textiles	 52.40
	
60.50
	
52.40
	 59.10
25. Aluminium product	 92.60
	
95.35
	
89.40
	
93.25
	
81.90
	
86.70
26. Light Engineering	 62.90
	
66.80
	
57.20
	
61.85
	
37.61
	
41.30
27. Vehicle-Ship Bldg	 89.90
	
90.20
	
79.00
	
85.18
	
80.68
	
83.45
Mean Concentration 	 68.37
	
72.37
	
68.58
	
72.55
	
60.85
	
65.81
Standard Deviation	 26.15
	
24.38
	
25.26
	
23.92
	
26.53
	
27.22
Note: '-' Indicate non availability of employment data for those industries.
The estimated values of Hill for the 28 industries for 1985/86 and 1986/87 are also
reported in Table 5.2. It is evident from Table 5.2 that the values of HHI are high in
those industries where levels of four and five firm concentration ratios are also
observed to be high. These industries are beverage, leather products, cement, bp and
ci sheet, sewing machine, and petroleum products, etc. This result indicates that there
are inequalities among the leading firms of these industries. On the other hand
industries with high concentration ratios but low HHI are fertiliser, tobacco products
and aluminium products. Therefore these industries are composed of relatively equal
sized firms, which generated relatively lower values of HHI. It is also evident that the
extent of inequalities among firms are quite low in industries such as jute textiles, rice
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milling, edible oils, bakery, pharmaceuticals, glass, sugar, steel rerolling and hand
loom, all of which have HHI below 0.10.
Table 5.2. Hirschman-Herfindahl Indexes in Major Industries
in Bangladesh
1. Jute Textiles
2. Rice Milling
3. Edible Oils
4. Bakery
5. Beverage
6. Leather Products
7. Fertiliser
8. Pharmaceuticals
9. Cement
10. Glass
11. BPCI Sheet
12. Electric Products
13. Battery
14. Machinery
15. Sewing machine
16. Petroleum Products
17. Steel Rerolling
18. Hand loom
19. Cutlery
20. Sugar
21. Tobacco Products
22. Rubber Products
23. Tanning & Finishing
24. Textiles
25. Aluminium Products
26. Light Engineering
27. Vehicle-Ship Building
28. Industrial chemical
Year 1985/86
0.0475
0.0108
0.0398
0.0621
0.4671
0.6745
0.3293
0 .0600
0.5403
0.0975
0.6258
0. 1924
0.3725
0.1215
0.9087
0.9257
0.0347
0.0635
0.3297
0.0769
0.2597
0.2195
0.0650
0.2564
0.2959
0. 1689
0.3288
0.23 17
Year 1986/87
0.0465
0.0139
0.0797
0.0597
0.4109
0.38 18
0.2510
0. 1296
0.5197
0.1171
0.562 1
0.1604
0.2675
0.1295
0.9261
0.9257
0.0407
0.0200
0.3270
0.0760
0 .3555
0.2235
0.0533
0.2544
0.3016
0. 14 14
0.3379
0.2788
5.3 Relationship between profitability and measures of concentration:
statistical and econometric analysis
5.3.1 Measurement of profitability
There exists much controversy regarding the most appropriate measure of
profitability. Among different measures of profit, two most widely accepted measures
are the price-cost margins and rate of return on assets or equity. A major problem
with rate of return measure of profitability arises from lack of comparable data on
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assets classified by suitably disaggregated industry (Clarke, 1985). This measure has
been used in U.S. studies of profitability and market structure, especially before
1970s.
As an alternative measure of profitability, the price-cost margin has been used in a
number of studies to test the relationship between profitability and concentration
(Collins and Preston, 1968; Khalilzadeh, 1974; Amjad, 1978; Pagoulatos and
Sorensen, 1976; Jacquemin, 1980; Pugel, 1980; and Turner, 1980). In most studies
this is measured as value added at factor cost minus wages and salaries, depreciation
and other overhead costs divided by total revenue, and hence is an approximation to
the ratio of gross profits and overheads to sales26. The use of price-cost margin as a
measure of profit rates has been criticised on the ground that it is profit rate on the
firm's sales, not on firm's invested capital or asset (Benishay, 1967). While on the
same ground price-cost margin has been regarded as a superior measure of profit.
Weiss (1974) pointed out that 'rates of return on sales may indeed be conceptually
superior to returns on equity or assets, since two firms with the same degree of
monopoly power would not have the same rates of return on equity if the capital they
needed per dollar of sales differed'. We, therefore, decided to use industry price-cost
margin as a measure of profitability. The price-cost margins are calculated by
subtracting costs from gross sales. The Census of Manufacturing Industries (CMI)
data for 1985/86 and 1986/87 are used to calculate the price-cost margins as:
26 
"Alternatively, it can be viewed not as an index of profitability at all but rather as an approximation
to an index of market power. Following Lemer (1934), we may argue that an appropriate index of
monopoly power of a firm is (p1 - c)/p1 where p, is its price and C, its marginal cost. Taking a
weighted average of such Lemer indices, with revenue weights, we have
PCM =
	
(p . - c1)x,/ p,x, (1) where x, is output and PCM is the industry price-cost margin.
The measured price-cost margin is only an approximation to (I) except in the case where average costs
are constant and hence equal to the marginal costs, C,. If this approximation can be taken to be
reasonably accurate, however, then the price-cost margin offers a reasonable direct measure of
monopoly power (Clarke 1985, 106)".
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PCM=,Ni)	 (5.1)
Qi
where, Q1 is the value of output excluding indirect taxes. EC1 denotes employment
cost which includes wage and salaries. IC1 refers to intermediate cost. This is
composed of the cost of raw material and fuel and electricity. NIC, depicts non-
industrial cost which consists of depreciation, rent, interest, advertisement and other
overhead costs. These classifications of costs are obtained directly from the Census of
Manufacturing Industries of Bangladesh27.
The data set used for statistical and econometric analysis for the representative years
and averages of the two years are shown in Appendix Table A.5.2, A.5.3 and A.5.4
respectively.
5.3.2 Correlation analysis of price-cost margins and measures of concentration
This section reports the relationship between industry price-cost margins and
alternative measures of concentration with the aid of simple and rank correlation
methods28 . Table 5.3 presents the results of simple correlation between price-cost
margins and four-firm concentration ratio and HHI. It is observed from Table 5.3 that
simple correlation between profitability and four-firm concentration are quite high and
are significant at better than one percent levels in all the three representative years.
When HHI is used as a measure of concentration, the simple correlation coefficients
fell from high levels to moderate levels. As a consequence the level significance of
27 The price-cost margins exclude fixed costs such as the cost of capital machinery and buildings etc.
By excluding fixed costs this measure responds to the criticism that differences across industries of this
measure could be due to variations in capital-output ratio alone (Benishay, 1967 and Ornstein, 1975).
28 The pioneering work on profits and concentration was done by Bain (1951). In his sample of 42 US
industries, the simple linear correlation coefficient between profitability and concentration were r
0.33, which is significant at less than 5 per cent level. Since there are some arguments that price-cost
margins may not generate the precise measure of profit, it may be preferable to use rank correlation
coefficient to examine the relationship between profitability and concentration.
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correlation coefficients reduced from 1 percent level or better to 13 percent level or
better.
Table 5.3. Results of Correlation Between Price-Cost Margin
and Measures of Concentration
a. Simple Correlation between Price-Cost Margin and Four-Firm
Concentration Ratio
1985/86	 1986/87	 Av: 1985/86 & 1986/87
0.5728	 0.5767	 0.6073
P=0.001	 P=0.001	 P=0.001
b. Simple Correlation between Price-Cost Margin and Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index
1985/86	 1986/87	 Av: 1985/86 & 1986/87
0.4292	 0.3092	 0.3934
P=0.011	 --	 P=0.061	 P=0.013
Note: P refers to probability values associated with correlation coefficients.
The significance of the coefficients is tested using a one-tailed test.
The results of the rank correlations between price-cost margins and alternative
measures of concentration are provided in Table 5.4. The rank correlations between
profitability and four-firm concentration are quite high and are similar to the levels
observed in the simple correlation case. The rank correlation coefficients are
significant at better than one percent levels in all the three cases. On the other hand,
the rank correlation between price-cost margins and Hill are higher than the simple
correlation between price-cost margins and Hill. As a result the significance level of
the rank correlation coefficients increased to 7 percent level in this case from 13.
percent level in simple case.
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Table 5.4. Results of Rank Correlation Between Price-Cost Margin
and Measures of Concentration
a. Rank Correlation between Price-Cost Margin and Four-Firm
concentration Ratio
1985/86	 1986/87	 Av: 1985/86 & 1986/87
0.5678	 0.5497	 0.5880
P=0.001	 P=0.001	 P=0.001
b. Rank Correlation between Price-Cost Margin and Hirschman-
Herfindahi Index
1985/86	 1986/87	 Av: 1985/86 & 1986/87
0.5794	 0.4570	 0.5077
P=0.001	 P=O.007	 P=0.O01
Note: P refers to probability values associated with correlation coefficients.
The significance of the coefficients is tested using a one-tailed test.
5.3.3 Econometric estimation of profitability and market structure variable
The estimation procedure used to analyse the relationship between profitability and market
structure variable is the ordinary least square method (OLS)29. The relationships between
price-cost margins and concentration measures are tested both in linear and log-linear form.
The models also incorporate a capital-output ratio variable to examine the extent to which the
absolute capital requirements, captured by high capital-output ratio, would constitute entry
barriers and further strengthen the relationship between price-cost margin and concentration.
The capital-output ratio is calculated by dividing the book value of fixed assets by the value
of production. The information on values of fixed assets and the values of production are
obtained from the CMI reports for each of the respective years.
29 The results obtained from the ordinary least square methods are efficient as there is no significant
contemporaneous correlation between the independent variables. It is noted that with cross-section
data the constancy of variance of the error term may be violated leading to the problem of
heteoscedasticity. In such a situation, the estimates will be inefficient but unbiased. Thus Whites test
was carried out to check whether there are problems of heteroscedasticity in the data. The results of
this test suggest no evidence of heteroscedasticity. Moreover the examination of the pattern of outliers
also suggests non-existence of heteroscedasticity.
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Following two equations are used to test the relationship between price-cost margins
and concentration ratio.
(PCM), = c + a4 (CR4),+ a2 (K/O), + u	 (5.2)
Log (PCM) = c + a1 log(CR4),+ a2 log(K/O), + u	 (5.3)
Where (PCM), Estimated price-cost margin in the ith industry.
(CR4), = Four-firm concentration ratio in ith industry.
(K/u), = Capital-output ratio of the ith industry.
u = Error-term.
5.3.3.1 Results of regression analysis
The results of the regression analysis of linear form are given in Table 5.5 for the
individual years as well as for the average of the two years. An examination of the
Table 5.5 indicates that the explanatory variables (i.e. concentration ratio and capital-
output ratio) display the expected signs. However, the estimated coefficients are
significant only for the concentration ratio. In particular, the regression coefficient of
the concentration ratio is significant at less than the 1 percent level for the three
representative years.
The regression coefficient of the capital-output ratio is not significant for any of the
two years or for the average of the two years. It, therefore, appears that the capital
intensity of the industry, as reflected in the capital-output ratio, is not significantly
related to the price-cost margin. The low correlation between capital-output ratio and
concentration (simple correlation coefficient, r, is between 0.25 to 0.35 for different
years) obviates the need to regress price-cost margin with capital-output ratio alone.
The results of the regression analysis of log-linear form are also presented in Table 5.5
for the individual years as well as for the average of the two years. Again, the
estimated coefficients are significant (at less than the 1 percent level) only for the
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Dependent Concentra- Capital
Variable	 tion Ratio	 Output
(CR)	 Ratio4
2. PCM
3. Log
PCM
2. PCM
3. Log
PCM
2. PCM
3. Log
PCM
O.207a	 1.989
(0.829)(3.0 12)
0.203°	 1.397
(3.247)	 (0.763)
0.213 a
(3.370)
1.494
(0.75 1)
concentration variable with the expected positive sign for all the representative years.
It is also observed that the regression coefficient of the capital-output ratio is not
significant for any of the two years or for the average of the two years. Thus the use
of the log-linear form does not significantly alter the results or enhance the
explanatory power of the model.
Table 5.5. Results of Regressions with Price-Cost Margin as Dependent Variable in 28 Industries,
Linear and Log-linear form
R2
	
0.346	 0.294
	
0.376	 0.327
	
0.348	 0.296
	
0.367	 0.3 16
	
0.383	 0.333
tion Ratio	 Output	 Term
Log (CR4) Ratio
Log(K/O)
Year 1985/86
-	
-	 3.792
0.700 a	 0.050	 0.042
(3.493)	 (0.434)
Year 1986/87
-	
-	 4.494
0.677°	 0.065	 0.081
(3.563)	 (0.677)
Average: 2 Years
-	
-	 3.398
0.691 a	 0.043	 0.025	 0.437	 0.392
(.1 ivirn	 (0.464)
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-ratios. The significance of the coefficients is tested using a one-tailed
test.
a: significant at the 1 per cent level.
The relationship between price-cost margins and concentration using an alternative
measure of concentration namely as Hill is also tested. The motivation for this is to,
check the robustness of the outcome observed with four-firm concentration ratio as
the measure of concentration. The results of the regression analysis with HHI as a
measure of concentration depict that the signs of the regression coefficients of the
explanatory variables are positive in all cases, conforming to theoretical expectations.
There is, however, a difference in the significance level of the regression coefficients
of concentration variable in this model compared to the equation 5.2. In particular,
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the significance levels of the regression coefficient of the concentration variable when
measured by the HHI index reduced from 1 percent level to 10 percent level or better.
It is also observed that when HHI is used as a measure of concentration the regression
coefficient of the capital-output ratio is significant at 10 percent level or better for the
1985/86 and for the average of the two years.
The use of log-linear framework greatly enhances the significance levels of the ETHI
variable to 1 percent or better from 10 percent or better levels observed in linear case.
This result of log-linear framework also indicates that the capita-output ratio is
significant at 10 percent level or better for the average of the two years only.
Regression analysis between price-cost margins and Hirschman-Herfindahl index is
elaborated in Appendix A. 1.
The results of these models support the theoretical and empirical observations that
price-cost margins are significantly related to concentration levels in Bangladesh,
whichever of the two concentration measures is selected. The results also reveal that
capital intensity of the industry as reflected in the capital-output ratio is not
significantly related to the price-cost margin, even when different measures of
concentration are used. Amjad (1978) and Sharwani (1976) also found significant
association between profitability and concentration for large scale manufacturing
sectors in Pakistan. Their studies, however, were confined only to the manufacturing
sectors of the western province and did not include the manufacturing sectors of the
eastern province which is now known as Bangladesh.
5.4 Import penetration: impact of foreign competition on price-cost margins
In this section, the impacts of foreign and domestic factors on domestic profitability
are examined in an integrated framework. Two measures of import penetration or
foreign competition are used to estimate the relationship between domestic profitability
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and foreign competition. These two measures are the shares of imports in total domestic
supply and the effective rates of tariff.
5.4.1 Import shares
While it is conventional to characterise firms in highly concentrated industries as those
having significant market power, this inference can be altered in the context of industries
facing substantial degrees of actual import competition. High levels of imports may reduce
the ability of domestic firms to maintain prices above the long-run average cost of
production. Furthermore, modern oligopoly theory reveals that potential (import)
competition through the threat of entry, foreign entry, may also compel domestic firms to set
prices close to the competitive levels (Pagoulatos and Sorensen, 1976). Esposito and
Esposito (1971) pointed out that foreign producers may often more easily overcome entry
impediments faced by the domestic and foreign entrants and, thereby, may exert the strongest
influence upon the pricing decision of the domestic firms. It is thus expected that, ceteris
paribus, profits margins are lower in industries where actual and potential import competition
is higher.
In line with many other empirical models, as a quantitative measure of actual import
competition the current shares of imports (MIDS) in total domestic supply (DS) is included
in the model. The total domestic supply consists of output plus net imports. The data for
imports and exports are obtained from the Bangladesh Trade Statistics. The corresponding
output values are obtained from the Census of Manufacturing Industries for the respective
years. Both of these reports are published annually by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.
The sectoral classification used in these two reports are also same.
The conjecture is that the higher the import shares the greater is the degree of actual import
competition, so it is expected that this variable (i.e. import shares) should exert negative
influence on profit margins.
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5.4.2 Effective rates of tariff
The use of import shares to proxy import penetration although a widely accepted
variable, may not be the most desirable variable. In effect, the model should be using
levels of competing imports by sectors as opposed to total import shares by sectors.
However, due to the paucity of published data on levels of competing imports, most
researchers have assumed that sectoral competing imports and sectoral total imports
are the same and hence they used import shares to capture the extent of foreign
competition. This approach may, however, be inappropriate in models for developing
countries where large parts of imports are financed by project aid. The goods that are
imported under projects are usually exempt from tariff and other payments and are not
allowed to be traded in the domestic market along with domestic products and
commercial imports. Therefore, imports fmanced by project aid can be classified as
non-competitive imports. In Bangladesh, on average 40 to 45 percent of imports are
financed by project aid (The World Bank, 1993). In partiular the shares of imports
financed by project aid were 39 and 48 percent in 1985/86 and 1986/87 respectively.
On the other hand it appears that some parts of the commercial imports are non-
competitive as well. For example, in the case of the petroleum sector almost all the
imports are crude petroleum products which are used in the domestic refineries to
produce refined petroleum products. Crude and refined petroleum products are
different commodities and hence, they are complementary rather than competitive
products. However, unlike the petroleum sector, differences between non-competitive
and competitive imports are not readily apparent for other sectors. Therefore, it is not
possible to generate sectoral estimates of competitive imports without resorting to
value judgement.
One accepted alternative is to use effective tariff rates to portray the strength or extent
of foreign competition (Bloch 1974, and Hitiris 1978). Tariff rates, which directly
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affect the prices of imported goods in the domestic market, have significant influence
on the behaviour of domestic firms. In effect, high rates of tariffs restrict the flow of
imports by raising the market prices of imported goods and thereby allow the
domestic counterpart to reap above normal profits in the domestic market. High
levels of tariffs coupled with low levels of imports may induce the domestic firms to
maintain prices above the long-run average cost of production. It is thus expected
that, ceteris paribus, profit margins are higher in industries where effective tariff rates
are high.
Theoretical support for this can be drawn from Nakao (1986) who used a generalised
model of collusive oligopoly under threat of foreign competition to examine the
relation between the profitability of domestic firms, shares of imports, and
international trade barriers. He argued that the barriers to international trade are
associated positively with the total profits of the domestic oligopolists and negatively
with the shares of imports; the reduction in the international trade barriers decreases
the total profits of collusive oligopoly in the domestic market, and increases the shares
of imports. Therefore, in addition to import shares, effective rates of tariff can be
used as an alternative variable to capture the strength of foreign competition. The data
on effective tariff rates are obtained from the National Board of Revenue (NBR). The
National Board of Revenue uses the same sectoral classification as the Bangladesh
Trade Statistics. Therefore the sector classification of the NBR and CMI are also
same.
The following two equations are used to test the relationship between price-cost
margins and the degree of foreign competition:
(PCM) 1
 = c + a1 (CR4 ),+ a2 (K/O), —a3(M),+ u	 (5.4)
(PCM), = c + a1 (CR4 ) 1 + a2 (K/O) 1 +a3 (TR) 1 + u	 (5.5)
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Where (PCM) I = Estimated price-cost margin in the ith industry.
(CR4), = Four-firm concentration ratio in ith industry.
(Kb),	 Capital-output ratio of the ith industry.
(M), = Import penetration i.e. imports as a percentage of total domestic
supply. The total domestic supply is estimated as DS= Output+
Imports -Exports.
(TR), = Effective rates of tariff in the ith industry.
u = Error-term.
5.4.3 Results of regression analysis
The results of the regression analysis with foreign competition variables such as
import shares and effective rates of tariff are presented in Table 5.6 below. In all
cases the coefficients for the import shares have negative signs, and they are
statistically significant at less than 5 percent level. The results of the regression
analysis with effective rates of tariff capturing the extent of import penetration
indicate that the coefficients of the tariff variables have the expected signs, and are
statistically significant at less than 1 percent level except for the year 1986/87. The
tariff coefficient is significant at less than 2.5 percent for the year 1986/87. This
result suggests that the regression coefficients of tariff rates are more statistically
significant than the of import shares coefficient. The coefficients of the concentration
ratio variable are significant at 1 per cent level or better in both models. The
regression coefficients of the capital-output ratio are not significant in any of the three
cases when import share is used as a proxy for import competition. However, the
capital-output ratio turns out to be significant at 10 percent level in the model with
effective tariff rates. It is also observed that values of both the R 2 , R 2 are higher in
these models (i.e. model 5.4 and 5.5) compared to the previous models. Thus more of
the variation of price-cost margins is explained by models 5.4 and 5.5.
These results not only indicate that the import competition plays a major role in
affecting profitability in domestic industries, but also supports the observations that
149
price-cost margins are higher in those industries where concentration levels are high
and import shares are low or effective tariff rates are high (Nakao, 1980).
Table 5.6. Results of Regression Analysis: Impact of Imports and Tariff Rates on Industry Profits
Dependent	 Concentra- Capital-	 Import	 Tariff Rates Constant	 R2
Variable	 tion Ratio	 Output	 Share	 Term
(CR4)	 Ratio	 (M)	 (TR)
Year 1985/86
	
_0.101 c	 -	 7.224	 0.425	 0.355
(1.812)
-	 0.072a
	 0.025	 0.481	 0.416
(2.492)
Year 1986/87
	
_0.097 c	-	 7.550	 0.438	 0.368
(1.961)
-	 0074b	 0.215	 0.475	 0.410
(2.4 16)
Average: 2 Years
	
_0 .099 c	-	 7.163	 0.472	 0.406
(2.0 12)
5.PCM	 0.198a	 2996d	 -	 0.071a	 0.151	 0.516	 0.455
__________ (3.453)	 (1.585)	 (2.568)
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-ratios. The significance of the coefficients is tested using a one-tail
test.
a: significant at the 1 per cent level.
b: significant at the 2.5 per cent level.
c: significant at the 5 per cent level.
d: significant at the 10 per cent level.
The influence of foreign competition on price-cost margins with an alternative
measure of concentration such as HHI is also examined. In all the three cases the
coefficients of the import share variable have the expected negative signs, and they
are statistically significant at 10 percent level or better. The results of the regression.
analysis with effective rates of tariff depict that the tariff coefficients have the
expected signs, and are statistically significant at less 2.5 percent level except for the
year 1986/87. the tariff coefficient is significant at less 5 percent level for the year
1986/87. This result thereby supports previous findings that the regression
coefficients of tariff rates are more statistically significant than import shares
4. PCM	 0.209 a	 2.354
(3.176)	 (1.021)
5. PCM	 O.184a	 3878d
(2.899)	 (1.678)
4. PCM	 0.204 a	 2.137
(3.440)	 (1.204)
5. PCM	 0.199a	 2745d
(3.478)	 (1.555)
4. PCM	 0.215a	 1.973
(3.615)	 (1.043)
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coefficients. Regression analysis between price-cost margins, import competition and
Hirschman-Herfindahl index is elaborated in Appendix A.2.
Furthermore, the effect of foreign competition on domestic profitability is also
examined by using dummy variables for competing imports. It is assumed that the
dummy variable for competing imports of the ith industry (i.e. MD, = 0) is zero
where import shares are less than 20 percent of domestic supply, and in all other cases
it is one (i.e. MD1 = 1). It is observed that when we use dummy variables for
competing imports, divided the industries into two different categories-those where
imports are less than 20 percent and those with more- the results are almost similar to
the model where import share was used as a measure of import competition. These
results are elaborated in Appendix A.3.
These results, thus, support the earlier findings that the import competition exerts
strong influence on the profitability of domestic industries. It is also observed that
price-cost margins are higher in those industries where concentration levels are high
and import shares are low or effective tariff rates are high.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter the impact of market structure variables on profitability in the 28 major
manufacturing sectors in Bangladesh for the years' 1985/86 and 1986/87 has been
examined. The sample covered over eighty-five percent of the manufacturing sector.
The main results are: (i) On the basis of high levels of concentration it appears that
the extent of competition is weak in most of the industries in Bangladesh. (ii) The
simple correlation between profitability and four-firm concentration ratios are high
but when HHI is used as a measure of concentration, the simple correlation
coefficients fell from high levels to moderate levels. (iii) The rank correlation
coefficients between profitability and four-firm concentration ratios are also high and
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are similar to the levels observed in the case of the simple correlations measure. However,
the rank correlation between price-cost margins and HI-il are higher than the simple
correlation between price-cost margins and HUT and are significant at much higher level of
significance. (iv) When price-cost margins are used as an indicator of profitability,
concentration is an important factor explaining differences in profitability among different
industries. This result is robust even when alternative measures of concentration are used.
(v) In most of the cases it is observed that profitability is not significantly related to the
capital-output ratio. (vi) The foreign competition variables play a major role in affecting
profitability in domestic industries. The result also supports the observation that price-cost
margins are higher in those industries where concentration levels are high and import shares
are low or effective tariff rates are high.
In this study, no attempt has also been made to examine the extent of concentration in other
sectors such as agriculture and services since relevant information is not available in
Bangladesh. The general perception, however, is that the extent of concentration in those
sectors is significantly lower then the extent of concentration observed for the manufacturing
sector. For instance, the financial services (i.e. banks and insurance) sector has a four-firm
concentration ratio of 48 percent in 1986/87 which is substantially lower than the average
four-firm concentration ratio observed for the manufacturing sector.
Finally, it is important to note that these findings may be viewed with caution since no
adjustment has been made to capture informal activities. Although it would be desirable to
include informal activities in a model of an underdeveloped country like Bangladesh, lack of
data prevented us from making any adjustment. No information is available regarding the
extent of informal sector activities in Bangladesh. However, in line with the findings of
comparable developing countries, it is believed that the extent of overall informal sector
activities could be around 15 percent of GDP. On the other hand, it is also believed that
informal activities are more concentrated in sectors other than the manufacturing sector of
the economy.
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Appendix to chapter five
Table A.5.1. Industry Output as a percentage of total
Manufacturing Output
Industry	 Industry Output
	 Cumulative
as a % of Total	 Percentage
__________________________ Industiy Output
Jute Textiles	 16.15
Textiles	 10.33	 26.48
Petroleum Products 	 9.49	 35.97
Tobacco Products	 7.77	 43.74
Leather Products	 4.98	 48.72
Fertiliser	 4.78	 53.50
Rice Milling	 4.61	 58.11
Pharmaceuticals	 4.25	 62.36
Sugar	 3.50	 65.86
Edible Oils	 3.40	 69.26
Tanning & Finishing	 2.28	 71.54
BPCI Sheet	 2.23	 73.77
Hand loom	 2.14	 75.91
Steel Rerolling	 1.69	 77.60
Light Engineering	 1.12	 78.72
Aluminium Products 	 0.86	 79.58
Vehicle & Ship Building	 0.86	 80.44
Industrial chemical
	 0.83	 81.27
Battery	 0.81	 82.08
Cement	 0.71	 82.79
Machinery	 0.70	 83.49
Bakery	 0.42	 83.91
Electric Products	 0.42	 84.33
Beverage	 0.37	 84.70
Glass	 0.32	 85.02
Rubber Products	 0.22	 85.24
Cutlery	 0.02	 85.26
Sewing Machine	 0.01	 85.27
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A. 1 Regression analysis between profitability and Hirschman-Herfindahl index
The relationship between price-cost margins and Hirschman-Herfindahl index as an
alternative measure of concentration is also tested. The modified models with HHI
take the following forms.
(PCM) = c + a 1 (HHI)1 + a2 (K/O), + u	 (A.5.2)
Log (PCM) 1 = c + a log(HHI)1 + a2 log(KIO) 1 + u	 (A.5.3)
Where (PCM) = Estimated price-cost margin in the ith industry.
(HHJ)1 = Hirschman-Herfindhal Index of the ith industry.
(KIO) = Capital-output ratio of the ith industry.
u = Error-term.
The results of the regression analysis of linear form are shown in Table A.5.5 for the
individual years as well as for the average of the two years. The signs of the
regression coefficients of the explanatory variables are positive in all cases,
conforming the theoretical expectations. The significance levels of the regression
coefficient of the concentration level when measured by Hill index reduced from 1
percent level to 10 percent level or better compared with models where concentration
ratio is used as a measure of concentration. The regression coefficient of the capital-
output ratio is not significant for any of the two years or for the average of the two
years when concentration ratio is used as a measure of concentration. However, when
HHT is used as a measure of concentration the regression coefficient of the capital-
output ratio is significant at 10 percent level or better for the 1985/86 and for the
average of the two years. Table A.5.5 also reports the results of the regression
analysis of log-linear form. The use of log-linear framework greatly enhances the
significance levels of HHI variable to 1 percent or better from 10 percent or better
levels observed in linear case. This result of log-linear framework also depicts that
the capita-output ratio is significant at 10 percent level or better for the average of the
two years only.
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Table A.5.5. Ordinary Least Square Regression Equations Explaining Price-Cost Margin in 28
Industries, Linear and Log-linear form
Dependent	 Herfindahi	 Capital-	 Herfindahi	 Capital-	 Constant	 R2
Variable	 Index	 Output	 Index	 Output	 Term
(HHI)	 Ratio	 Log (HHI)	 Ratio
_______	 (KJO)	 Log (K/O)
Year 1985/86
A.2. PCM	 15778b	 3769d	 -	 12.441	 0.257	 0.197
(2.226)	 (1.559)
A.3.Log	 -	
-	 0362z	 0.051	 3.486	 0.498	 0.448
PCM	 (4.519)	 (0.492)
Year 1986/87
A.2, PCM	 2.616	 -	 -	 14.602	 0.153	 0.086
(1.540)	 (1.292)
A.3.Log	 -	
-	 0238a	 0.089	 3.332	 0.255	 0.195
PCM	 (2.655)	 (0.852)
Average: 2 Years
A.2. PCM	 9554d	 3975C	 -	 14.404	 0.161	 0.094
(1.329)	 (1.822)
A.3. Log	 -	
-	 0.232'	 0139d	 3.39 1	 0.292	 0.237
PCM	 (2.836)	 (1.380)
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-ratios. The significance of the coefficients is tested using a one-tail test.
a: significant at the 1 per cent level.
b: significant at the 2.5 per cent level.
C: significant at the 5 per cent level.
d: significant at the 10 per cent level.
A.2 Regression analysis between profitability, import competition and HHI
The influence of foreign competition on price-cost margins with Hirschman-
Herfindahi index is also examined. Inclusion of HHI in place of four-firm
concentration ratio modifies the models in the following forms.
(PCM), = C + a1 (HHJ)1 -I- a2(K/O),—a3(M),-i- u	 (A.5.4)
(PCM), = C +a(HHJ)1 + a2(KIQ),+a3(TR) 1 -i- u	 (A.5.5)
Where (PCM) = Estimated price-cost margin in the ith industry.
(Hill)1 = Herfindhal Index of the ith industry.
(Kb) 1 = Capital-output ratio of the ith industry.
(M), = Import penetration i.e. imports as a percentage of total domestic
supply. The total domestic supply is estimated as DS=Output+
Imports -Exports
(TR) 1 = Effective rates of tariff in the ith industry.
	
u	 = Error-term.
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The results of the regression analysis with the modified models are presented in Table
A.5.6. In all cases the coefficients of the import share variable have the expected
negative signs, and they are statistically significant at 10 percent level or better. The
results of the regression analysis with effective rates of tariff depict that tariff
coefficients also have the expected signs, and are statistically significant at less 2.5
percent level except for the year 1986/87. Tariff coefficient is significant at less 5
percent for the year 1986/87. The coefficients of the HHT are significant but at lower
levels of significance of 10 percent or better in both the models. Contrary to our
previous findings, the capital-output ratios turn out to be significant in all cases. The
results thus suggest that capital intensity may influence price-cost margin when an
alternative measure of concentration is adopted. The levels of significance are
relatively stronger in models where HHI is combined with the effective rates of tariff.
Table A5.6. Results of Regression Analysis: Impact of Foreign Competition Variables on Profitability
Dependent Herfindahi Capital- 	 Import	 Tariff Rates Constant	 R2
Variable	 Index	 Output	 Share	 Term
(HHI)	 Ratio	 (M)	 (TR)
Year 1985/86
(2.165)	 (1.744)
A.5. PCM	 13.328c	 5550b
(2.028)	 (2.379)
A.4. PCM
	
15053b	 4.148c
A.4. PCM	 11358d	 3355d
(1.606)	 (1.679)
A.5. PCM	 9824d	 3395C
(1.409)	 (1.938)
A.4. PCM	 8.820'
(1.552)	 (2.060)
7.797"
	
5.384'
1.671)
-0.089 d
(1.457)
-	 0.075"
(2.412)
Year 1986/87
-0.097'	 -
(1.679)
-	 0.072c
(1.972)
Average: 2 Years
0090 d	 -
(1.513)
-	 0.076"
(2.3 11)
	
15.736	 0.317	 0.232
	
7.58 1	 0.402	 0.327
	
17.671	 0.242	 0.147
	
10.580	 0.271	 0.180
	
17.677	 0.235	 0.139
	
9.843	 0.3 14	 0.228A.5. PCM
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-ratios. The significance of the coefficients is tested using a one-tail test.
a: significant at the 1 per cent level.
b: significant at the 2.5 per cent level.
C: significant at the 5 per cent level.
d: significant at the 10 per cent level.
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A.5.3 Regression analysis with dummy variable for competing imports
In this section the results of the effects of import competition is examined using a
dummy variable for competing imports. Inclusion of dummy variable for competing
imports modifies the model in the following forms:
(PCM), = c + a(CR4), + a2 (K/O), —a3(MD)1 + u	 (A.5.6)
Where (PCM), = Estimated price-cost margin in the ith industry.
(CR4), = Four-firm concentration ratio in ith industry.
(Kb),	 Capital-output ratio of the ith industry.
(MD), = Dummy variable for competing imports i.e. MD, =0 when imports
are less than 2Opercent of domestic supply and otherwise MD, = 1.
u	 = Error-term.
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table A.5.7. It is observed that
when we use dummy variable for competing imports the results are not significantly
different from the results observed in model where import shares are used as a
measure of foreign competition. The sign of import variable is negative in all cases as
the model predicts and is statistically significant in all the three cases.
Table A.5.7. Regression Results: Impact of Dummy Variable for Imports on Industry Profits
Variable	 tion Ratio	 Output
(CR4)	 Ratio(K/O)
A.6. PCM
	 0.217a	 2.792
(3.268)	 (1.186)
Imports
(MD)
Year I
6.310c
(1.737)
	
Constant	 R2
Term
(86
	
7.102	 0.419	 0.347
A.6. PCM	 0.223 a
(3.769)
A.6. PCM	 0.227
(3.774
2.236
(1.275)
2.176
(1.13 8)
Year 1986/87
_7.038 c	 7.562
(2.161)
Average: 2 Years
6.330 c	 7.030
(1.987)
	
0.454	 0.385
	
0.470	 0.404
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-ratios. The significance of the coefficients is tested
using a one-tail test.
a: significant at the I per cent level.
b: significant at the 2.5 per cent level.
c: significant at the 5 per cent level.
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Chapter Six
A Computable General Equilibrium Model for the Bangladesh Economy:
Competitive and Non-competitive Variants
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, an alternative model of the Bangladesh economy is developed to
analyse the effects of tariff reforms on resource allocation and income distribution
under both competitive and non-competitive assumptions. The model explicitly
incorporates features of imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale. A
review of the literature reveals that imperfectly competitive behaviour and increasing
returns to scale has been modelled in different ways. In one approach (e.g. Cox and
Harris, 1985) the industry rationalisation effects of trade reforms are discussed. In
this type of model the firm's perceived demand elasticity is treated as constant in the
short run. Other market structure variables such as the number of firms, marginal cost
(or unit variable cost) and profits are determined endogenously. Increasing returns to
scale are assumed to stem from the fixed cost part of the total cost. Fixed cost is
usually calculated using available econometric estimates of the minimum efficient
scale of production and cost saving achievable. The latter parameter depicts the
decline in cost that would result if a firm were to expand its output from the actual
level to the efficient scale of production. Additional gains from trade reforms appear
to come from industry rationalisation effects, that is the exit of inefficient firms, and a
reduction in unrealised scale economies. In other types of model (e.g. Devarajan and
Rodrik, 1991) the pro-competitive effects of trade reforms are explained. In this type•
of model all the market structure variables, including the firm's perceived demand
elasticity, are endogenous. The market structure variables that characterise imperfect
competition are marginal costs, the number of domestic firms, the excess profit
condition and the market demand elasticity for domestic goods. Increasing returns to
scale are also assumed to stem from the fixed cost part of the total cost.
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The fixed cost is composed of labour and capital costs in the same proportion as in
total value added. However, the calibration of increasing returns to scale is achieved
in an ad hoc fashion due to lack of relevant estimates (i.e. minimum efficient scale
etc.).
Here a Devarajan and Rodrik-type model is developed to examine the effects of tariff
liberalisation in Bangladesh. The reasons for pursuing the Devarajan and Rodrik
approach are that: (i) the model can accommodate both the pro-competitive effect and
industry rationalisation effect; (ii) the model allows for calculations of welfare and
resource allocation effects under imperfect competition with and without scale
economies; (iii) it also shows an alternative way to calibrate increasing returns to
scale when relevant estimates such as minimum efficient scale and the level of fixed
costs etc. which would be required to specify increasing returns to scale in line with
Cox and Harris, are not available.
The present model incorporates market structure variables to characterise imperfect
competition. These are marginal costs, the number of firms in each industry, the
excess profit condition and the market demand elasticity for the domestic goods. In
calibrating these variables we have tried to remain close to actual and observed data
such as: profit rates; differential rental rates for capital etc. The income distribution
effects which are generally ignored in most imperfect competition models, are also
captured here. The original equilibrium of the model is expected to replicate the
economy of Bangladesh for 1988/89 set out in the SAM data base. The chapter is set
out in the following way. In section 6.2 a competitive variant of the model is
presented. Section 6.3 incorporates the market structure variables to capture non-
competitive behaviour. In section 6.4, calibration with increasing returns to scale is
discussed. Concluding observations are presented in section 6.5.
162
6.2	 A computable general equilibrium model for Bangladesh economy:
the competitive case
This section presents the equations of a CGE model assuming perfect competition and
constant returns to scale. In each sector, the output is produced by capital, labour and
intermediate inputs which are used in fixed proportions to output. The primary factors
capital and different types of labours make up the sectoral value added. In this
version of the model, the factor market is separated into a market for capital and a
market for labour. Accordingly, separate labour and capital market clearing
conditions are specified in the model. The labour market clearing condition requires
equality between labour demand and fixed labour supply with wage rates as the
equilibrating variable. Similarly the capital market clearing condition requires
equality of capital demand and supply. In this case the equilibrating variable is the
rental rates. Apart from the specification of production structure and separation of
factor market, the specification of this model is similar to that specified in chapter 3.
The equations, variables and parameters of this model are presented in Table 6.1. The
presentation is brief because the model specification is similar to that already
discussed and elaborated in chapter three.
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Table 6.1 Equations of the CGE Model: Competitive Variant
6.1 PM=PWM..ER(l+tm1+st)
6.2 PE,=PWE1ER
PE.D+PM1M,
6.3 F =
Prices
6.4 P=PLi-tfl.P,-td,
6.5 pic
6.6 PX = PJL•D1+PE,•E,
XI
6.7 X, = 4flLL' .I
ax
6.8 W,.txj,,=Pa,,
aLDil
Production and Supply
6.9 INT=t,.X
6.10 1?, = P•a,1
Exports and Imports
6.11 X = AT, .[y,.E,' +(1-y1).D,'Y	 6.14 Q1 = AQ, [8, 
M1PI +(l_81).D']'
6 . 12E, =L.[]V1	 6.15 1D.[_PE46110,
PE3.71
6.13 E=E,°r PWEi]J
PWSE,
6.16 Y,-flWvil.LDI
6.17 YLh=Ih,.Y
6.18 Yh=[YLh+YKh+RM,ER+DV,
+GTR,, -4- NHTRh} • (1 - thh
 - Sh)
Incomes
6.20 Yk=1.K,
6.21 YKh=.Yk
6.22 YG =t/.I+Etd,.X,.PX,+tc•YC
h	 I
PWM,. M, . ER ^ st, . PWM, M, . ER + YKG
6.19 YKG	 k•	 6.23 YC=Xk•Yk
Final Demand
6.24 CDIh = Pm +(,h/I).(Yh -	 Pih i)
	 6.27 GD, 
= 
• GTOT
6.25 IN=IN7,	 6.28 ID,=>KyDKj
6.26 PIç..DK,=1.I
Savings
6.29 SHh=shYh	 6.31 SG = YG - GL. - GTR,
630 SC=YC
	
6.32 S=>SHh+SG-1-SC+SF.ER
Equilibrium Conditions
6.33	 LD,,=LS,	 6.35	 K1=KS
6.34 ç= INT, -l->CD,h +GI +ID,	 6.36	 PWM,•M1 =PWE,.Ej+>RMh+SF
6.37 l_-S=SHh+SG+SC+FS-ER
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Table 6.1 Variables and Parameters of the CGE Model
Variables
Returns to capital in sector i
RJvIh Remittances
S	 Total savings
SHh Household savings
SG	 Government savings
sc	
Corporate savings
SF	 Foreign savings
Composite goods supply
NFITRh Net transfers among households
Average wage of labour category I
X,	 Domestic output,
YC	 Corporation income
Labour income
Capital income
YL h 	 Household income from labour
YKh Household income from capital
YKG Government income from capital
YG	 Government income
Household income
CDh ,	 Household demand for good i
D, Domestic sales of domestic output
DK,	 Investment by sector of destinations
DVh Dividend payments to households
E, Exports from sector i.
ER	 Nominal exchange rate.
GD, Government final demand
GTRh Government transfers to households
I	 Investment
ID,	 Final demand for investment goods
1N7	 Intermediate demand
K,	 Capital demand
LD,, Labour demand
M	 Imports
PD,	 Domestic sales price
FE,	 Domestic price of exports
PK,.	 Composite price of capital
PA'I, Domestic price of imports
P WE, World price of exports
A,	 Production function shift parameter
a,,	 Share parameters for labour
Share parameters for capital
rn,,	 Sector-specific parameter
Input-output coefficients.
tm,	 Tariff rates on imports
st,	 Sales tax rates on imports
td,	 Indirect tax rates
AQ, CES function share parameter
3'	 CES function shift parameter
0
	
Elasticity of substitution.
AT,	 CET function shift parameters
'Ii	 CET function share parameters
'vi	 Elasticity of transformation
Labour to household matrix
Parameters
'hk	 Capital to household matrix
Government income from capital
xj	 Corporation income from capital
[3	 Government expenditure shares
Ph,	 Household expenditure shares
Investment destination shares
lC:	 Capital composition matrix
Corporate tax rate
thh 	 Household income tax rate
Sh	 Household savings rate
G TOT Real government expenditure
E,°	 Export demand shift parameter
Price elasticity of export demand
PWM, World price of imports
PWSE, World price of export substitutes
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6.3 Model variant with non-competitive behaviour
In this section, the specification of various market structure variables is discussed. In
particular, this involves the estimation of: marginal costs; the number of firms in each
industry; the excess profit condition and the market demand elasticity for domestic
goods. This information is essential in order to simulate the effects of trade
liberalisation in Bangladesh in the presence of non-competitive structure. Since
econometric estimates of market structure variables such as marginal cost and the
market demand elasticities are not available for the manufacturing sectors in
Bangladesh, a calibration procedure is used to estimate them. We proceed in the
following the steps:
(1) The 14 production sectors are first sub-divided into competitive and non-
competitive sectors on the basis of their degree of concentration. It was evident from
chapter five that the concentration ratios are quite high in major industries in
Bangladesh as measured by the four-firm concentration ratio. It was observed that the
average four-firm concentration ratios are 68 and 69 percent for 1985/86 and 1986/87
respectively. It was also observed that the estimated concentration ratios are rather
low for the jute sector. On the other hand, this ratio was not computed for the ready
made garment sector due to a paucity of data. However, casual observation suggests
that the ready made garment industry is composed of a large number of roughly equal-
sized firms. Therefore, the scope of collusion between firms appears to be small and
the industry may be characterised as being competitive. Accordingly, the garments
sector is treated as competitive. With the exception of the garments sector, the other
seven manufacturing sectors are treated as non-competitive. Evidence of
concentration is not available for the agricultural, construction, service and trade and
transport sector but in line with other studies, these sectors are assumed to behave in a
competitive manner.
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(2) On the import side, it is assumed that world prices are unaffected by
developments in the economy of Bangladesh. However, since domestic and imported
commodities within a sector are assumed to be imperfect substitutes, domestic firms
retain some market power in the domestic market in the non-competitive industries.
(3) Marginal cost is derived from the solution of the minimisation of total cost subject
to a given output level (see Appendix A. 1). For sector i this yields:
MC, =	 Izil (11	 /a,I).RI/akI)°' +	 rjj .	 (6.38)
41=1	 1
(4) The market demand elasticity for the domestic goods is calculated using the
information from the Armington specification. According to Armington, each
composite good is defined as a CES aggregate of domestically produced goods and
imported goods. Domestically produced goods within a composite good are treated as
perfect substitutes for each other. The market demand elasticity is calculated as the
percentage change in domestic demand for the domestic goods in response to a unit
percentage change in the price of domestic goods, i.e. PD, while keeping all domestic
expenditure on the relevant composite goods constant. The calculated market demand
elasticity takes the following form (the derivation is shown in Appendix A.2):
= —o +(l -
	 (1— 6)ai.pJr(IcJl) +
	 .	
(6.39)
where, o. and , are the Armington elasticity and the share parameter for sector i
respectively. This elasticity specification implies that the market demand elasticity ,
will change under any policy reform since it changes with PD, and PM,. Equation
(6.39) also shows that s. increases in absolute value whenever the relative price of
imports (i.e. PM,/PD,) falls. It implies that the domestic firms will behave more
competitively as a consequence of trade liberalisation (since a direct consequence
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of trade liberalisation is a fall in the relative price of imports). The inverse
relationship between market demand elasticity and the relative price of imports is
depicted by the following equation:
—
(1 a,) —(1— a,) . (1 -
 —	 '	 <0	 (6.39a)
PM,	 [(l-6,/o,r'.(Pr,/PD,)''+1]2
PD1
Contrary to this elasticity specification, in some models (e.g. Cox-Harris, 1985 and
Gunasekera and Tyres, 1988) the firms perceived demand elasticity is assumed
constant in the short-run. The elasticity of aggregate sectoral demand is also
endogenous in de Melo and Hoist (1990).
(5) No data are available for the number of domestic firms for the manufacturing
sectors. In the absence of such information, the number of domestic firms is
endogenously calculated in this model. The Lemer symmetry condition is used to
derive the number of domestic firms (see Appendix A.3). The Lerner condition states
that:
D1 .(1 -td,)--MC, = —1
PD,.(1-td,)	 N,.s, (6.40)
It is assumed that the non-competitive firms behave in a Cournot-Nash fashion.
Under this hypothesis, the firm's perceived demand elasticity for domestic sales is
N, . c,, where N, is the number of firms in sector i (see Appendix A.4 for further
discussion on the firm's perceived demand elasticity). Further manipulation of
equation (6.40) yields the number of domestic firms:
N=	 PD,•(l-td,)
c..[PD,.(l-td,)-Mc,]
For export sales, the Lerner symmetry condition takes the following form:
(6.41)
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FE,.(1-td,)-MC, = -1
	 (6.42)
PE,.(l-td,)
where r, is the price elasticity of export demand. The export demand elasticities are
exogenous and are different from the endogenously determined market demand
elasticities. It is observed that the right hand side and the left hand side of equation
6.42 are conceptually different because the number of firms is already derived, and
export demand elasticities are exogenous. However, the two sides of equation 6.42
should be equal and the equality between two sides is not attained unless either , or
FE, are allowed to adjust. To satisfy the equality condition FE, is allowed to adjust
while keeping rj. constant. In this case FE, will be marginally less than unity.
Alternatively, export demand elasticities, .s may be allowed to adjust setting FE,
equal to unity. In this case, ri1 would always be equal to s, and therefore the
developments in the domestic economy would directly influence the world market
which appears to be a highly unrealistic assumption.
(6) The level of excess profits is an important dimension of imperfect competition.
The level of excess profits is defined to be those profits above the normal amount
necessary to keep entrepreneurial resources committed (Richardson, 1989). The
excess profit function for the non-competitive sector i is specified as:
= [FX. .(l - rd.)—AC.].(N. XF,)	 (6.43)
where, XF, is the output per firm. No information is available regarding the amount
of excess profits in the non-competitive sectors. In previous studies, part of the return
from capital has been treated as pure or excess profits. To generate the amount of
excess profits, sectoral rental rates of capital (R,) observed in the SAM are reduced by
30 percent across all sectors, so that the total excess profits amount to 15 percent of
total corporate capital income. The 15 percent profit rate is chosen to be
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approximately equal to the average price-cost margins of 15.2 percent observed for
the manufacturing sector in Bangladesh for 1988/89. This rate is also
closely commensurate with the average price-cost margins estimated for 1985/86 and
1986/87. This implies that in the non-competitive variant the sectoral rental rates (R,)
are different for each of the 14 sectors but are less than the sectoral rental rates
observed in the SAM data base. Therefore, in the non-competitive sectors any excess
of revenues over wage, capital arid intermediate costs is treated as excess profits.
While in the competitive sector, this excess revenue is denoted as if it is a return to
specific factors, although no sector-specific factor is used in the model.
It is relevant to note that, de Melo and Hoist (1990) also used the information of
observed price-cost margin to specify an excess profit rate of 10 percent in their
model for Korea. On the other hand Devarajan and Rodrik (1991) assumed a uniform
five percent rental rate for capital for all sectors to generate the amount of excess
profits.
(7) The first order conditions (for labour and capital) for non-competitive sectors are
modified to capture the effects of imperfect competition, while the first order
conditions for the competitive sectors remain as before. The first order conditions for
non-competitive sectors are re-specified as:
(6.44)
or
R, =(MC, - 'jj P) ak	 (6.45)
or RI.KXI.(MCI->tJI.P).ak,
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(6.46)
(8) In the non-competitive variant, since the gross return to capital is now
decomposed into returns to capital; excess profits; and returns to sector-specific
factor, the distribution of capital income among institutions needs to be re-specified.
Equation (6.20) is re-specified to show to income from capital and profits:
The following equation is used to derive income from the sector-specific factor:
•	 (6.47)
i	 1
To distribute incomes from capital and sector-specific factors among institutions, the
same capital factor to institution allocation matrix is used, so that an institution's
income from these factors exactly conforms to the institution's income from capital
observed in the SAM data base.
Household income from capital is thus specified as:
(6.48)
The distribution of income from the sector-specific factor is specified as:
YSh=c.Y
	 (6.49)
where, YS h , 't and iç are the household's income from sector-specific factors, the
sector-specific factor to households allocation matrix and the income from the specific
factor respectively. Finally, household disposable income equation is re-specified as:
i =[YLh +YKh +YS h + RMh ER +Dr',+GTRh + NHTRh ] . ( l—th,, h)	 (6.50)
(9) The government income equation is modified to show the income from the
specific factor. The modified income equation has the form:
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Industry Profits
(million taka)
310
1330
520
1790
540
700
420
Output per Firm
(million taka)
370
1530
600
2030
670
820
570
YG
+td,X,PX-tc . YC+YKG +YSG
	 (6.51)
where, YSG shows government's income from sector-specific factor. This is estimated
as YSG ç.y5.
(10) Analogously corporations income is represented by the following modified
equation:
YC =YKC +YSC
	 (6.52)
where, YKC and YSC denote corporation's income from capital and sector-specific
factor respectively. These are computed as YKC = . Y and YSC = x
respectively.
The results of the calibration procedure are provided in Table 6.2. Table 6.2 shows
the calibrated values of the relevant variables. The calibration procedure generates the
base year of values of domestic output, the number of domestic firms, marginal cost
and the amounts of excess profits that are consistent with the assumptions and
observed data for Bangladesh for 1988/89.
Table 6.2. Calibration of Market Structure Variables
Non-competitive	 Number	 Marginal Cost
Sectors	 of firms	 (taka)
Food& Tobacco	 91	 0.843
Clothing	 9	 -	 0.896
Chemical	 22	 0.889
Cement	 10	 0.892
Machinery	 20	 0.907
Other Industries	 18	 0.9 15
Energy	 30	 0.766
Note: Number of firms is rounded to a whole number
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6.4 Calibration with imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale
To incorporate increasing returns to scale, in most models the total cost is separated
into fixed and variable cost components. The increasing returns to scale is then
assumed to stem from the fixed cost part of the total cost. The problem is to ascertain
the split between fixed and variable costs. In Cox-Harris type models fixed cost is
calculated using available econometric estimates of the minimum efficient scale of
production and cost saving achievable (cost disadvantage ratio). It shows the decline
in cost when a finn increases its output from the actual level to the efficient level.
Such a specification requires information on minimum efficient scale and the cost
disadvantage ratio. Such estimates are not available for Bangladesh nor it is possible
to estimate them as the required information is not available. Furthermore, the extent
of fixed cost by major industry groups is also not available. In the absence of such
essential information, an alternative approach (in line with Devarajan and Rodrik,
1991) has been adopted to specify increasing returns to scale based on the following
assumptions.
(i) Like other models, increasing returns are assumed to stem from the fixed cost
element of the total cost. It is also assumed that the fixed cost consists of labour and
capital costs in the same proportion as in total value added.
(ii) Scale elasticity which depicts the extent of unrealised scale economies is defined
as a ratio of the average and marginal cost (i.e. 0. = AC,/MC,). A uniform scale
elasticity of 10 percent is assumed for all non-competitive sectors. This implies that
average cost is assumed to be 10 percent higher than the marginal cost for each non-
competitive sector. This parameterizes the degree of increasing returns to scale in the
benchmark equilibrium. However, the scale elasticity is only fixed initially and it
varies across simulation outcomes as firm output, factor costs and input prices change.
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—a.FC
R.
(6.57)
A similar approach has also been used by de Melo and Holst (1990) and Devarajan
and Rodrik (1991). There is, however, some controversy as to how important and
symmetric these scale effects are within given industries. Accordingly, some models
such as Harrison et al (1995) and Francois et al (1994) adopted differential scale
elasticity values for different sectors. In Harrison et al, the elasticity values ranged
from 3 percent for food-beverage-tobacco products to 13 percent for processed rice.
In Francois et a!, where the values are 'best guessed', the range was between 5 percent
and 15 percent.
The scale elasticity is then used to calculate the fixed cost from:
FC, =(AC, - MC,).X,	 (6.53)
or F = MC, .(AC,/MC, - 1)•X,	 (6.54)
or F= MC,.(O,-1)•X	 (6.55)
where, FC, denotes total fixed cost in sector i.
Given FC,, the fixed amount of labour and capital inputs can then be estimated as:
= cx.,	 (6.56)
The production function is modified to incorporate the fixed amount of labour and
capital inputs. The modified production function takes the following form:
= A,fl (LD,, - LD,,)".(K, _ . k!	 (6.7*)
The first order conditions (for labour and capital) for non-competitive sectors are also
modified, while the first order conditions for the competitive sectors remain as before.
The first order conditions for non-competitive sectors are specified as:
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• Z J1 = ( MC, - 'r •	 • a 
tX1	
where LD,, =(LD,, - LDa)	 (6.44*)
J
or W . m 11 (LD, —LL,)=X1.(MC1—t,P)a1,
R =(MCI_>JI.PJ).ak,.,- 	 where 1k =(K1 -k)	 (6.45)
or
The calibration results with increasing returns to scale are presented in Table 6.3. The
calibration procedure generates the base year of value of domestic output, the number
of domestic firms, marginal cost, and the amounts of excess profits that are consistent
with the assumptions and observed data for Bangladesh for 1988/89. Notice that the
numbers of firms are significantly smaller in this case since marginal costs are lower
in the presence of fixed cost.
Table 6.3. Calibration Results with Increasing Returns to Scale
Non-competitive	 Number	 Marginal Cost Industry Profits Output per Firm
Sectors	 of firms	 (taka)	 (million taka)	 (million taka)
Food& Tobacco	 9	 0.766	 310	 3590
Clothing	 5	 0.814	 1330	 2860
Chemical	 7	 0.808	 520	 1890
Cement	 5	 0.808	 1790	 3840
Machinery	 6	 0.823	 540	 2010
Other Industries	 7	 0.831	 700	 2270
Energy	8 	 0.695	 420	 2120
Note: Number of firms is rounded to a whole number
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6.5	 Conclusion
In this chapter an alternative model of the Bangladesh economy is developed to
examine the effects of tariff liberalisation on resource allocation and income
distribution under both competitive and non-competitive assumptions. The present
model incorporates market structure variables to characterise imperfect competition.
These are marginal costs, the number of domestic firms in each industry, the excess
profit condition and the market demand elasticity for domestic goods. Since
econometric estimates of these market structure variables are not available in
Bangladesh, a calibration procedure is used to quantify them. The model also
incorporates features of increasing returns to scale. As in many other models,
increasing returns are assumed to stem from the fixed cost component of the total
cost. A uniform scale elasticity of 10 percent is assumed for all non-competitive
sectors. This parameterizes the degree of increasing returns to scale in the benchmark
equilibrium.
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(A.1.3)
(A.1.4)
Appendix to chapter six
A. 1. Derivation of the marginal cost function
The marginal cost function is derived from cost minimisation subject to the Cobb-
Douglas production function. The generalised form of the Cobb-Douglas production
function is specified as:
X= A.La •K'	 (A.1.l)
Assuming that A =1, the Cobb-Douglas production function takes the form
X= L •K
The cost minimisation problem specifies minimisation of
C=W.L+R•K
subject to X = La
The lagrange of the problem is then
H= W.L+R.K+&.[X_La .K(1a)]
The first order conditions are
(A.1.2)
(A.l.5)
W_?.[a.L°.K'"]
=R_?.[(l_a).La .K-a]
Manipulation of the first order conditions gives
W.L	 R•K
a•X (l—a)•X
a •K
W (1—a)
(A.1.6)
(A.1.7)
(A.1.8)
(A.1.9)
(A.1.lO)
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K = • (1— • L
R —cx
(A.l.l 1)
(A.1.14)
(A.1.15)
(A.1.16)
(A.1.17)
MC =	 = . R	 (1 - a).cCa
ax
(A.1.18)
or MC =(W/a)a.(R/1_a) (A.1.19)
Substitution of equation A. 1.10 and A. 1.11 for L and K in the production function
yields the following conditional factor demand functions
L =(W/R).(1—a/a).X	 (A. 1.12)
K =(R/w)a.(a/1 -	 (A.1.13)
Substitution of conditional factor demand functions in the cost function yields
C= W . L+R . K= W•X . W •R' .(1_a)t1.al
+R•X . R .	 .
or C= X.W	 .(1—a).a •(a/1—a+1)
or C=X.Wa •R' .(1_a)a.a .(1/1...cx)
or C= X.W R° .(1a)'.a
The derivative of total cost (C) with respect to output (X) yields the marginal cost
Now setting cx = a,1 , ( 1 - a)= a KI,	 =	 . J4, R = R. and adding the intermediate
cost component, the marginal cost (MC) for sector i can be written as
MC, = _! LJ(vJil 	 + 'r.. p	 (A.1.20)
A.2. Derivation of the market demand elasticity for domestic goods
The demand elasticity is calculated as the percentage change in domestic demand for
the domestic goods in response to a unit percentage change in the domestic price,
while holding all domestic expenditures on the relevant composite commodity (i.e. the
CES aggregate) fixed.
178
D. PD.
ÔPD,D, (A.2.1)
(A.2.3)
(A.2.4)
(A.2.5)
(A.2.6)
From the Arinington specification, the demand for domestic goods D, is derived as:
(A.2.2)=	 PLC'
multiplying both sides of equation (2.2) by 1 , we get
D1 =	 p . Q . pat-I . PD-
or D, =3,C .}.P,l.PDT,	 where 1=1.Q1
the composite or the unit price 1 is specified as;
= [i_ 8,)' .PM" +	 PD' ]iai
or ir' =(l_8)a1.PA1 '	 PLC'
substitution of equation (A.2.6) for ir'' in equation (A.2.4) yields
D1 =	 • 1• PE4' [(1— 61)a.PIt4l1 + 6II PD,']
The derivative of D, with respect to PD, is:
.i.[.y1.pD,-aI_1.jol_I+pD,_aI •(l—a.).6.0' .PD1']
division of domestic price PD, by domestic goods D1 gives
PD,	 PD,
-	 .	
.
PD.	 1.
or -=
D1	 10
(A.2.7)
(A.2.8)
(A.2.9)
(A.2.1O)
substitution of equation (A.2.8) and (A.2.lO) in equation (A.2.1) yields the market
demand elasticity for the domestic goods
} •[- . PD,' 'r' + PL 2 " . (1 - ) . 7'
IF;.
(A.2.l 1)
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or c. = 
P1_1.PD_(c71+I)[	
+(l,) .67' PD'' pl_ai]
pc 1 — 1 p_(OI+I)
PD1'
or c. = —0, +(1—o)ö1' p.'1
substitution of equation (A.2.6) for 'r'' in equation (A.2.13) yields
o___________________________E 1 =—a, +(1—c1).	 (1_,)a1.Pii4l_a' +5,' •PD,'"
(A.2.12)
(A.2.13)
(A.2. 14)
A.2.1 The responsiveness of the elasticit y of demand with respect to the change in the
relative price of imports
Further manipulation of equation (A.2.14) yields
1
	
- +(1 -
	 (1-
1
or =	 +(1	 (1— ,18,)[PM,1PD,]1' + 1
(A.2.15)
(A.2.16)
derivatives of , with respect to change in the relative price of imports yields
_______	
—(1 —,).(1 _6,/6,)a1.(P!,/PD,)1
<0=(1—c,).
a
PD,
(A.2.17)
A.3. Derivation of number of domestic firms
The number of domestic firms in each of the non-competitive sectors is derived from
the
'Lerner' symmetry condition.
PD .(1—td.)—MC. = —1
PD . (l—td.)	 N.•c,
(A.3.1)
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c. .[PD, .(1-td1)_MC1] 
-i
or
PR(l—td1)	 N1
manipulation of equation (A.3 .2) gives the number of domestic firms
N=	 PD,.(l-td1)
E,.[PD,.(1-td,)-MC1]
(A.3 .2)
(A.3.3)
A.4. Relationship between market demand elasticit y and firm's perceived demand
elasticity
The non-competitive finns are assumed to behave in Comout-Nash fashion. Under
this hypothesis, N 8 denotes the firm's perceived demand elasticity for domestic
sales. Richardson (1989) noted that the market demand elasticitys, would not in
general be equal to each firm's perceived demand elasticity, say e. He used an
'imperfection weight' 'P to depict the relationship market demand elasticity and firm's
perceived demand elasticity: ! 'P--. For perfectly competitive firms, 'P =0;
imperfect competition plays no role, and firms are independent. In the case of a
monopolist, 'P = ; and e=c. Analogously for a tight collusion of N firms, colluding
as if they were one to maximise profits, 'P and hence e=. For less intense
collusion of N firms, 'P lies between 0 and 1, and each firm's market power depends
moderately on that of its rivals. An important intermediate degree of imperfect
competition is Cournot competition, in which 'I' equals each firm's share of the
overall market ('P = X/N . X = 1/N, hence e N• ). Under Cournot competition
each firm optimally decides on its output, taking the output of its rival as given.
'Cournot pricing' involves marking up prices above marginal cost by the reciprocal of
N c, the product of a firm's market share and the overall market demand elasticity.
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Chapter Seven
Results of Tariff Liberalisation under Perfect and Imperfect Competition
7.1 Introduction
Bangladesh has been gradually liberalising her foreign trade regime since the early
eighties as an integral part of the structural adjustment programmes. The trade
liberalisation strategies have involved a gradual elimination or replacement of non-
tariff barriers during the first phase and reduction of tariff rates during the later phase.
The potential benefits of trade liberalisation are well recognised. Until recently, the
potential benefits of trade liberalisation have been justified within the paradigm of
traditional trade theory based on the "Hecksher-Oh1in-Samuelson framework.
Consequently, most empirical models have assumed that all markets are perfectly
competitive and have constant returns to scale in production. Simulations of trade
liberalisation with such models have tended to generate rather 'small' welfare gains,
often on the order of 1 percent of GNP or less (Cox and Harris, 1985).
The relevance of these results has been questioned on the grounds that the
assumptions of perfect competition and absence of scale economies are unrealistic,
leading to the omission of potentially important additional sources of welfare gains.
In many sectors (as evidence suggests for manufacturing sector), industrial structure is
better depicted by a small number of large firms rather than a large number of small
firms which individually have no control over market prices. Under such
circumstances, trade liberalisation can yield potential additional efficiency gains by
reducing the monopoly power of domestic firms (i.e. pro-competitive effects) and
rationalisation of domestic industry through exploitation of scale economies.
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Venables (1985) states that " the incorporation of industrial organisation
characteristics into trade theory has generated new insights into understanding
additional sources of potential gains from trade, such as economies of scale, and
observed trade flows, in particular the inter industry trade. Furthermore the
recognition of the importance of industrial organisation features in international trade
has provided a wider framework for the analysis of trade and industrial policies."
Empirical studies have lagged behind the growing theoretical literature. A notable
exception to this is the pioneering work by Harris (1984) in which the basic features
of 'industrial organisation' entailing imperfect competition, scale economies and
product differentiation have been incorporated into a CGE model for Canada. The
potential benefits of trade liberalisation were found to be much greater than that
yielded by model based on traditional trade theory.
Most case studies have been for developed countries yet, according to de Melo and
Hoist (1990), it is the developing countries that the influence of market structure
variables or industrial organisation features is likely to be greatest. Rodrik (1988)
used concentration ratios, among other measures, to compare the extent of monopoly
power in the manufacturing sector of the developing and developed countries. He
argued that imperfect competition is more pervasive in the manufacturing sector of the
developing countries than their counterpart in the developed countries. Some of the
studies with 'new' trade theory involving developing countries are Rodrik (1988),
Gunasekera and Tyres (1988), Devarajan and Rodrik (1989 and 1991), and de Melo
and Hoist (1990). The importance of inclusion of market structure variables in the
trade policy analysis in the context of a developing country has also been pointed out
by Krugman (1986) and Hamilton and Whalley (1987).
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On the other hand, Gunasekera and Tyres (1988), claimed that economies of scale,
product differentiation and imperfectly competitive market structure may be of limited
relevance to developing countries with their small manufacturing sectors. But as they
industrialise, these features assume greater significance. Increasingly, the growth in
manufacturing exports of developing countries is likely to be linked to markets
characterised by entry barriers that typify imperfect competition.
There is now evidence that the manufacturing sector in Bangladesh appears to have
imperfectly competitive features as measured by the popular four-firm concentration
ratios and Hirschman-Herfindahl index. In particular, it is observed that the average
four-firm concentration ratios in 1986 and 1987 are 68 and 69 percent respectively.
Even though the concentration ratios on their own cannot show how collusive the
behavioural outcomes in particular industries are, these numbers seem broadly
indicative of the extent of imperfect competition (Rodrik, 1988). Furthermore,
measures of concentration (i.e. concentration ratios and Hirschman-Herfmdahl index)
are found to be statistically significant determinants of 'profitability'-measured by
price-cost margins. Considering the evidence of imperfect competition in the
manufacturing sector, it seems reasonable to include features of 'industrial
organisation' within trade policy analysis in Bangladesh.
In this chapter a Devarajan-Rodrik type CGE model is applied to assess the resource
allocation, welfare and income distribution effects of trade liberalisation in
Bangladesh. The decision to use a CGE model is also vindicated by the fact that in
recent years these models have been employed to examine various aspects of trade
and tax policy alternatives and in particular to address the following questions: (i)
whether the incorporation of market structure variables significantly alters the results
yielded by the traditional trade models; (ii) whether there is any significant difference
in outcome between no entry (of domestic firms) and free entry
equilibrium;
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(iii) whether there is any additional gain for manufacturing sectors with increasing
returns to scale; and (iv) what are the implied income distribution effects of trade
liberalisation.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section 7.2 reviews the main features of general
equilibrium results of trade policy with imperfect competition. Simulation results of
tariff liberalisation under different model variants are discussed in section 7.3,
Section 7.4 discusses the income distribution effects. Concluding observations are
presented in section 7.5.
7.2	 Main features of computable general equilibrium research on trade policy
with imperfect competition
Almost all trade models with imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale
report larger welfare gains from trade liberalisation compared with traditional trade
models based on 'Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson' framework. The larger welfare gains
appear to have been generated from different sources, such as (i) industry
rationalisation effects (Cox-Ilarris, 1985, Gunasekera and Tyres, 1988); and (ii) pro-
competitive effects (Devarajan and Rodrik, 1989, 1991). At the sectoral level, the
manufacturing sector turns out to be the main beneficiary of trade liberalisation in
contrast to the perfect competition models where the manufacturing sector is the
major loser.
One common feature observed in most models is the treatment of the manufacturing.
sector as the non-competitive sector. Other sectors such as agriculture, services,
construction and transport are assumed to behave in a competitive manner. This
assumption is made perhaps because some evidence on extent of imperfect
competition is available for manufacturing sector while for other sectors such
evidence is virtually non-existent.
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Market structure variables common to most models are marginal (or unit variable)
cost, the number of firms, zero and excess profit conditions, and the market demand
elasticities. Except for the market demand elasticity, all other variables are usually
endogenous. In some models (e.g. Cox-Harris, 1985; Gunasekera and Tyres, 1988)
the market demand elasticities are constant in the short run while in Devarajan and
Rodrik (1989, 1991) and de Melo and Hoist (1990) they are endogenous. In most
models, increasing returns to scale are assumed to stem from the fixed cost part of
total cost. The fixed cost is composed of both labour and capital costs. The basic
assumption is that it takes a minimum amount of labour and capital to start
production. The firm's technology is then characterised by indivisibilities. The
presence of fixed cost is the result of existence of such indivisibilities.
Even though there is no general theory of price determination in non-competitive
industries, most models adhere to the monopolistic competitive pricing rule and the
focal pricing rule (e.g. Cox-Harris in the case of Canada). The monopolistic
competition pricing rule is based on Lemer mark-up formula which states that each
firm sets a mark-up over marginal (or unit variable) costs according to the perceived
price elasticity of demand for its products (Delorme and Mensbrugghe, 1989-91). The
focal pricing rule is a "tariff-limit" pricing rule where domestic prices are set at the
world price plus the tarifP°. Richardson (1989) states that focal pricing incorporates
two features that heighten the importance of imperfect competition for trade policy
and lead to an increase in welfare gains. Firstly, all domestic firms implicitly collude
among themselves without any competitive deviation to undercut the average price of•
their rivals. Secondly, all domestic firms also implicitly collude with their
foreign
30 The pricing rule is based on the empirical work of Eastman and Stykolt (1967) who showed that a
given industry protected by a tariff, in which domestic consumption is small relative to Industry's
minimum efficient scale of production, is likely to be characterised both by a high number of firms
with suboptimal capacity and excessive product differentialtion.
186
competitors by setting a price that is essentially equal to the world price plus the
import tariff on the foreign competing goods.
Most commentators (e.g. Deardorff, 1986) have argued that the use of focal pricing
may have produced large benefits from trade liberalisation, especially when Canadian
liberalisation is matched by its trading partners. In that case, trade liberalisation
directly reduces the collusive focal price charged by all Canadian firms, rationalising
all industries by compelling some firms to exit and incumbent firms to lower mark-up
and increase scale by travelling down their average cost curves. In this regard it is
relevant to note that Brown and Stern (1988), Wigle (1988) and Markusen and Wigle
(1987) all observed smaller welfare effects from very similar trade policy experiments
with less or no recourse to focal pricing.
In Delorme and Mensbrugghe (1989-9 1) monopolistic competition pricing and focal
pricing were both used to demonstrate the sensitivity of the simulation results to
different assumptions regarding oligopolistic behaviour. The simulation results show
significant differences between the results obtained under the two pricing hypotheses.
In particular, estimated welfare gains are larger under the monopolistic competition
pricing than the focal pricing. This is because the extent of scale economies realised
under the monopolistic competition pricing hypothesis (13%) was much higher than
the cost savings achieved (7%) under the focal pricing hypothesis. Therefore, this
result appears to refute the claim that focal pricing hypothesis tend to produce larger
effects through greater realisation economies of scale than monopolistic pricing•
hypothesis.
Like the traditional trade models, the results of trade liberalisation under 'new trade'
models are also sensitive to parameter values used such as scale elasticity, market
demand elasticity and profit rates. The sensitivity of welfare gains to parameter
values has been demonstrated in de Melo and Hoist (1990). They used two alternative
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scale elasticity rates of 10 and 20 percent and two profit rates of 0 and 10 percent. In
the zero profit case, the estimated welfare gains are 2.6 to 5.3 percent of GDP, with
cost disadvantage ratios of 10 and 20 percent respectively. On the other hand the
estimated welfare gains are much higher in the case of excess profit rate of 10 percent
compared with the zero profit case. For instance, in the case of excess profit rate the
estimated welfare gains are 4.9 and 10.2 percent of GDP with scale elasticity of 10
and 20 percent respectively. The sensitivity issue has also been discussed by Harrison
et al (1995). According to them "the larger the estimated unrealised economies of
scale in our model, the more potential gains there are from rationalisation and the
more an increasing returns to scale implementation would be expected to produce
larger estimated gains from trade liberalisation".
7.3 Simulation results of tariff liberalisation
In the present application to Bangladesh in all experiments the tariff rates on imported
products are reduced by 50 percent with an upward adjustment of existing domestic
production tax rates, so as to maintain the neutrality of government revenue. Given
the narrow direct tax base, and the problem and high administrative cost involved in
taxing agricultural surplus in Bangladesh, the economy has to rely on the domestic
indirect tax system to raise the additional revenue to maintain revenue neutrality
(Mansur and Khondker, 1994, provide some estimates of tax potential in Bangladesh).
The results of simulations using different variants of the model are presented in
Tables 7.1 to 7.6.'
7.3.1 Experiment one: tariff liberalisation under perfect competition
This section reports the results of tariff reduction under perfect competition and
constant returns to scale. In this case all sectors are assumed to behave in a
competitive manner and production takes place under constant returns to scale.
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Table 7.1 Results of Tariff Liberalisation under Perfect Competition
(percentage changes)
Sectors	 I	 Output	 Imports	 Exports
Subsistence Agricull	 0.98
	
3.51
	
1.33
Commercial
	
3.93
	
0.35
	
1.23
Agriculture
Forestry	 1.23
Food and Tobacco	 -1.58
	
19.87	 -1.54
Clothing	 -0.01
	
12.38
	
1.82
Garments	 2.41
	
68.05
	
2.92
Chemical	 -0.41
	
13.27
	
0.57
Cement	 -4.39
	
1.01	 -1.14
Machinery	 -7.46
	
1.43	 -3.40
Other Industries	 -3.72
	
22.67	 -0.81
Construction	 -2.33
Energy	 -4.63
	
7.48	 -4.15
Services	 -0.25
	
1.01	 -0.80
Trade and Transport 	 0.11
All Sectors	 -0.23
	
7.43	 1.07
Tariff
Rates
8.52
8.28
34.23
25.59
62.97
19.63
23.39
24.12
30.15
10.98
Factors are fully mobile between sectors and full employment of factors is
assured through the equality of factor demand and supply. Finally, the equality of
savings and investment closes the model. The results of tariff liberalisation under
perfect competition are shown in Table 7.1.
* Tariff rates refer to the effective tariff rate.
As expected, the reduction in tariff rates leads to a substantial increase in the volume
of imports for almost all sectors. The increase in the volume of imports is larger for
sectors with higher tariff rates such as garments, other industries, and food and
tobacco sector. Other sectors that show moderate growth in the volume of imports are
chemical, clothing and energy sectors. An examination of the price indices for
imported and domestic goods reveals that the imported to domestic good price ratio
has significantly declined to produce a substantial increase in the volume of imported
goods. In particular the decline in the price ratio is largest for the garments sector
with a corresponding increase in the volume of imported goods for that sector. This
pattern can be observed for all other import-augmenting sectors in the Appendix Table
A.7.l.
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In this same experiment, the overall volume of exports increased by 1.07 percent
which is mainly due to an increase in the volume of exports of garments, clothing,
chemical, subsistence and commercial agriculture sectors. Apart from garments,
clothing and chemical sectors, all other manufacturing sectors show a decline in the
volume of exports. The specification of the export demand function implies that,
given the elasticity of export demand and other parameters, a fall in the domestic price
of exports would lead to an increase in export demand. This relationship appears to
hold for the eleven trading sectors (see Appendix Table A.7.2). In particular the
domestic price of exports has risen for the six export-contracting sectors while the
price fell in other five sectors to produce small increase in exports.
As a result of tariff liberalisation, resources move from heavily protected sectors such
as manufacturing sectors to less protected sectors such as subsistence and commercial
agriculture, forestry and trade and transport sectors. This movement of resources is
expected given the initial levels of protection provided to domestic industries.
Protection (such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers) permits domestic industries to
operate with value added higher than prevails under the free trade, thereby providing
incentives for the movement of resources into protected industries. Thus, when such
protection is removed, resources tend to move from protected to less protected sectors.
Accordingly, almost all the manufacturing sectors show small to moderate declines in
output as protection is reduced. The largest percentage decline in output occurs in the
machinery sector; closely followed by the energy sector. The other sectors where
output declined are; cement, other industry, food and tobacco, chemical and clothing
sector. As a result of such decline, total manufacturing output declines by 1.3 percent
in this experiment. Among the less protected sectors, the commercial agriculture
sector shows the largest percent increase in output, followed by the forestry and
subsistence agriculture sectors.
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7.3.2 Experiment two: tariff liberalisation under imperfect competition
In this section the outcomes of tariff liberalisation under imperfect competition and
constant returns to scale are presented. Seven manufacturing sectors are characterised
as non-competitive while the other seven production sectors are assumed to behave in
competitive manner in this scenario. The results of tariff liberalisation for this are
presented in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2 Results of Tariff Liberalisation under Imperfect Competition and Constant Returns to Scale
(Percentage changes)
Sectors
Subsistence Agriculture
Commercial Agriculture
Forestry
Food and Tobacco
Clothing
Garments
Chemical
Cement
Machinery
Other Industries
Construction
Energy
Services
Trade and Transport
All Sector
Output	 Imports	 Exports	 Margi-	 Profit
nal cost
	
2.43	 -0.02
	
2.03
	
0.36
	
18.39
	
6.11	 -3.51	 -9.40
	
12.21
	
4.31	 -1.62	 -0.15
	
69.71
	
1.67
	
14.21
	
3.99	 -2.66	 -3.62
	
17.53
	
4.69	 -1.87	 -6.45
	
26.75
	
5.37	 -3.31	 -5.11
	
28.53
	
5.29	 -3.00	 -2.29
	
3.32	 19.63	 -4.88	 -12.81
	
1.41	 -1.53
	
15.46	 1.33
-0.20
0.93
5.46
2.62
-1.80
1.47
1.02
10.18
16.47
1.73
14.29
9.65
-0.73
5.35
3.06
Note: In this experiment the excess profits are allowed to adjust, holding number of domestic firms
fixed.
As in the previous experiment, a consequence of a reduction in tariff rates is that the
volume of imports increases substantially for all the sectors. The largest growth in the
volume of imports is observed for the garments sector, followed by other industries,
machinery, food and tobacco and the cement sectors. Other sectors that show
moderate growth in the volume of imports are the chemical and clothing sectors.
Again an examination of the price indices for imported and domestic goods reveals
that (Appendix Table A.7.l), the imported to domestic goods price ratios
have substantially declined to produce a noticeable increase in the volume of imported
goods.
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The overall volume of exports increased by 1.33 percent in this experiment. It is
noticed that the volume of exports increased in nine out of eleven trading sectors. The
other two remaining sectors show small declines in export. Again an examination of
the domestic price of exports indicates that the domestic prices of exports have
declined in these nine sectors to produce an increase in exports. It is also observed
that growth of manufacturing exports is larger compared to the previous case. This is
because of moderate output growth of manufacturing sectors in this case.
Striking differences between the two experiments (i.e. one and two) are observed
when resource allocation effects are examined. In the competitive case, due to tariff
liberalisation resources move from heavily protected sectors to less protected or non
protected sectors. In this case tariff liberalisation therefore mainly favours the less
protected sectors such as subsistence and commercial agriculture, forestry and trade
and transport sectors. On the other hand, the heavily protected manufacturing sector
is the major loser. Except for the garments sector, output declined in all other
manufacturing sectors. In the non-competitive case, the pattern of resource re-
allocation is reversed with the manufacturing sectors turning out to be the main
beneficiaries of liberalisation. Almost all the manufacturing sectors show moderate
output growth with largest output growth noted for the machinery sector. This sector
is closely followed by cement and energy. The expansion of the construction sector is
perhaps due to strong inter-industry linkages with the machinery and cement sectors.
In particular, total manufacturing output increased by 4.3 percent in this case
compared to the previous case where manufacturing output as whole declined by 1.3
percent.
It is interesting to note the simultaneous expansion of output and contraction of excess
profits of the manufacturing sectors. It is observed that the excess profits decline in
all non-competitive sectors. The reduction of excess profits in these sectors is an
expected outcome of intensified import competition. But what explains the growth of
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the manufacturing sector? It depends to what extent import competition alters the
slope of the domestic firm's demand curve (and hence marginal revenue curve).
Outputs of domestic firms increase when import competition sufficiently flattens the
demand and marginal revenue curves faced by domestic firms 31 . That is, by allowing
flow of imports in the domestic markets tariff liberalisation reduces the market power
of domestic firms and compels them to behave competitively-that is, it reduces the
gap between prices and marginal cost and expands output. Changes in producer
prices are shown in Appendix Table A.7.3.
To understand the mechanism at work it is useful to consider an economy where a
domestic monopolist competes with a single foreign firm. The domestic monopolist
has a downward sloping demand curve d0 and a marginal revenue curve mr0 . For
simplicity, it is assumed that the marginal cost (c) is constant and is equal to the
average cost. The domestic monopolist is in equilibrium when the marginal cost
curve (c) intersects the marginal revenue curve mr,. The equilibrium price and
quantity demanded are p0 and x0 respectively. The domestic monopolist realises
excess profits equal to the area cp0ta. The initial equilibrium is denoted by point a in
figures 1 and 2.
3! Almost all trade policy changes market demand curves. But such changes are much more significant
for non-competitive behaviour than for perfect cometition, where the demand curves of firm remain
invariantly flat (Richardson, 1989). Mere pivoting of the market demand curves around an equilibrium
point will alter the perceived elasticities and equlibrium even if no coventional "shift occurs
(Bresnahan, 1987). Changes in tariff rates generally cause the elasticity of market demand to alter and
hence change the size of marks-up and price distortions (which are invariant at zero under perfect
competition).
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Consider the consequences of import tariff liberalisation on the domestic monopolist's
price, quantity produced and excess profits. Because of tariff liberalisation the
domestic monopolist's demand curve shifts inward. In this regard two cases may be
considered32:
(i) In the first case, consider a parallel inward shift of the domestic monopolist's
demand curve to d1 from d0 . The corresponding new marginal revenue curve is mr1
which is also parallel to original marginal revenue curve mr0 . The new equilibrium of
the domestic monopolist is defined by point b, at which the new marginal revenue
curve mr1 intersects the marginal cost curve (c). The price is p1 which is less than the
initial price p0 . Analogously, quantity demanded x 1 , is less than the initial quantity
demanded x0 . The excess profit of the domestic monopolist is also reduced (since
cp1sb <cp0ta). Therefore, the domestic monopolist responds to intensified import
competition by shifting its demand curve inward and thereby reducing output, price
and profits when such shift does not affect the slope of the demand curve. This
situation is illustrated in figure 1.
32 It is impossible to provide definite answers to the question of what are the resource re-aliocation
effects of tariff reforms under conditions of imperfect competition at any acceptable level of theoretical
generality (Rodrik, 1988 p-I23). The resource allocation effects of trade liberalisation will depend on
(1) the type of trade restriction; (ii) the nature of oligopolistic interactions; and (iii) the ease of entry
and exit. While analysing this issue in a partial equilibrium framework Buffie and Spiller (1986)
shows that the range of theoretical possibilities are unbounded. Domestic output can increase or
decrease, as can the domestic price. Given that the search for theoretical generality is a dead end, an
alternative is to carry out numerical simulations under assumptions that seem realistic and reliable
(Rodrik, 1988 p124). This is essentially the approach that has been adopted in this study.
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Figure 1: Inward Shift in Monopolist's Demand Curve
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(ii) On the other hand, intensified import competition can have a second effect on the
demand curve of the domestic monopolist. Beyond shifting the demand curve inward,
tariff liberalisation can change its slope and make it flatter. This case is illustrated in
figure 2. The new demand curve is d1 which is more elastic than the demand curve
d0 . The corresponding new marginal revenue curve is mr1 . Given the marginal cost
(c) of the monopolist, the new equilibrium position is b where the new price p 1 is
smaller than the initial price p0 . Contrary to the first case, the quantity produced is
larger in this case (ox1 > ox0 ). The effect on monopolist's profits is ambiguous.
Monopolist's profits may increase or decline in the new equilibrium. It depends on
bow the tariff liberalisation shifts the demand curve. In figure 2, the shift in the
demand curve is drawn so that the profit levels are lower in the new equilibrium. In
the initial equilibrium (i.e. at point a) the excess profit of the domestic monopolist is
= cp0ta = cp1va + p1p0tv	 (7.1)
In the new equilibrium (i.e. at point b) the domestic monopolist's excess profit is
= cpsb cp1va+vasb
	 (7.2)
Subtracting (7.1) from (7.2), we find
- 
= [cpva + vasb]—{cp1va ^ p1p0tv]	 (7.3)
it 1	 =vasb—pp0tv	 (7.4)
From figure 2 it is observed that area p1p0tv is larger than area vasb. Hence it appears
that it 1 <it 0 . Thus, the domestic monopolist realises less profits in the new
equilibrium compared to the initial equilibrium. A similar approach is used by
Koutsoyiannis (1979) to show that the level of profits is higher for a discriminating
monopolist compared to a simple monopolist.
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Figure 2: Changes in the Slope of Monopist's Demand Curve
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This is what happens in this case as tariff liberalisation renders the demand faced by
domestic firms more elastic. Although the demand curve shifts inward due to tariff
liberalisation, the change in the slope of the demand curve in the new equilibrium is
large enough to offset the deleterious effect on firm's output. Domestic firms now
perceive themselves as having less control over their prices, and hence increase
output. This is known as the pro-competitive effects of trade liberalisation.
Devarajan and Rodrik (1989, 1991) also reported an expansion of manufacturing
output due to the pro-competitive effects of tariff liberalisation. They reported a
larger expansion of manufacturing output compared with the present experiment.
This may be because: (i) they considered a complete elimination of tariffs, while in
our experiments tariff rates are halved, leading to much smaller degree of import
competition in our case; (ii) to keep government revenue at the pre-reform level a
lump-sum tax was levied on household's income in their experiment, whereas in our
case production tax rates are raised. Consequences of higher production taxes on non-
competitive firm behaviour are well established in micro-theory (Koutsoyiannis,
1979). Higher production taxes affect the price of composite goods. As a result, the
marginal cost curve shifts upward (c2 ) to establish a new equilibrium (1) where output
is lower (x2 <x 1 ) and price is higher (p2 > p1 ) compared with the equilibrium (i.e. b)
in which production taxes are not raised but tariff rates are reduced.
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7.3.3 Experiment three: tariff liberalisation under imperfect competition
and entry and exits of domestic firms
In this section the consequences of tariff liberalisation are examined when the number
of domestic firms in each non-competitive sector is allowed to adjust freely in
response to policy changes. The present scenario does not necessarily denote a long-
run scenario or outcome because full mobility of labour and capital factors are already
allowed in the previous experiments. Instead this scenario depicts a situation where
there are no barriers in the industrial structure to prevent entry and exits of firms.
However, the accepted terminology in empirical research is to refer this scenario as a
long run scenario where all primary factors of production are mobile and domestic
firms can enter and exit without impediments. The usual (e.g. Cox and Harris, 1985
and Gunasekera and Tyres, 1988) way to proceed is to set the level of excess profits to
zero and then allow the number of domestic firms to adjust endogenously in response
to policy reforms. In our case, since the base scenario allows for excess profits, the
zero profit condition is not directly comparable to the base scenario. In that case, one
would be comparing a long-run equilibrium under free trade with a short-run
equilibrium under trade protection.
To overcome this problem, de Melo and Hoist (1990) and Devarajan and Rodrik's
(1991) approach assumed that the 'observed' level of excess profits describes a long-
run solution to start with. Therefore, the level of firm's profits is fixed to the
benchmark level of excess profits and then the number of domestic firms are allowed
to adjust endogenously in response to policy changes.
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Table 7.3 Results of Tariff Liberalisation with Entry and Exit of Domestic firms
(Percentage changes)
Sectors
Subsistence Agriculture
Commercial Agriculture
Forestry
Food and Tobacco
Clothing
Garments
Chemical
Cement
Machinery
Other Industries
Construction
Energy
Services
Trade and Transport
All Sectors
Output	 Imports	 Exports	 Margi-	 Number
nal cost	 of firms
	
2.43
	
0.02
	
2.64
	
0.23
	
18.22
	
7.61	 -4.35	 -1.60
	
11.99
	 5.44	 -1.97	 2.50
	
69.73
	
1.81
	
13.59
	
9.68	 -6.02	 -1.52
	
17.54
	
4.70	 -1.72	 -1.20
	
26.45
	
7.44	 -4.60	 -3.45
	
27.24
	
10.05	 -5.68	 -1.53
	
3.68	 19.89	 -4.98	 -3.21
	
1.65	 -1.77
	
15.29	 1.44
-0.30
1.08
4.82
3.56
-1.44
1.61
4.51
9.99
17.91
4.35
14.36
10.19
-0.84
6.13
3.23
Note: In this experiment the number of domestic firm is allowed to adjust, keeping the excess profits
fixed.
The results of the tariff liberalisation experiment with entry and exit of domestic firms
are presented in Table 7.3. It is observed that these results are not significantly
different from the results observed in the second experiment. The changes in the total
and sectoral level of imports and exports are also quite similar to the results observed
in the previous experiment.. In particular, the increase in total imports (15.29%) is
slightly lower in this case in comparison to the increase of 15.45 percent observed in
the pervious case. In the case of exports, the total volume of exports increased by
1.44 percent in this case compared with the 1.33 percent increase observed in the
previous case.
The pattern of sectoral output change is also similar in the two experiments. As in the
previous experiment, except for clothing all manufacturing sectors show moderate
growth in output when firms are allowed to exit and enter domestic industries.
Moreover, total manufacturing output growth observed in the two experiments is also
very close. Total manufacturing output growth is 5.2 percent in this case compared
with output growth of 4.3 percent in the previous case.
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The apparently similar resource-allocation effects of tariff liberalisation between these
two experiments may be due to small entry and exit of domestic firms and observed
high sensitivity between firm-level profits and entry and exit of domestic firms. It is
noticed that the number of firms declines in all six sectors that experienced a
reduction in profits in the previous experiment. It appears that firm-level profits are
sensitive to changes in competitive environment generated by exit and entry of
domestic firms.
7.3.4 Experiment four: tariff liberalisation with increasing returns to scale
Some results of the tariff liberalisation experiment under increasing returns to scale
are reported in Table 7.4. To perform this experiment a uniform scale elasticity of 10
percent is assumed for all non-competitive sectors. However, the scale elasticity
changes as relative price, input price and firm output all change with tariff
liberalisation. It is expected that the overall welfare gains are enhanced to the extent
that scale elasticity is reduced: that is to the extent that firms move down their average
cost curves.
Table 7.4 Results of Tariff Liberalisation with Increasing Returns to Scale
(Percentage changes)
Sectors
Subsistence Ag.
Commercial Ag.
Forestry
Food-Tobacco
Clothing
Gannents
Chemical
Cement
Machinery
Other Industries
Construction
Energy
Services
Trade-Transport
All Sectors
Output	 Imports	 Exports	 Margi-	 No of	 Scale
nal cost	 Firms	 Elasticity
	
2.92	 -2.52
	
4.35	 -0.52
	
18.60	 5.80	 -2.33	 -3.25	 -1.00
	
13.96
	
0.25	 0.96	 3.45	 -1.10
	
69.68
	
3.46
	
15.45
	
3.53	 -1.21	 -2.23	 -1.00
	
22.94	 15.26	 -6.92	 -3.75	 -1.80
	
40.48
	
9.45	 -4.51	 -5.96	 -1.70
	
32.03
	
7.52	 -3.22	 -2.25	 -1.10
	
4.22	 24.55	 -6.99	 -4.26	 -1.30
	
0.22	 0.58
	
20.43	 2.98
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-1.56
-1.19
6.53
3.51
-1.58
3.17
2.67
26.51
34.47
7.44
24.62
14.74
0.63
7.44
5.19
Changes in the total and sectoral level of imports and exports are higher in this
scenario compared with the previous experiment. In particular, growth of total
imports (20.43 %) is much higher in this experiment in comparison to total import
increase of 15.29 percent observed in the pervious experiment. In the case of exports,
total volume of exports increased by 2.98 percent compared with 1.44 percent
increase previously.
The most significant difference is the much larger expansion of output of the
manufacturing sectors. Almost all the manufacturing sectors show a much larger
output growth. The largest output growth is observed for the machinery sector which
expands by 34 percent (previously 18 %). The cement sector expands by 27 percent
(J)reviously 10 %). The increases in output of the construction and energy sectors are
25 and 15 percent respectively in this experiment, whereas previously the
corresponding output increases for construction and energy sectors are 14 and 10
percent. On the other hand, the other industry sector expands by 7 percent compared
to an output expansion of 4 percent previously. The output expansions of food and
tobacco and chemical sectors are not significantly different from the previous
experiment. Total manufacturing output as whole expands by 9.1 percent (previously
5.2 percent). Clearly the larger expansion of the machinery, cement, energy and
other industry sectors is due to moderate reduction in unrealised scale economies in
these sectors. This is reflected by the decline of the scale elasticity () in these
sectors. The fall in scale elasticity implies a reduction in unit cost as the scale of
production increased.
Devarajan and Rodrik (1991) reported a doubling of manufacturing output for
intermediate goods and the food processing sector with 3 to 4 percent reduction in
unrealised scale economies respectively. The output expansion of cement and basic
metal sector was very large (109%) due to large (12%) reduction in unrealised
economies of scale.
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The exit rates of domestic firms are larger in this experiment compared to the previous
experiments; perhaps the moderate benefits from scale economies now compel more
inefficient firms to leave the industry. The exit rates of domestic firms are, however,
moderate at around 2-6 percent. On the other hand, the entry rate in the other
remaining sector is also moderate (3.5%). These rates are similar to the exit rates
reported by Devarajan and Rodrik (1991) in the case of Cameroon. Our estimates of
exit of domestic finns are significantly smaller than the exit of domestic firms
reported by Gunasekera and Tyres (1988). They reported high exit rates of 25-47
percent for domestic firms in the case of Korea in response to trade liberalisation33.
7.4 Welfare and income distribution effects of tariff liberalisation
The concept of efficiency or welfare is the starting point for any policy analysis.
Unlike a pure theoretical approach where only an ordinal measure of alternative states
are examined, in applied policy analysis some measures of welfare are employed to
compare movement from one state to another.
Therefore, in applied policy analysis, generally some monetary representations of
individual utility functions are used. This is defined as the amount of money required
to attain a level of utility at a reference price vector. This is termed as money metric,
and its value is derived from the expenditure function. The expenditure function
which is the inverse of the indirect utility function is a vital tool for welfare analysis
and allows 'measurement of utility'. Since the value of expenditure function depends
on the set of prices used, there are different money metrics one can use. The most
No estimates are available for entry and exit of domestic firms in the manufacturing sectors of
Bangladesh. Tybout (1989) and Roberts (1988) reported some estimates of net exit rates for Chile and
Columbia, albeit in the absence of policy shocks. On average the net exit rates were around -3 and 6
percent per year in three- digit industries in Chile and Columbia respectively.
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widely used ones are compensating variation (CV) and equivalent variation (EV).
These are generally used because they have easy interpretation in terms of the
compensated demand curves. In the EV approach, the idea is to measure in money
terms, how much income needs to be given up to the consumer at the 'pre-policy
change' level of prices (Is) in order to enable him to enjoy the utility level which
arises after the policy change is effected ('post-policy change level of utility'). The
CV comes from the opposite direction. It measures the change in 'post-policy change'
level of prices (1) that brings the consumer to the 'pre-policy change' level of utility.
In a many consumer economy, the use of aggregate EV or CV as a measure of welfare
changes, although avoiding any explicit Social Welfare Function (SWF), has an
implicit SWF because of the adding up approach. Boadway and Bruce (1984) showed
that there are some well-known problems in interpreting the aggregate EVs or CVs
and one needs to be careful in interpreting the result of such measures. Social
ordering requires more data and judgement than does household ordering and it may
not be possible to measure changes in welfare simply on the basis of household
orderings of social status drawn from their market behaviour 34 . When EV is used as a
measure of welfare, it is implicitly assumed that aggregate market behaviour is
generated by a single household whose preferences coincide with the social
ordering35.
34 Social ordering requires more information than household preference orderings as its information
base. It also requires some degree of household welfare comparability and measurability. It will also
require a method for aggregating individual welfare. Thus the social ordering requires information on
comparability, measurability of household welfare as well as a method for aggregating household
welfare. On the other hand, household orderings are based on their market behaviour i.e household's
income and market prices.
The aggregate EV 'measures' utilities by the money matric and simply adds the utilities together,
assuming the constancy of the marginal utility of income. The aggregate EV is like a classical
utilitarian social welfare function applied to individuals with constant marginal utility of income. Thus
pure redistributive changes do not affect it ( Boadway and Bruce, 1984).
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1.49
1.41
1.37
One
-0.05
-0.69
-1.17
-0.03
-0.70
-1.14
-0.72 1.62
Household
Groups
Self-employed
Low Income
Middle Income
High Income
Employee
Low Income
Middle Income
High Income
GDP
Two	 Three	 Four
1.48	 1.49	 2.76
1.41	 1.42	 2.70
1.43	 1.46	 2.84
	
1.51	 2.78
	
1.42	 2.70
	
1.41	 2.73
	
1.65	 3.10
7.4.1 Income distribution effects and changes in gross domestic product
Since there are some problems in interpreting aggregate EV or CV as a satisfactory
measure of welfare, changes in gross domestic product are used as an index to
compare outcomes between different equilibria. Distributional consequences are
captured through the changes in income levels of the household groups, changes in
factor income and factor returns. Although each household group generates income
from different sources, only factor incomes are allowed to change and all other
sources of household incomes are held constant in different experiments. Since all
factors are perfectly mobile between sectors, changes in welfare between equilibria
can be traced through relative factor returns. Therefore, to evaluate the effect of tariff
liberalisation on the functional distribution of income (i.e. returns to factors), it should
be noted that in the supply side, the changes in the factor returns affect the distribution
of factor income between sectors. Given the households' endowment of labour and
capital, these shifts in factor income then determine the distribution of income among
households. Table 7.5 reports the changes in income of household groups and the
gross domestic product in each of the four experiments.
Table 7.5 Percentage Change in Households Income and Gross Domestic Product
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It is observed from the Table 7.5 that in the first experiment, changes in income are
negative for all household groups and GDP growth is negative in this
case.
The decline in income is, however, larger for the high income household groups
compared with low income household groups. It is noted in the SAM data base that
high income household groups generate relatively more income from capital, while
labour income accrues relatively more to the low income household groups.
Therefore, when capital income changes are larger than the labour income changes,
the income of high income household groups changes more than the income of low
income household groups. It is observed from Table 7.6 that fall in capital income is
taka 3.94 billion which is larger than the labour income decline of taka 0.70 billion.
This explains why the fall in income is larger for the high income household groups
compared with the low income household groups.
Contrary to the first experiment, income increased for all household groups in the
second experiment because of positive GDP growth observed in this case. Again the
distribution of income appears to favour the low income households under both the
self-employed and employee household groups. For example, in the self-employed
household group the income increase of low income household is 1.03 times higher
than the income increase of high income household. For the employee household
group, the income increase of low income household is 1.09 times higher compared
with the income rise of the high income household. This degree of progressivity in.
household's income is a direct consequence of the large increase in labour income (i.e.
taka 5.80 billion) in comparison to a moderate increase in capital income (i.e. taka
4.60 billion).
The distribution of income also appears to favour the low income households in the
third experiment. There is, however, no significant difference in the degree of
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progressitivity observed between this and the second experiment. This is because
the increases in labour and capital income are not significantly different in this
case compared with the previous case and hence the degree of progressivity in
income distribution is also similar in this case compared with the previous case.
The income increase of all household groups is much more pronounced in the fourth
experiment. Income increases of all household groups are almost doubled because of
relatively large GDP growth in this case compared with the previous two experiments.
The income distribution effects are, however, mixed. The distribution of income
appears to favour the high income household group in the self-employed household
category but in the employee household group the distribution of income favours the
low income household group. In contrast to the previous two experiments, the capital
income increase is higher in the case. Increase in capital income is taka 10.66 billion
and the labour income increase is taka 9.32 billion. Relatively higher capital income
increase may explain why the distribution of income favours the self-employed
household group.
It is observed that gross domestic product increased when imperfect competition is
introduced. This is because resources are pulled away from low factor return (i.e.
wages and rental rates) sectors to relatively high factor return sectors. The GDP
growth is similar between second and third experiments because the resource
allocation patterns are the same. The increase in gross domestic product is much
higher with the incorporation of increasing returns to scale. The additional gain
emanated from a reduction in unrealised economies of scale. At this point it is
relevant to note that almost all trade models reported magnified welfare gains from
trade liberalisation when imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale are
introduced.
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Three	 Four
	
0.88
	
0.64
	
-0.93	 -0.62
	
1.67
	
2.42
	
1.48
	
2.15
	
1.58
	
2.34
	
3.38
	
7.68
	
3.80
	
7.99
	
3.55
	
8.09
	
1.65
	
3.68
Table 7.6 Changes in Factor Income and Factor Returns
Factor
Classification
Administrative
Service
Ag-HL
Ag-FLSF
Ag-FLLF
WSK
wSS
WUSK
Capital
Labour
One
Changes ir
-2.88
-2.55
1.67
1.78
1.74
-3.32
-3.24
-3.12
-1.36
Experiments
Two
Factor Returns (in %)
0.99
-0.89
1.46
1.31
1.40
3.99
4.69
4.51
1.56
Changes in Factor Income (in billion taka)
	
-0.70	 5.80	 5.82	 9.32
	
-3.94	 4.60	 4.72	 10.66
Note: Ag-HL, Ag-FLSF and Ag-FLLF means agricultural hired labour, family labour in small
firms and family labour in large firms respectively. Similarly WSK, WSS and WUSK stand
for skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers respectively.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, alternative computable general equilibrium models have been used to
assess the resource allocation, welfare and income distribution effects of tariff
liberalisation in Bangladesh. It has been observed that the results of tariff
liberalisation are sensitive to the way the model is specified. The main conclusions
are:
(i) In the competitive and constant returns to scale model variant, resources moved
from heavily protected sector (e.g. manufacturing sector) to less protected sectors as a
result of tariff liberalisation. This movement in resources is expected given the initial
levels of protection provided to the domestic industries. Protection permits domestic
industries to operate with value added higher than that prevails under the free trade
thereby providing incentives for the movement of resources into protected industries.
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Thus, when such protection is removed, resources tend to move from protected to less
protected sectors.
(ii) When imperfect competition is introduced, the pattern of the resource allocation
is reversed with heavily protected manufacturing sectors turning out to be the main
beneficiary of liberalisation. Almost all the manufacturing sectors show moderate
output growth compared with competitive case. The expansion of manufacturing
output is due the pro-competitive effects of tariff liberalisation.
(iii) The pattern of sectoral output change is similar between the no-entry experiment
(i.e. experiment two) and the free entry experiment (i.e. experiment three). As in the
experiment with no entry and exit of domestic firms, all manufacturing sectors show
moderate growth in output when firms are allowed to exit and enter domestic
industries. The apparently similar resource-allocations effects of tariff liberalisation
between these two experiments may be due to small entry and exit of domestic firms
and observed high sensitivity between firm-level profits and entry and exit of
domestic firms.
(iv) Almost all the manufacturing sectors show much larger output growth with the
incorporation of increasing returns to scale. In particular, the increase in output is
almost doubled for the machinery, cement and energy sectors. This magnification
comes from a reduction in unrealised scale economies in these sectors.
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(v) The distribution of income appears to favour the low income households in the
first three experiments. The income distribution effects are mixed in the fourth
experiment. In this case, the distribution of income appears to favour the high income
household group in the self-employed household category but in the employee
household category the distribution of income favours the low income household
group. It appears that the progressivity and regressivity in income distribution of
household groups depend on the relative change of the capital and labour income.
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Appendix to chapter seven
Table A7. 1 Base and New Level of Relative Price of Imported and Domestic Goods
One
0.983
0.998
1.000
0.845
0.910
0.676
0.894
0.948
0.919
0.825
1.000
0.901
0.985
1.000
Sectors
Subsistence Agriculture
Commercial Agriculture
Forestry
Food and Tobacco
Clothing
Garments
Chemical
Cement
Machinery
Other Industries
Construction
Energy
Services
Trade and Transport
Base Case
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
Experiments
Two	 Three
0.980	 0.980
0.992	 0.989
1.000	 1.000
0.888	 0.896
0.905	 0.912
0.671	 0.672
0.903	 0.934
0.945	 0.946
0.932	 0.944
0.834	 0.859
1.000	 1.000
0.925	 0.93 5
0.984	 0.981
1.000	 1.000
Four
0.964
0.978
1.000
0.884
0.877
0.680
0.899
0.978
0.954
0.844
1.000
0.9 12
0.978
1.000
Table A.7.2 Base and New Level of Domestic Price of Exports
One
0.997
0.998
1.000
1.011
0.992
0.985
0.999
1.0 10
1.025
1.007
1.000
1.030
1.007
1.000
Sectors
Subsistence Agriculture
Commercial Agriculture
Forestry
Food and Tobacco
Clothing
Garments
Chemical
Cement
Machinery
Other Industries
Construction
Energy
Services
Trade and Transnort
Base Case
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
Experiments
Two	 Three
1.000	 1.000
0.999	 0.999
1.000	 1.000
0.961	 0.953
0.956	 0.950
0.990	 0.989
0.969	 0.938
0.952	 0.952
0.961	 0.950
0.960	 0.934
1.000	 1.000
0.874	 0.873
1.010	 1.011
1.000	 1.000
Four
1.004
1.002
1.000
0.955
0.973
0.979
0.964
0.889
0.932
0.940
1.000
0.848
0.996
1.000
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Table A.7.3 Percentage Changes in Producer Price
Four
1.68
1.60
11.47
-4.24
-0.77
-2.31
-2.27
-10.04
-7.05
-4.86
1.70
-14.56
-0.32
-6.73
-0.01
0.63
4.07
-2.34
-1.48
-1.26
-4.82
-2.03
-4.23
-5.01
1.35
-5.85
-1.86
-8.50
One
-0.63
-0.59
-1.34
0.95
-2.49
-2.16
-1.17
-2.05
-1.41
-1.77
-3.27
2.25
0.97
-2.11
Experiments
Two	 Three
0.01
0.36
2.45
-1.60
-1.16
-1.17
-1.66
-2.72
-3.10
-2.44
1.17
-3.27
-1.60
-7.62
Sectors
Subsistence Agriculture
Commercial Agriculture
Forestry
Food and Tobacco
Clothing
Garments
Chemical
Cement
Machinery
Other Industries
Construction
Energy
Services
Trade and Transport
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Chapter Eight
Summary and Conclusion
8.1 Areas for improvements and extensions
Different variants of the computable general equilibrium models developed in this
study are calibrated to Bangladesh economic data for 1988/89. The economy of
Bangladesh is numerically specified within the framework of a social accounting
matrix. It shows the major macroeconomic relations in a detailed framework and
provides a consistent macroeconomic data set for policy modelling. Every effort has
been made to use best available information to compile the social accounting matrix.
However, it appears that the procedures used to distribute labour income and
unincorporated capital income among the six household groups may not be the most
appropriate methods.
The available information on percentage of earners by four major factors and the 16
HES income groups and the derived estimates of number of earners by factors are
used to distribute labour income by the six household groups. A more desirable
approach would be to use the direct estimates of labour income by the HES income
groups or the household groups. However this information is not available for all the
eight labour factors. Therefore, the above procedure is adopted to derive labour by
the six household groups. Similarly, the procedure used to distribute unincorporated
capital income among the six household groups may not be the most appropriate one.
Again a more desirable method would be to use the direct estimates of capital income
by the HES income groups or the household groups. However this information is not
available in Bangladesh. Due to lack of such data, average monthly incomes of each
household by the HES income groups are used to perform this distribution.
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More research needs to be undertaken to improve this aspect of the SAM by
generating direct estimates of labour and capital income by the HES income groups.
One potential area for extension of the present SAM is the disaggregation of the
consolidated capital account. In the present SAM one consolidated capital account is
specified to capture the flow of savings and investment by institutions and sectors. To
show the flow-of-funds between different financial institutions the consolidated
capital account needs to be presented in more detail. Specifically the consolidated
capital account transactions may be disaggregated between the major capital account
institutions. These are non-fmancial enterprises, central bank, other monetary
institutions, other credit institutions, insurance companies, government, local
authorities, households, and rest of the world. The disaggregated capital account will
show the consolidated balance between total savings and total investment, with
sectoral exposition of the flow-of-funds. The accounts will depict how savings are
allocated to investment within the sector and how the difference will be transferred to
other sector directly or through the intermediation of financial institutions. The
disaggregated capital account will show the financial transactions between
institutions, accumulation and formation of capital and their linkages with rest of the
economy. This information will be particularly useful to analyse the economy wide
effects of financial sector reforms.
The parameter estimates used to specify the computable general equilibrium models
such as the substitution elasticities between factors, elasticities of substitution between
imported and domestic goods are not the actual estimates for Bangladesh. Ideally,
these parameters should be estimated econometrically. However, such estimates are
not available for Bangladesh nor it was possible to estimates these key parameters
econometrically within the purview of the present study. Thus these parameters are
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obtained from available literature to calibrate the models. This is one area where
more research may be conducted to estimate them econometrically.
The specification of market structure variables and increasing returns to scale involves
estimation of marginal costs, the number of domestic firms in each industry, the
market demand elasticity for the domestic goods and scale elasticity for the non-
competitive sectors. It is desirable to use econometrically estimated values of these
variables and parameters. Again no such estimates are available in Bangladesh nor it
was possible to estimates these variables and parameters econometrically due to
paucity of relevant data. Therefore, a calibration procedure is used to estimate them.
This is another area where research may be undertaken to estimate some of the above
market structure variables such as marginal cost, the market demand elasticities and
the scale elasticities.
The core CGE model is static, with economywide capital stock fixed exogenously.
Within the single period, the model does generate savings, investment, and the
demand for capital goods. The capital goods are installed during the period, so the
investment simply denotes a demand category with no effects on supply in the model.
Hence, heterogeneity of capital is of limited importance in the static model, since its
only effect will emerge through its impact on the sectoral structure on investment final
demand. In a longer term and in dynamic models, the heterogeneity and endogeneity
of investment and capital can be very important and may have different affects
compared with models where they are treated to be fixed and exogenous. Thus this is
another area where research may undertaken to make investment and capital
endogenous and to quantify their impact compared to a static specification.
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8.2 Achievements and summary of major findings
An important achievement of this study is the compilation of a social accounting
matrix for Bangladesh for 1988/89. Such a framework is particularly useful for a
country like Bangladesh with conflicting data sources. The compilation exercise
integrates different data sources in a detailed framework to show the major
macroeconomic relations in Bangladesh and provide a consistent macroeconomic data
set for policy modelling. The methodology and statistical procedures used to compile
the SAM are also discussed in detail. This exercise thus provides a useful framework
to generate and extend future social accounting matrices in Bangladesh.
Govermnent of Bangladesh introduced a consumption-type and destination principle
based value added tax in 1991. It is generally argued that a single rate VAT with zero
rate limited only to exports would be regressive. Thus another purpose of the study is
to examine the distributional consequence of the VAT system that has been adopted in
Bangladesh.
Analysis of incidence of the indirect tax system is based on two approaches: a simple
approach and a computable general approach. One surprising fmding of this exercise
is that there are no significant differences in the indirect tax incidence estimates
observed between the simple and CGE approaches. Both approaches indicate that
because of exemptions on subsistence agricultural products, and because of the
progressive structure of the tariffs, the overall indirect tax system would continue to.
remain progressive even after the introduction of a single rate VAT.
Another important observation is that the introduction of revenue-neutral uniform
VAT is likely to make the overall indirect tax system less progressive than the degree
of progessivity observed under the pre-VAT system although the impact is small.
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It is also observed that the results of our CUE model are significantly different from
the results reported by Chowdhury and thereby tend to refute his claims that a VAT
system would be detrimental to overall production and consumption in Bangladesh.
The relation between market structure variables and the profitability in manufacturing
sector of Bangladesh is also examined in this study. The purpose of this exercise is
to provide some empirical evidence on the relation between industrial structure and
profitability and to assess the importance of foreign and domestic factors on industry
profitability.
The results of this exercise support the theoretical and empirical observations that
profitability are significantly related to the concentration levels in manufacturing
sector in Bangladesh. Another important finding is that foreign competition variables
play a significant role in affecting profitability in domestic industries. The result also
supports the observations that the profitability are higher in those industries where
concentration levels are high and imports shares are low and effective tariff rates are
high.
As mentioned earlier, one of the objectives of this study is to examine resource
allocation, welfare and income distribution effects of tariff liberalisation in
Bangladesh within the paradigm of both the traditional and new trade theories.
Towards this end an alternative model of the Bangladesh economy is developed to
analyse the effçcts of tariff liberalisation on resource allocation and income
distribution under both competitive and non-competitive assumptions.
It has been observed that the results of tariff liberalisation are sensitive to the way the
model is specified. It is observed that in the competitive and constant returns to scale
model variant, resources moved from the heavily protected sectors (e.g.
manufacturing sectors) to less protected sectors as a result of tariff liberalisation. This
movement of resources is expected given the initial levels of protection provided to
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the domestic industries. Protection permits domestic industries to operate with value
added higher than that prevails under free trade thereby providing incentives for the
movement of resources to protected industries. Thus, when such protection is
removed, resources tend to move from protected to less protected sectors.
When imperfect competition is introduced heavily protected manufacturing sectors
turning out to be the main beneficiary of liberalisation. Almost all the manufacturing
sectors show moderate output growth when imperfect competition is introduced.
Expansion of manufacturing output appears to come from the pro-competitive effects
of tariff liberalisation. That is, by allowing flow of imports in the domestic markets
tariff liberalisation reduced market power of domestic firms and compels them to
behave competitively. That is, it reduces gap between prices and the marginal cost and
expands output.
It is also interesting to note that almost all the manufacturing sectors show much
larger output growth with the incorporation of increasing returns to scale. The larger
expansion of output of manufacturing sectors is due to a reduction in unrealised scale
economies. This is reflected in a decline of the scale elasticity in these sectors. The
fall in scale elasticity implies a reduction in unit cost as the scale of production
increased.
The income distribution effects of tariff liberalisation are also examined. The
distributional consequences are captured through the changes in income levels of the
six household groups. The distribution of income appears to favour low income
households. It also appears that the progressivity and regressivity in income
distribution of household groups depend on the relative change of capital and labour
income.
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The results of the present study cannot be called definitive because of the use of
parameters values that are obtained from the available literature and because of
inevitable divergence between the situational reality and the ways models are
specified. However, studies of the present kind can provide useful and important
insights for policy analysis and provide broad guidelines for actual policy-making in
developing counties like Bangladesh.
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